

**The Ramakrishna Mission
Institute of Culture Library**

Presented by

Dr. Baridbaran Mukerji

RMICL 8

2402

**The Ramakrishna Mission
Institute of Culture, Calcutta**

LIBRARY

Date Due **S**

Sāṅkhya Philosophy

BY
RAMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE, M.A., LL.B.,

PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AND PHILOSOPHY,
LATE LECTURER, HUGHLI COLLEGE ; EDITOR OF
BERKELEY'S THREE DIALOGUES ; ETC.

FASCICULUS I.
SĀṆKHYA KĀRIKĀ
WITH
GAUDAPĀDA'S SCHOLIA
AND NĀRĀYAṆA'S GLOSS.

Thare Press: Calcutta.

MDCCCXCVIII.

All rights reserved.

R.M.I.C. LIBRARY	
Acc No.	
Cl No.	
D.	
St	ard
(s
Card	
ked	

2.402 ✓✓✓ ST.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY R. DUTT,
HARE PRESS :
46, BECHU CHATTERJI'S STREET, CALCUTTA.

Inscribed

TO THE MEMORY OF

MY DARLING,


NÍHÁRA-VARANÍ,

BORN 30 AUGUST, 1895,

DIED 24 SEPTEMBER, 1897.

Whom the gods love they die young.

P R E F A C E.



THIS small volume is the first instalment of a work on the Sánkhyā Philosophy which I projected some time ago. Ever since I took to the study of Hindu Philosophy I have felt the want of text-books in English, which approach the subject in the right spirit and present such an exposition of it as is calculated to facilitate the study for those who have been brought up in the methods of the western schools of thought. If our old Philosophy is to become a living force again, we must try to assimilate it to modern thought. If we are to get any further, the past must be interpreted in the light of the present, the

mouldered branches must be lopt away, and (all human thought being an organic process) a synthesis of the East *and* the West must be achieved.

With the intention of bearing my humble share in this great work I began a study of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. After some consideration I decided that my first work had better take the form of a commentary on the leading text-book of that school. I had, of course, the late Professor Wallace's works upon Hegel in my mind. I selected the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* because oriental scholars seem to be now agreed that in it we possess the oldest work of authority on the subject. I also decided that a translation of the text should be accompanied with a translation of some of the best native commentaries. I have no desire of denying the valuable results that have been achieved by independent philological criticism, but, in my humble opinion, it cannot be gainsaid that the native scholiasts still remain the best guides we have to the elucidation of difficult Sanskrit works. It is the work of their forefathers

which they are interpreting, and they have grown up amidst a living tradition which makes their exegesis all the more authoritative. They are more likely to give us the original doctrine as it *was*, rather than as it (according to our "superior" notions) *ought to be*. I have selected the commentaries of Gaudapáda and Náráyana for translation here, because the former is the oldest (this scholiast appears to have been the teacher of the preceptor of the great Śāṅkarāchāryya, who is said to have lived in the eighth century, A. D.), and the latter, considering its merit, is not so well known as it deserves to be. I further intended to add a series of essays to serve for prolegomena. But these have to be reserved for the present. In fact, I had no desire of rushing into print so early. But the rules under which the University of Calcutta now awards the Premchand Roychand studentship are stringent, and at the end of two years from the date of his election each student must satisfy the Syndicate of the said University that he has carried out some special investigation or

work. So I had no alternative in the matter.

The text which I have generally followed is that of Pandit Bechanaráma Tripáthí printed in the handy and useful edition which he contributed to the Benares Sanskrit Series in 1882. In the translation, though I have never consciously sacrificed accuracy, I have throughout tried to produce a version which will read English. But I do not expect that the success has been much; any body who has attempted the thing knows how difficult it is in translating Sanskrit to secure at the same time elegance and fidelity. In the brief annotations which I have added my aim has been only to explain the text, to clear up such difficulties as are likely to trouble students who are not familiar with the philosophy of Ancient India. I have also inserted an introductory essay on the leading ideas of Kapila's doctrine for the same purpose. All detailed exposition and comment I reserve for the present.

Now remains the pleasant duty of expressing my obligations to the various writers


I have consulted. Especial mention must, however, be made, among translations of the *Sāṅkhyā Kārikā*, of the works of Professor H. H. Wilson (Oxford, 1837, this gives Colebrooke's version with an original comment) and Mr. John Davies (*Hindu Philosophy*, Trübner's Oriental Series, second edition, 1894). Professor Wilson's edition has been adversely criticised by some scholars, but I have found it very helpful and suggestive. His translation of Gaudapāda's scholia is generally reliable and always elegant, and I am indebted to it for several happy renderings. Among versions of the *Sāṅkhyā Pravachana* I have consulted Dr. Ballantyne (*Sāṅkhyā Aphorisms of Kapila*, Trübner's Oriental Series, third edition, 1885) and Prof. Garbe (*Aniruddha's Commentary &c.*; Bibliotheca Indica, 1891-2). I have also derived some suggestions from Dr. F. Hall's Preface to *Sāṅkhyā Sāra* (Bibliotheca Indica, 1862).. Lastly I must acknowledge with gratitude that my esteemed friend Pandit Rājendra Chandra Sāstri, M. A., Librarian to the Government of Bengal, has kindly read

proofs of this work and made many very valuable suggestions. A revision by a scholar of such eminence cannot but have added greatly to the value of the book. It is, however, only fair to add that I am alone responsible for all errors and imperfections.

And so, little book, I am sending you forth after many anxious nights and days. If you prove of assistance to even one single student of Sāṅkhya Philosophy, you will have achieved your end and I shall have obtained my reward. For in the words of the immortal Kālidāsa,

क्लेशः फलेन हि पुनर्नवतां विधत्ते ।

CONTENTS.



FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS	xv
SĀṆKHYA KĀRIKĀ:			
FOREWORDS	LI
BIRD'S-EYE VIEW	LVII
TRANSLATION	I

Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS.

The end of all philosophic speculation in Ancient India was liberation. Different are the ways in which the different systems view the universe and various are the methods they employ, but salvation, emancipation from the bondage of pain, is the common goal they strive to reach. There are certain fundamental concepts which dominate all Indian thought and give it this particular cast. The explanation of these concepts, is, of course, to be sought for in the character and dispositions of the people.

The first important concept is that of the immortality of the Soul. One of the most firmly rooted ideas in the human mind, especially the unsophisti-

End of Hindu
Philosophy : Li-
beration.

1. Immortality
of Soul.

cated mind before the school-master was abroad, is that the surcease of this existence is not the be-all and the end-all, that though there is death it is not total annihilation. Man leaves a ghost behind, which may be found inhabiting trunks of trees or bodies of animals. The point is that though the flesh perishes, something more subtle and ethereal—the spirit—survives. This is a conviction which seems so universal that it is almost entitled to rank as an intuition (to use the terminology of a school of thought now growing obsolete). Of course, the concept is rather crude in the mind of the savage, and, as he gains in moral and intellectual power, it grows clearer, more definite, and almost more scientific. Now in estimating the tendencies of Hindu thought this is a factor that should not be left out of count.

The next important concept is that of the
 2. Power of power of work. Nothing that
 work. you do is without its effect upon your character and in your life, no single action ever perishes. As you now sow so you shall reap. Every single wicked deed will have to be atoned for either in this life or the next. For the soul perishes not, and it will be born again and again till the burden has fallen off, till the whole stain has been washed out with the fragrant balm of virtuous deeds. The intensely moral character of the Hindu made him feel—and feel very keenly—that there is nothing unmerited, no

undeserved joy or sorrow, in this world ; each man ever gets his desert and nothing but his desert. The human soul never passes out of the cycle of mundane existence till the influence of all previous misdeeds has worked itself out, till vice has paid its price, and that with interest, in virtue. This causes the continual transmigration of Soul, and it passes from man into beast and from beast into man, from a higher order of creation into a lower and *vice versa*, according as the balance of work sways. The explanation of this grand theory is not to be found in any hygienic or religious prescript,¹ or in any naive half-savage belief in the continuance of human existence in animals and trees.² In the one case you put the cart before the horse, in the other you wholly miss the significance of either conception and (in vulgar parlance) confound chalk with cheese. The ultimate explanation, as has been suggested

¹ This is the notion of Voltaire. He proceeded upon the idea that a use of meat was injurious to health in the Indian climate, and in order to dissuade people from it, the old thinkers promulgated the cult of animal-worship, and this seems to have been afterwards strengthened with the teaching that the souls of our ancestors might be dwelling in the so-called lower orders of creation.

² Gough in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 24-5, broaches the theory that the Aryans borrowed the notion of continuance of life from the aborigines in India, and this notion was afterwards developed into the theory of 'the fruit of work' (कर्मफलं), 'the invisible power of merit and demerit' (अदृष्टं).

before, is to be found in the moral consciousness of the Indian people; the extreme sensitiveness of conscience which made them alive to the momentous* importance of all action.¹ It is a mistake to say that the Hindu Philosophy is devoid of sentiment and purely intellectual in character. It has its roots deep sunk in a solid basis of morality, and its whole current is dominated by ethical concepts. The superstructure of thought is built, as it always should be, upon a substantial foundation of Moral Philosophy. If the said foundation ever seems to us buried out of sight, this is not because it is not there, but because our own sensibilities have grown so dull and callous that we fail to perceive moral ideas until and unless they are forced upon our notice with beat of drum.

The third concept which deserves attention is the belief that the world
 3. A world of pain. is full of pain. If there is anything actual on the earth, if there is any experience which impresses us with an ineradicable feeling of stern reality, it is sorrow. That is the true portion of humanity

¹ Prof. Flint's suggestion that by the Hindu mind "rest is longed for as the highest good, and labour deemed the greatest evil" (*Theism*, p. 69) is groundless. In fact, as every reader of the *Bhagavad Gītā* knows, nowhere else has the gospel of work been preached with so much force. What the Hindu mind really shrank from was sin and misery, and it was very far indeed from holding out a premium to indolence.

here. And not unnaturally so. For man is not perfect, and every error that he commits, misled, as he continually is, by blind instincts and uninformed emotions, he must expiate by a life of misery. If there is ever joy it is evanescent, and even then not unmixed with pain. As has been said above, nowhere else was the doctrine that a man is the architect of his own fortunes, grasped with such grim earnestness, nowhere else was it more keenly felt that all optimism is a mockery—nay, a lie forged by sophistry and inexperience. The sage who said, “Nobody is happy anywhere,”¹ might have sympathised with the agony of soul that led Byron to cry out,

Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
 Count o'er thy days from anguish free,
 And know, whatever thou hast been,
 'Tis something better not to be.²

The fourth idea is that the bondage of
 4. Knowledge pain is due to ignorance, and
 saves. that by the acquisition of saving
 knowledge it is possible for us to free our-

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, VI. 7. This is according to Aniruddha's lection. *Vijñāna* omits न; the sense then is, “Only some one, somewhere, is happy.”

² To guard against misconception, however, I should note that the thought here is quite alien to the Hindu mind. It is in direct conflict with the sublime lessons of fortitude and self-repression that our ancestors were fond of teaching. What is like is the intensity with which the misery in life is apprehended by the English poet. To the Hindu the *summum bonum* is not non-existence but beatitude. not निर्वाण but ब्रह्मभावः.

selves from it. It is ignorance which is at the root of the whole evil. For ignorance excites desire by inducing misapprehensions and mistaken conceptions in our mind, by perverting, if not blinding, our moral vision, and by making us fancy that to be good which in reality is not so. This desire makes us sin, and the wages of sin is pain. When by hearing, thinking, and continual meditation, one learns at last to distinguish between reality and appearance, between truth and untruth, between the good and the not-good, the bonds of sense fall off and the soul is liberated. After a bath in the clarifying waters of knowledge the eyes of the soul are purged, and, self-centred in beatific content, it looks back upon its mundane experiences as so many hideous nightmares. In all Hindu philosophy it is knowledge which saves and it is the soul which is saved. The case of flesh in which the soul—not without its own fault, mind—finds itself is of the earth, earthy ; and the earthy bonds blear its vision. It is knowledge, knowledge of the highest truth, that restores to the soul the consciousness that it is of the heaven, heavenly, and all attachment to objects of sense is pernicious and delusive. When the soul has realised this it slips the carnal bonds and, recognising its own true nature, once more dwells apart in moral and spiritual grandeur. I know of nothing loftier or nobler than this conception of the liberated soul, in possession

of the highest truth and identified therewith, from which all frailties of flesh have retired, and the eternal calm of whose content no transient fancies vex. They have done grievous wrong to the ancient philosophy of India who have thought that the Hindu mind had not then risen to a consciousness of its intrinsic dignity.¹ Of all errors there is none more mischievous than the one which leads you to fancy there is nothing beyond because you are not far-sighted enough to see it.

These are the concepts which permeate all Hindu thought. They are akin, one may seem even to lead to another, but if our study is to be one of pleasure and profit, it will be useful to apprehend them distinctly and bear them clearly in mind. Now we proceed to investigate the leading notions of the doctrine of Kapila, perhaps the oldest philosophical system at present extant.

The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy starts, as may be expected, by positing the existence of pain and declaring the desirability of extirpating it. The first line of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ,

“On account of the strokes of the three-fold

¹ When one finds that even a sober scholar like Dr. J. E. Erdmann has gone astray on this point (see his *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 13), it is enough to make his heart sink with despair.

pain [arises] an enquiry into the means of the removal thereof," the first *sūtra* of the *Sāṅkhya Pravachana* lays down

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः,

"Well, the final end of soul is the complete cessation of the three-fold pain."

Pain is of different kinds. These may be divided into three classes according to their origin. First of all, there is the pain that is due to our own self. It may be organic or intra-organic, but in either case its cause is not to be sought beyond ourselves. Next, there is the pain which is due to outward influences. This is two-fold, according as the influence proceeds from beings and agencies that come across us in ordinary experience, or emanates from forces that are above us and are supernatural. Now pain of what kind soever is to be obviated, to be completely removed so that there may be no return. There are various means which we employ, means well-known and in common use by which we try to guard ourselves from the assault of pain. For instance, I fall ill, the doctor comes and administers medicine. But means of this kind can supply but temporary relief. I may get well for to-day, but there is nothing to guarantee that there will be no relapse; no amount of medication will render me immune to all possible pain in future. So obviously

the ordinary means will not avail. There is a different sort of means that may be employed. The religious books prescribe various kinds of pious observances, and these, it is said, have happiness for their result. But even they will not do. These rites generally enjoin the performance of sacrifices, and sacrifices are not harmless things; they entail the destruction of animal or at least vegetable life. But happiness cannot be based upon unhappiness. How can that be a source of joy to me which causes injury to a fellow-being? Pain can but lead to pain; an affusion of water will only aggravate a chill.¹ Moreover, granting even that the performance of religious ceremonies will bring the promised reward, that it will lift the performer to a higher and happier sphere, the question still remains to be answered, 'What is there to guarantee permanent immunity from pain?' All heavenly bliss is transitory, even the so-called divinities fall and pass away. What is wanted is a remedy that will for all time fore-close pain, that will cut it away at the very root so that nothing of it can ever grow again. Now, so long as we continue bound by worldly ties, so long as we have to live here—no matter whether in this or any other form—pain cannot cease, for there is no avoiding of experience, and

¹ *Sāṅkhya Pravachana*, I. 84.

experience means pain.¹ We must transcend experience if we are to escape pain. This can be done only by means of knowledge, knowledge of the truth. Until we see through a thing there is no getting beyond it. When we have completely understood what experience means, when we have clearly grasped in thought the two elements which bring it about, and when we have read with the X-rays of intelligence the relation that subsists between the two, we are in a position to become independent of experience. Thus with true knowledge—and that alone—will terminate experience, and with experience pain will come to an end.

This true knowledge is a knowledge of the truth, a cognition of the true nature of the principles of being. True knowledge: subject and object. Such principles are primarily two. There is the Subject which knows and the Object which is known. Neither by itself is sufficient. If we analyse any experience that we have we shall find that it is a synthesis of these two factors, and of nothing else. Various may be the forms in which the non-ego manifests itself, quite infinite the objects of our knowledge, but they have one feature that is common to all,

¹ "Whatever I have experienced," said the holy Jaigishavya, "born over and over again among gods and men, all this was nothing but pain." (I quote from Dr. Garbe's translation in his version of Aniruddha, p. viii.)

viz., that they are all *objects* of knowledge, and so other than the *subject* of knowledge, and it is this feature upon which all philosophical classification is naturally based. When we have spoken of the subject and the object or the ego and the non-ego, the self and the not-self, the soul and the non-soul, or any other terms that you prefer, but mark, of the two generally and not of any particular determinations of either, we have exhausted the whole universe of being, all that may be matter of experience for us in the world that we can know. It is quite possible that as we reflect more and more upon these two categories, as we cogitate more deeply and from a higher plane than the ordinary man, the man in the street, attains to, we may be brought to think that the two are not so independent of and different from one another as we were at first led to suppose, that there is a unity which underlies the duality. But all knowledge must begin with the duality, and if it is to keep touch with the realities of life it must return to it. The great merit of the Sāṅkhya philosophy is that it took hold of this duality in a very strong and clear-sighted fashion, and that it stuck to it.

I have no desire to pronounce hereupon
Monism and Dualism. the merits of the controversy
 between the Monists and the
 Dualists or (to use the terms which some
 authorities prefer) between the Idealists and

the Realists. But it cannot be denied that Dualism is a most important aspect of thought, one which all Idealism must presuppose, and without which no Idealism can be complete. All students of the history of philosophy will remember how the pendulum of human thought has continually oscillated between these two poles. It is a mistake therefore to suppose that Idealism arose *before* Dualism, and a statement like Dr. Garbe's that "there can be no doubt that the idealistic doctrine of the Upanishads regarding the Brahman-A'tman...is an older product of philosophical thinking than the leading ideas of the other systems"¹ proceeds upon a complete misconception of the natural evolution of human thought. The world must be perceived as involving a duality before man can rise to a unitary conception of the whole ; all effort at identification must in fact, presuppose difference or diversity. "The *foundation* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy is," therefore, *not* "to be sought in a reaction against the propagation of the consistent idealism which began to be proclaimed with enthusiasm," as the learned Professor suggests², though, of course, the two philosophies must have developed in antagonism and with reference to one another.

¹ Garbe *Aniruddha's Commentary*, Introduction, p. xix.

² *Ibid.*

We have said that the Sāṅkhya philosophy started with a duality. We have got to investigate the nature of this duality. According to Kapila the two ultimate principles of being are **पुरुषः** and **प्रकृतिः** or (as they are usually translated) Soul and Nature. All creation is the result of a relationship established between these two. It may be useful here to explain what the word *creation* in philosophic parlance means. Creation, generally speaking, is the production or bringing into existence of the world. Now this production may be viewed either subjectively or objectively. We may seek to learn how the world came into being at all, quite independent of any intelligent beings to whom it may be an object of knowledge.¹ Or we may investigate how such an intelligent being, a man, in fact, comes to know it. The latter is the problem of philosophy.² A philosophic thinker has got to enquire into the true significance of experience—not objective creation, but creation subjectively

¹ The cosmogonist deals with the question of objective creation. Among the utterances of ancient Hindus upon this subject special attention may be called to *Rig Veda*, VIII. x. 83 and 129.

² This point is well brought out in a series of able articles on *Sāṅkhya Darśana* contributed by Mr. Umesh Chandra Battavyāla, M. A., C. S., to the Bengali magazine *Sādhana*, vols. II and III.

considered,—he has got to explain how there is experience at all, what are the conditions that render such a thing possible. It will hence be understood, that Kapila does not pretend, any more, than any other accurate thinker, to explain how there came to be a world at all (in its ultimate abstraction); he confines himself to the more modest, but perhaps more important, question, how there comes to be a world *for us*? We are being continually affected by things, we are constantly acquiring knowledge. What are these things? How do they affect us? How and whence is this knowledge? Such are the questions which he sets himself to answer. He does not ask himself how there came to be such a thing as a self, a knowing subject, or an object for it to know. There is the subject and there is the object. We need not go behind these facts. But let us try to comprehend how they are brought into relation with one another. Any one who understands what the problem of philosophy is will see at once that it is from experience we start and that it is experience we have got to explain.

Kapila also, reflecting upon this fundamental problem of philosophy, saw that experience implied two factors, a knower and the known. It was only when the two were brought together and a relation established between them that knowledge resulted. What the exact nature

Kapila's
Dualism.

of this relation was, and how it led to experience were the matters that were to be investigated and elucidated.

The knower Kapila called Soul, the known Nature. What the ultimate character of either is he does not enquire, he has no desire of transgressing into the province of the cosmogonist. Consequently he is content to accept the description of soul that he finds in the holy scriptures. The *S'vetás'vatara Upanishad* describes soul as "witness, intelligent, alone, and devoid of the three qualities¹," as "without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied²." According to the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, "nothing adheres to soul³." And says the *Amrita-bindu Upanishad*, "the absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it]; nor is it bound nor is it an effector [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated⁴."

¹ VI. 11.

² VI. 19, Gough, *Phil. of Upanishads*, pp. 232-3.

³ IV. iii. 16.

⁴ V. 10. I do not certainly mean to suggest that Kapila had these identical passages before him and worked upon them. It is quite possible that these are of a date very much later than his. I quote them merely as samples of the Scriptural account of soul. It was this account which Kapila had before him and upon which he drew in formulating his conception of the transcendental ego.

We shall find that Kapila nowhere substantially deviates from the conception of the ultimate nature of soul which the foregoing lines indicate.

So much for the transcendental ego, the self that lies beyond experience. Nature? i. Non-manifest. As for the transcendental non-ego, the object as it is in its essence, before it has been modified by connection with the subject and so made an object of experience, Kapila considers it wise to describe it by a negative. It is the अव्यक्त¹, the non-manifest, the indiscrete. As it is never matter for experience it is not possible to give any description of it which will be more specific and positive. It is, however, none the less real because negatively characterised. "To say that we cannot know the Absolute is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there is hidden the assumption *that* it is, and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something."² Moreover, without it there can be no experience. In fact, what is experience but a transformation into mani-

¹ This seems to correspond to असत् of the Vedic hymns. Cf. "In the earliest age of the gods entity sprang from non-entity; in the first age of the gods entity sprang from non-entity." (*Rig Veda*, VIII. x. 72.)

² H. Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 88.

fest forms of the non-manifest? This transformation takes place only when the subject, the principle of intelligence, comes in contact with the Object, the non-manifest principle. All matter of experience, all objective things, are thus transformations or products of this ultimate principle, and since these things are real,¹ the source thereof must be acknowledged as indisputably established.

Experience will thus be seen to have two
 ii. Primal causes, 1^o essential, *viz.*, the
 Agent. non-manifest Object, 2^o concomitant, *viz.*, the manifesting Subject. When we view the non-manifest in this light we are able to predicate one, and the most important, characteristic of it. It is प्रकृतिः, प्रधानं, the Primal Agent, the fundamental source from which the world springs. True, it is by means of the soul that we have experience, but it is of the forms, modes, or evolutes of this Cause of causes that we have experience. The whole world is a product of evolution, all that we cognise therein has come by development from pre-existing forms. The origin of beings is not to be sought in any sudden creation out of nothing, it is a con-

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 79: "[The world] is not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes." Cf. also VI. 52. The relation between Kapila's Non-manifest and Manifest has a close correspondence with that between Spinoza's *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*. The Sāṅkhya Nature is not, however, identified with God.

tinued process in which the simple has constantly led to the complex, the subtle to the more gross. We may then conceive the non-manifest as plastic stuff which exists originally in the form of a homogeneous continuum. Now this continuum is described by the evolutionist of Ancient India as the equipoised condition of certain forces. These forces are three, सत्त्व', रजः, and तमः. The first perhaps may be rendered as the force of stable existence,¹ the second is the force of attraction, the third of repulsion.² When Intelligence supervenes there is a disturbance, and the activity of the last two forces leads to evolution by aggregation and segregation.³

¹ Herbert Spencer speaks of two modes of force, "the one not a worker of change and the other a worker of change,—actual or potential." The second he calls energy, the first, "the space-occupying kind of force," he says, "has no specific name." (*Op. cit.*, p. 191) It is this latter which corresponds to सत्त्व'.

² Yāska in his commentary on *Rig Veda*, II. iii. 23, explains रजः as काम and तमः as द्वेष.

³ I use these terms advisedly. The anticipation by the ancient Hindus of doctrines that are supposed to be distinctively modern is very remarkable. There is one point, however, in which the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution has a clear advantage over the Spencerian. According to Kapila the world-process cannot be taken to be independent of Intelligence. Mr. Herbert Spencer makes a forced abstraction, and says, "the homogeneous is unstable and must differentiate itself." (*First Principles*, ch. xix.)

साम्यवैषम्याभ्यां कार्यद्वयम् ।

When the several forces aggregate in excess or defect there is creation; when the aggregation is broken up, they revert to their original state of equipoise, and there is dissolution. Thus synthesis builds the world and analysis destroys it. It will hence be seen that the process of evolution was conceived in those olden days in a way not very unlike that current in ours. For says Herbert Spencer, "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."²

In a similar way the world-stuff under the influence of intelligence assumes forms more and more concrete. The first evolute is बुद्धि, consciousness pure and simple. This may be likened to the dawn of intelligence in an infant, when it first begins to perceive, but the perception is yet exceedingly dim and

Sāṅkhya doctrine of evolution.

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, VI. 42. Aniruddha's comment is, साम्यात् प्रकृतेः सद्व्यवस्थामात् प्रलयः । वैषम्यात् प्रकृतेर्महदादिभावो न विसद्व्यवस्थामात् सृष्टिः ।

² *First Principles*, p. 396. Dissolution he defines as "the absorption of motion and consequent disintegration of matter" (p. 285).

faint and wholly without definitude and particularity. This stage is one of colourless feeling and may be symbolised simply as *feel* or *perceive*. The consciousness, however, gradually grows fuller, and the second evolute is अहंकार, self-consciousness. The perception is yet very faint, but it has gained one attribute, a very dim consciousness of the ego. This stage we may symbolise as *I perceive*. The next evolutes are the तन्मात्राः, the rudiments of the elements, the subtle essences of all formal existence. These cannot be particularised any further than as *mere somethings*. Upon these follow the senses, the chief of which is common or central (मनस्),¹ and the rest have their appointed objects. The *somethings* now become *things*. And finally come the five gross forms of being, the elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These in different combinations make up all formal existence, the whole of the infinitely diversified world that we can ever know. The *things* have now gained wonderfully in content and have become *specific objects*.

Such, in brief, is the process of evolution as conceived by Kapila. Thus the non-manifest develops into the manifest, Nature is modified into the world. This

¹ Readers will remember Aristotle. Cf. E. Wallace's Introduction to the *Psychology*, p. lxxv.

conception of the manifest things being modes or product of a non-manifest cause is capable of throwing great light upon the character of that cause. This is because the relation of causality is, according to Kapila, a relation of identity. When we speak of one thing causing another, we do not simply mean that the one phenomenon precedes and the other follows, there being nothing but a bond of temporal succession between—nor do we mean that the one thing gives rise to the other, which other is unlike its own self and wholly new. No, what we really mean is that the potential becomes actual, what was *in* the object comes out *on* the object. The cause is not one thing and the effect another, but the effect is the same as the cause, it is only a modification of it whereby the implicit has become explicit, the indiscrete has manifested itself as discrete. This being the truth, it is easy to see that the manifest effect must agree generally with the non-manifest cause, except in so far as it has undergone alterations in consequence of its modified state. Therefore we find I's'vara•Krishna telling us.

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥¹

The évolutes possess attributes some of

¹ *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 8.

which are like and others unlike those of the evolvent. The attributes that are like are the essential attributes, they express the constitution and the fundamental nature. For instance, the evolvent, as well as the evolutes and as much as these, consists of the three forces, stable, urgent, and inert ; it is, like them, devoid of discrimination and rationality but furnished with a power of development, and it is objective and generic in character.¹ The predicates that belong specially to the evolutes, on the other hand, are the characters of being caused, non-eternal, limited, changeful, multiform, dependent, attributive, conjunct, and subordinate. But these evolutes are not all simply effects. Some of them possess a causal power also. And, in fact, if there is evolution, it cannot be otherwise. To quote Mr. Spencer again, "Every differentiated part is not simply a seat of further differentiations, but also a parent of further differentiations ; since in growing unlike other parts, and by so adding to the diversity of the forces at work, it adds to the diversity of effects produced."² In a similar spirit the Sāṅkhya teachers speak of

¹ A comparison of Kapila's Root-evolvent with Schopenhauer's Will and Hartmann's Unconscious would be at once interesting and instructive. Mr. Davies has a note upon the subject (*Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 143-151).

² *First Principles*, p. 548.

the first seven modes of Nature as प्रकृतिविकृतयः, evolvent-evolutes.

So far of the objects of experience. But how are they experienced? Intelligence is not attributed to the world-stuff, and without intelligence there is no experience. You cannot, for instance, say that the eye perceives; in a dead man the image upon the retina will be exactly the same as it is in your or my case, and yet there will be, there can be, no perception. Perception then belongs not to the eye but to something beyond the eye. It belongs to the subject, the principle of intelligence, which for shortness' sake we may designate as soul. Now

No experience
without intelli-
gence.

we have seen that according to the scriptural account no action belongs to the soul.¹ What do we then mean when we profess to trace in experience the agency of soul? What we mean is simply this: there would be nothing to see unless there was the soul to see. The cosmic forms would continue in their potential condition if intelligence did not supervene. It is only when the non-ego approaches the ego that the influence of the latter sets up a commotion within it, the equilibrium of the forces is disturbed, and the object-world becomes manifest in discrete forms. The meshes of this world then

¹ Readers will remember *Bhagavad Gītā*, III. 27.

encompass the soul, and in the multitude of perceptions it gets confounded and comes to fancy that it is identical with what it perceives. The confusion is between the soul and what, for distinction's sake, may be called the self; the soul as it finds itself in experience as experiencing is the self. It is then invested with a frame, and the man (जीवात्मा) thinks that the body is the soul, and he ascribes all the operations of the senses and the organs to himself. He speaks, for instance, of himself as seeing or hearing, as stout or thin, as well or ill. He describes his worldly possessions, house, or wife, or child, as *his*, and says, 'I am enjoying happiness, I am enduring pain.' The ordinary man thus loses sight of the soul in its ultimate essence, the transcendental ego, and is even misled to think that it is the same as the empirical ego. It is this error which lies at the root of all our misery, by being at once the result and the cause of experience, and the end of philosophy is to dispel it and, by establishing truth, to put an end to the bondage of soul.

It may be useful here to sketch Kapila's theory of knowledge. Taking the case of an embodied soul in the form of a human being, we find that the instruments of cognition are, in an ascending order, the senses (including the mind), self-consciousness and intellect. It is the sensibility which comes in first and close

Sāṅkhya theory
of knowledge.

contact with objects, and thereby supplies us with the rudiments of experience. The function of the particular senses, however, is simple apprehension.¹ What they apprehend is a manifold, a congeries of single impressions, though each apprehends only a manifold of a particular kind. Upon this manifold, this congeries, the mind as the common sense operates, and its function is to synthesise. For instance, while sitting in this room, I receive impressions of various kinds, patches of colour, sensations of texture, of sunlight, of cold, sounds, odours, and many others, sensible units all separate from one another. The sensibility furnishes me with them either simultaneously or successively, and with nothing more. But these sensations are not yet objects, they will have to be grouped together and distinct aggregates formed of them before there can be any perception of them as *things*. It is the function of the mind to form these groups, and thereby to transform a certain number of stimuli into one distinct percept. Thus the confusing legion of impressions gives place to perceptions of table, chair, clock, etc. When this process of synthesis has been carried out, and the manifold of sense

¹ By this word I mean the primitive act of knowledge. • "I use the term Apprehension," says Mr. Hobhouse, "for the state of mind sometimes known as sensation, sometimes as perception, sometimes as immediate consciousness." (*Theory of Knowledge*, p. 18, note.)

marshalled into order, there is a further process of aggregation, and this takes place at the instance of what may be called self-apperception. The fluctuating units of sensation are referred to the statical unity of the ego, and the consciousness supervenes that the sensations are mine, that I perceive. The perception, however, is not complete till the object has been determined by a further process of thought, till it has been identified by reference to the category to which it belongs. It is the function of Kapila's Intellect to do this, to define and ascertain objects by recognising that they realise a certain type. When the percept has been fully determined in this way, when we know what it is and know it as forming a part of the furniture of the mind, it is presented by Intellect to the soul in order that the principle of intelligence may have a view of it. And until the (empirical) ego perceives the object there is no perception in the true sense of the word.¹

¹ The gradation of functions is thus illustrated by Vāchaspati: "As the headmen of a village collect the taxes from the villagers, and pay them to the governor of the district; as the local governor pays the amount to the minister; and the minister receives it for the use of the king; so mind, having received ideas from the external organs, transfers them to egotism; and egotism delivers them to intellect, which is the general superintendent, and takes charge of them for the use of the sovereign, soul." (I quote from Wilson's translation in the Oxford *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 117.)

It will be interesting to compare this theory with that propounded by the greatest of modern philosophers, Immanuel Kant. It

Kant's Epistemology. is a central point with this Copernicus of mind that there is no knowledge without unification, no perception without synthesis. Sense supplies us only with isolated points, mere instants of feeling. However large may be the number of these points, sensation by itself will never enable us to get beyond them, they will for aye remain a series of blind points, each standing alone and unaware of the rest. The data of sense, according to Kant, must be *given*, but there can be no perception until they are *thought*. The single beads must be gathered into a necklace, the separate beams of sentient life must be collected into one focus, before knowledge can be built up.¹ For as notions without perceptions are void, so perceptions without notions are blind. Intellect or understanding must co-operate with sensibility, the torch of the former must set the blind sense-stimuli on light. Intellect again has functions lower and higher, and these are described by different names. The faculty of imagination, for instance, "blind but indispensable," is at work from the very beginning, and forms totals out of

¹ I have borrowed the similes from the late Prof. Wallace, *Kant* (Blackwood), p. 165.

the manifold of sense. It works unconsciously indeed, but not at random, because the spontaneous action of the closely allied understanding supplies it with rules of combination. The totals thus formed are next fused into the existing furniture of the mind by being referred to the "standing and abiding ego." Consciousness is a unity; were this not so, our experience would be wanting in solidarity, all objective cognition would lack connectedness. Perception with Kant is thus, as Professor Adamson sums up, "a complex fact, involving data of sense and pure perceptive forms, determined by the category, and realised through productive imagination in the schema."

There is much here of which Kapila's Kapila and Kant. epistemology may be considered an adumbration. According to Kant, the mere manifold of impressions (which really is only an abstract element in known objects) is all that we get from the sensibility; the unity of the manifold is contributed entirely by the understanding. According to Kapila also, synthesis (without which there can be no object for experience) proceeds from the three internal instruments, Intellect, self-apperception, and mind. And if in trying to mark out the several constituents of our actual knowledge in its completeness,—constituents, be it remembered, which are only logically distinguishable,—Kapila ap-

pears to draw the line of division rather too rigidly, and almost to make them successive temporal stages by which man advances to knowledge, it should be remembered that even the great Germān has not escaped that charge. Nor should it be argued that Kapila's soul has nothing to do and is wholly superfluous. It is the principle of intelligence, and we cannot really be said to *perceive* until by the help of a notion we also *understand*. The action of the several instruments with which the phenomenal self is furnished is mechanical and blind.

To return to the proper object of the
 Liberation. Sāṅkhya philosophy. This, as we have said, is to discover means for the liberation of Soul. Bondage, we have seen, overtakes the Soul when it comes in contact with the non-soul. It then becomes subject to experience. The bondage, however, is only reflectional. As a China rose when placed near a crystal vase lends to it its own hue, and the crystal looks red not because it has changed in colour but because the reflection of the flower has fallen upon it, so, owing to the proximity of Nature, Soul seems to be bound, but in reality it is not so, either essentially or adventitiously. It is after continued experience, however, after the phenomenal self has acquired merit by virtuous life, that the soul wakes up ;¹ it then

¹ The Rev. John Davies says, "Knowledge is the

perceives that it was under a delusion, that it is other than what, under empirical conditions, it had so long been led to fancy as identical with itself. When it has risen to this discriminative knowledge and recognised that it is different from Nature, 'It is not I' and 'I am not so,'¹ the trammels of migration (संसार) burst, and the soul stands free. "It does not return again, it does not return again."² Mundane experience ceases for it, and hence the Scripture says, "He who knows the soul overcomes grief."³ Thenceforth it dwells in beatitude, in blissful contemplation of its own nature, which is the highest.⁴ Knowledge in our limited sense

only ark by which it (the soul) can attain to its final position of pure abstraction; but by this ark even the worst might pass over the ocean of this restless world to the haven of perfect and eternal rest" (*Hindu Philosophy*, p. 115). In his zeal for "moral elevation" the learned critic here loses sight of the fundamental doctrine of *karma*. According to the Hindu, it is not possible for the *worst* (for many very much better than the worst, for the matter of that) to attain to the knowledge which saves.

¹ Cf. *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, II. iii. 6, III. ix. 26.

² *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, VIII. xv. 1.

³ *Ibid*, VII. i. 3.

⁴ When Dr. Garbe explains "the highest salvation" according to Kapila as "the eternal rest of consciousness (*sic*) existence" (*Monist*, IV. 585), he is not quite correct. It is a fundamental tenet of the Sāṅkhya school that liberation springs from discriminative knowledge. Moreover it is difficult to see how there can be any existence

exists not for the emancipated soul. It has returned from the variegated world of experience to the deep recess of its own self, and its being thereafter is in immediate self-intuition (अनुभव).¹

There is one important point in Kapila's
 Multeity of Soul. conception of the soul which needs mention here, inasmuch as it is a distinguishing tenet of his school. He holds, not very unlike the Vedāntist, that when the soul has attained to discriminative knowledge and seen that experience does not really belong to it, the bondage of sense ceases for it, and it obtains liberation. We might say, it withdraws into itself, and thereafter has nought to do with the non-ego. But our philosopher does not say that the soul thus emancipated is absorbed in the Deity. The Sāṅkhist has not investigated into the early history of the soul, how it came to be, whether it is a part of some yet higher principle of intelligence or not. But there is

for soul from which consciousness is wholly absent. Soul is described to have the nature or form of thought (*Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, IV. 50, and its very existence is consciousness. Cf. Aniruddha on VI, 59 (the Doctor's own translation, p. 300), where the emancipated soul is described as being "in its essence, knowledge of the [whole] universe."

¹ Truly did Hegel say, "Every thing in heaven and earth aims only at this—that the soul may know itself, may make itself its object, and close together with itself." (The idea here is wholly and purely Vedāntic.)

one point which the Sāṅkhist is anxious to enforce, and that is that souls are individual and many. It is very probable that they are of a like nature,—they are all principles of intelligence,—but that fact by itself does not make them identical. If there were in reality only one Supreme Soul and all the multitudinous human souls were but partial manifestations of it, the phenomenon of personality would remain unexplained. We should expect all men to be affected by the same condition at the same time, all souls should be bound or liberated together; but it is not so. When a theory is contradicted by indisputable experience, the theory requires amendment. Kapila therefore rejects the pantheistic conclusion.

It may be here asked, what is the Sāṅkhya conception of God? Some critics have declared that Kapila's doctrine is atheistical. That it is, at any rate, non-theistical has been long acknowledged. Kapila's philosophy is called निरीश्वरः सांख्यः, Patanjali's ऐश्वर्यः. What has not, however, been as widely recognised is that in the doctrine we are now considering the problem of theism does not properly arise. What Kapila was dealing with is not objective creation, but subjective. Philosophy with him, as we have indicated before, is strictly a re-thinking of experience. Consequently the question was not before him,

and like many another great man, he has not answered it. Much capital, it is true, has been made of certain aphorisms in the *Sánkhya Pravachanā*. But, apart from the question how far faithfully these aphorisms represent the original views of the school, what is to be noted about them is their guarded expression. The old Hindu felt that if man attempts to conceive God, he is naturally led to do so anthropomorphically, but such a conception, by its very imperfection and incompleteness, must land him in contradictions. He also felt that, when a phenomenon could be otherwise explained, an appeal to *Deus ex machina* was a clumsy expedient and more likely to weaken your case than advance it. For instance, we can satisfactorily explain what befalls a man by reference to his previous actions; the hypothesis, therefore, that God is the giver of the fruits of works is a useless one. Nobody will contend that He gives them regardless of merit and demerit; the fruits must be determined by the works, and the supposition that God directs them is consequently a gratuitous assumption. The astute philosopher, however, is not prepared to commit himself to any positive declaration. He notices that God is not an object of sense-perception, nor does inference properly touch Him,—for all inference is by means of the establishment of an invariable connection between the middle and the major terms,

this is to be gathered from experience, and experience avails not in the case of Him who is imperceptible and unique;—the third kind of proof, reliable testimony, is also not of much assistance, for we find the world described in Scripture as the product of Nature.¹ The Sāṅkhist therefore says,

ईश्वरासिद्धेः,²

He is not demonstrable by the ordinary methods of proof. The aphorist would not assert 'God is not,' he prefers to hold his judgment in suspense. If he pronounces any verdict it is one of 'not proven.' For aught we know Kapila felt with Kant that while it is unquestionably necessary to be convinced of God's existence, it is not quite so necessary to demonstrate it.

Such, in brief, are the leading notions of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The problem was to explain experience, and the solution has been worked out by showing that phenomena can be understood only with reference to the noumena. As Mr. H. Spencer says, "An entire history of any thing must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible. Be

Historical
beginnings of
Sāṅkhya doc-
trine.

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, V. 10-12.

² *Ibid.* I. 92.

it a single object or the whole universe, any account which begins with it in a concrete form, or leaves off with it in a completed form, is incomplete; since there remains an era of its knowable existence undescribed and unexplained.”¹ The origin of experience, Kapila shows, is to be traced in the non-manifest Primal Agent, the consummation of knowledge is to be found in the unphenomenal Soul. Thus we may say of phenomenal existence that from the great deep to the great deep it goes. In the ever-memorable cosmogonic hymn of the *Rig-Veda* it is said, “Then neither naught (असत्) nor aught (सत्) existed...the Only One breathed without wind, supported by Himself. Nothing was except He. At first was darkness enveloped by darkness, all was undistinguished, and water was on all sides. The void was covered by non-entity, that alone came to life by might of fervour. In the beginning came desire upon Him, which was the earliest seed of mind; wise men, pondering, have discerned in their heart that this is the bond between what is (सत्) and what is not (असत्).”² True, this is a description of the origin of the world in the objective sense, but it has furnished the starting-point to all philosophical speculation in India, and in it the beginnings

¹ *First Principles*, p. 278.

² *Rig-Veda*, VIII. x. 129.

of the Sāṅkhya theory of creation are also to be sought.¹ असत् is Kapila's अव्यक्त, सत् is व्यक्त, and the only one, the mind which "was, as it were, neither entity nor non-entity,²" is पुरुषः.

It remains to explain what the name सांख्य means. It is difficult to fix at this distance of time what precise significance it originally bore. The word संख्या means number, and the derivative सांख्य must have at first signified 'numeral' or 'enumerative.' Since number plays an important part in a knowledge of things—all objects in space must, in fact, be considered in this aspect, must be quantitatively determined in order to a proper cognition—it is not difficult to see how there was a gradual transition in significance, and the word came to mean 'consideration', 'decision', and even 'adequate cognition', 'complete and thorough differentiation.' It is quite possible, if not probable, that Kapila's system was named the सांख्य because it went in for a careful enumeration of the principles.³

¹ This hymn is generally taken as foreshadowing Vedāntic idealism. But it is possible, I believe, to place adualistic construction upon it also. Attention should here be also called to *Rig-Veda*, II. i. 164, especially to *riks* 4, 20, 30 and 36, the last of which Sāyana explains in a distinctly Sāṅkhya fashion.

² *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, x. 5. 3. 1.

³ This is the explanation suggested in the *Mahābhārata*.

A determination of the notions numerically is a prominent feature of the system. Even a cursory glance through the *Tattva-Samāsa* will show this. The Sāṅkhya is the enumerative philosophy *par excellence*. But this is not all. We have seen how strongly it enforces the need of discriminative knowledge. It is the true nature of the soul that is to be apprehended, and the non-soul is to be distinguished from it ; otherwise there is no salvation, no rending of the fetters of phenomenal existence. Such being the cardinal doctrine of Kapila, it is not impossible that the secondary significance of the name **सांख्य** is not absent from its connotation when it is applied to signalise this school of thought. It is the science which has adequate knowledge for its end, it discusses the twenty-five principles and sets forth spirit as distinct from matter.

सांख्यदर्शनमेतावत् परिसंख्यानदर्शनं ।

संख्यः प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रवक्षते ॥

तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत् परिसंख्याय तत्त्वतः ।

सांख्याः सह प्रकृत्या तु निस्तत्त्वः पञ्चविंशकः ॥

XII. 11409-10.

A number of glosses upon the word **सांख्य** will be found collected in the footnotes to Dr. Hall's preface to his edition of *Sāṅkhya Sāra*, pp. 3-6.

FOREWORD^S TO THE SÁṆKHYA KÁRIKÁ.



The word कारिका means a memorial verse. I's'vara Krishna then by naming his work सांख्यकारिका intends to suggest that it is but a compendium of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, an epitome which formulates the essentials of the doctrine in a form convenient for being committed to memory. Here we have the gist of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, the cardinal tenets, and nothing more. If we want a detailed exposition of the doctrine we must consult some other work. In Distich 72 the scope of the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* is indicated. All the fundamentals of the complete science are dealt with it by it,—the sixty topics, as they are called,—illustrative tales and controversial questions have alone been excluded. There is probably a reference here to some previous work. But this does not seem to be now extant. In fact, among all the works on the subject that we at present possess, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* seems to be the oldest. The तत्त्वसमास, even if earlier, does not answer the description suggested by *kārikā* 72. It presents only skeleton out-

lines, and is a mere collection of catch-words. It is more like the index of a work—and that even a very bare one—than a work itself. The **सांख्यप्रवचन**, on the other hand, is obviously a later compilation. But this question must be reserved now for discussion elsewhere.

We propose only to analyse here the scheme of the work we are now dealing with. It opens with an announcement of the end of all speculation. This is salvation, deliverance from pain (verse 1). How is this to be obtained? The different means are discussed and, by a process of elimination, it is shown that naught but a discriminative knowledge of the cardinal principles or categories will avail (verse 2). These are the non-manifest, the manifest, and the intelligent, and in verse 3 their nature is indicated from the development point of view. Here the work pauses for a moment to define the dialectics of the school. The various proofs are enumerated and their scope is indicated (verses 4-7). In examining their application to the **Sāṅkhya** categories it is suggested that non-manifest Nature is too subtle to be an object of perception and has to be inferred from its products or effects (verse 8). This leads to an examination of the causal relation, which is pronounced to consist in identity (verse 9). In the next two verses the characters of the three fundamental categories, the non-manifest, the manifest,


and the intelligent are described. Then the three constituents of the non-ego are taken up, the factors of goodness, passion and darkness ; their nature is investigated (verses 12-13), and it is shown how the various qualities of the non-manifest and its modes follow from their very constitution (verse 14). Verses 15 and 16 establish the existence of Nature, verse 17 establishes that of Soul. The next verse shows that the latter is plural, and verse 19 indicates its nature. The following two verses explain why there is a union of Nature and Soul and what is the effect thereof. The respective natures of the three cardinal principles having been determined, Isvara Krishna proceeds to describe how the manifest is evolved from the non-manifest. Verse 22 lays down the order of development, and this is explicated in the four following verses. Then the respective functions of the several instruments are described, and it is explained how they subserve the purpose of Soul and by co-operation effect knowledge (verses 27-37). These eleven verses, in fact, sum up the epistemology of Kapila. Then the specific and non-specific elements are discussed (verse 38). Bodies are either subtle or gross. The gross body perishes at death, the subtle clings to the Soul till it is liberated, and contributes to the growth of a sense of personality (verses 39-42). Then the dispositions (भावः, states of being) are discussed.

They are all products of the first evolute of Nature, and exercise a momentous influence upon the conditions of our life (verses 43-45). The intellectual production is then considered under the four aspects of obstruction, incapacity, acquiescence, and perfection. The first three act as checks to the last. The aggregate of the varieties is fifty (verses 46-51). It is next explained why there is a two-fold creation, *viz.*, intellectual and dispositional. It is because the subtle person and the dispositions presuppose one another (verse 52). The world of living things is then described (verses 53-54). In man the soul suffers pain because of its peculiar subtle investure (verse 55). The development of being that has been described is for the deliverance of each individual soul. The action of Nature is thus for the sake of another (verse 56). It is illustrated in the two following verses that there is nothing *prima facie* improbable in activity being unselfish and altruistic. The phenomenal world ceases as soon as it has been fully experienced and seen through (verses 59-61). Soul in its (transcendental) essence is neither bound nor liberated nor migratory. These conditions are incident to phenomenal existence (verses 62-63). The character of the knowledge which saves is next indicated (verses 64-66). If there is not always a dissolution of the gross frame as soon as this knowledge has been attained, the reason is

that the force of previously received impulse (संस्कार) has not yet wholly exhausted itself (verse 67). When, however, the body perishes thereafter, the soul attains to an isolation which is both complete and eternal (verse 68). The remaining four verses wind up the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* by indicating its scope and history. May Prosperity attend !

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF SĀNKHĪYA KĀRIKĀ.

Knowledge destroys pain [vv. 1-2]
[vv. 64-6]



सांख्य कारिका ।

दुःखत्रयाभिधाताजिज्ञासा तदभिघातके^१ हेतौ ।

दृष्टे सापार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

1. On account of the attacks (strokes) of the three kinds of pain arises an enquiry into

^१ अभिघातके. Gaudapáda Váchaspati and Náráyana read अपघातके. The meaning in either case is much the same, *viz.*, competent for destruction or removal. The first अभिघातः has however, caused more difficulty to European critics. Colebrooke (supported by Wilson) has rendered it as 'embarrassment,' Lassen as 'impetus,' Fitz-Edward Hall as 'discomposure,' Davies as 'injurious effects,' and Garbe as 'trouble.' The original sense is that of striking or smiting, अभि + हन्—घञ्. Váchaspati explains, दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना प्रतिकूलतया चेतनाशक्तेरभिसम्बन्धः, *i. e.*, the disadvantageous connection (through contrariety) of the sentient faculty with three-fold pain resident in the internal organ. Náráyana has असह्यसंबन्धः *i. e.*, relation of intolerability.

the means of their removal.¹ If [the enquiry be pronounced] superfluous because of [the existence of] obvious [means], [the reply is] no, owing to the absence of finality and absoluteness [in them].

[GAUDAPĀDA.] *Salutation to that Kapila by whom, through compassion, was the Sāṅkhya philosophy imparted like a boat for crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was sunk.*

¹ Colebrooke translates, "the inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment." This was, not unjustly, criticised by Lassen, who, however, made a still greater mess of the second line, by construing चेत् with the first part of the clause, thus—दृष्टे सा (जिज्ञासा) अपार्या (भवति) चेत् (तथाऽपि) न (अपार्या भवति) एकान्तं भावात् ? St. Hilaire cut the Gordian knot by saying, "la philosophie consiste à guérir les trois espèces de douleurs." But even this is not quite correct, for जिज्ञासा and philosophy are hardly synonymous. जिज्ञासा means only a desire of knowing, whereas philosophy with the Hindus is always, as Dr. Hall points out, "a concretion." He prefers to translate the Sanskrit word as "desire." His rendering of the whole distich may be here cited, as about the most satisfactory yet accomplished: "Because of the discomposure that comes from three-fold pain, there arises a desire to learn the means of doing away therewith effectually. If it be objected, that, visible means to this end being available, such desire is needless, I demur; for that these means do not, entirely and for ever, work immunity from discomposure" (*Sāṅkhya Sāya* Pref., pp. 26-7).

*For the benefit of students shall I briefly expound the Śāstra, which is short in extent, lucid and is furnished with proofs, conclusions, and reasons.*¹

On account of, &c. Serves as a preface to this *A'ryya* verse. The holy Kapila [was] indeed the son of Brahmá, for "Sanaka, Sananda, and third Sanátana, Asuri, Kapila, Boḍu, Panchasikhá, these seven great sages are said to have been the sons of Brahmá."² Piety,

¹ प्रमाणसिद्धान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तं, Wilson renders, "resting on authority, and establishing certain results."

² Various are the stories current about the origin and parentage of Kapila, and I do not propose to discuss them here. It may, however, be said that but little reliance can be placed upon them, and they are obviously myths. It can hardly be denied that the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy was an actual personage, a living being of flesh and blood. And immemorial tradition affirms his name to have been Kapila. But all tradition that would, directly or indirectly, deify him can be easily understood, and we need not lose our temper and brand the feeling that prompted such invention with an ugly name. There are apparently three Kapilas known to ancient mythology:—(1) one of Brahmá's *mind-born* sons; this is supported by the *S'loka* cited by Gauḍapáda; but the seven names that are mentioned therein are not of the seven great *Rishis*; they represent a secondary set of *mánasa* sons; it is curious to note, however, that these are the sages (reputedly Sāṅkhya teachers) who are invoked in the ordinary *tarpaṇa* or satisfaction-services; (2) an incarnation of fire, mentioned in the *Mahábhārata*, III. 14197.

अग्निः स कपिली नाम साङ्ख्ययोगप्रवर्त्तकः; this seems to have been the sage who destroyed the sons of Ságara, *Rámáyana*, I. 41: (3) a son of the sage Kardama and Devahuti, an incarnation of Vishṇu; so described in the *Bhágavata Purána*, II. 7, 3, &c.; this parentage is accepted by Vijnána Bhikshu. See on the subject Hall, *Sāṅkhya Sára*, Pref. pp. 13-20.

Knowledge, Dispassion and Power came into existence together with Kapila.¹ Thus born, he, seeing the universe plunged in thick darkness through a succession of births and deaths, was filled with compassion, and to the enquiring Āsuri, a Brāhmaṇ of his own stock, communicated a knowledge of the twenty-five principles, from a cognition of which the destruction of pain results: [for it is said], "One who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear matted hair, or have a shaven crown, or keep a top-knot only, he is liberated; of this there is no doubt."²

Therefore has it been said, **On account of the strokes of the three kinds of pain is the enquiry, &c.** There are three kinds of pain, intrinsic, extrinsic, and supernatural. Of these, intrinsic is of two kinds, mental and corporeal; corporeal are fever, diarrhœa, etc., caused by disorder of wind, bile or phlegm; mental are absence of an object of desire, presence of an object of dislike, and the like. Extrinsic [pain] is of four kinds, due to the four kinds of created beings; [it] is produced by the

¹ This has been explained to mean that piety &c. were produced in Kapila as soon as he was born. But cf. Gauḍapāda's commentary on *Kārikā* 43.

² This couplet (substantially) is cited as borrowed through Panchaśikhā by Bhāvaganeśa in his *Tattva-yāthārthya-dīpana*. But the reference, Dr. Hall points out, is not quite correct (see *Sāṅkhya Sāra*, Pref., p. 23). 'Matted hair' marks a forest-dweller (3rd stage), 'shaven crown' an ascetic (4th stage) and 'top-knot' a house-holder (2nd stage), Davies assigns 'matted hair' to Śiva^a and ascetics, and 'shaven crown' to Buddhists (*Hindu Philosophy*, p. 35).

viviparous, the oviparous, the moisture-generated, and the earth-sprung, [that is,] by men, beasts, animals, birds, reptiles, gnats, mosquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, crocodiles, sharks, and objects which remain stationary. Supernatural [pain] is either divine or atmospheric, and implies such [trouble] as arises in connection therewith, [e.g.,] cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolt, &c.

Into what then is the enquiry that is prompted by the strokes of three-fold pain to be made? **Into the means of removing them**, the said three kinds of pain. **If the enquiry be** [considered] **superfluous because obvious**, *i.e.*, because obvious means of removing the three-fold pain exist : [thus] of the two-fold intrinsic pain, medicinal applications, such as pungent and bitter decoctions, and association with what is liked and avoidance of what is disliked [supply] the visible means [of remedy]; [so] the extrinsic may be prevented by protection and the like [means]. If you consider the enquiry superfluous on account of their being obvious means, **it is not so, owing to the absence of finality and absoluteness**, because through the instrumentality of the obvious means certain and permanent removal is not obtained. Therefore elsewhere is the enquiry [or] investigation¹ into the final and never-failing means of destroying [pain] to be made.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] *Having acquired knowledge through the special favour of the feet of the teacher Sri Rāma Govinda, and from Sri Bāsudeva having learnt all the śāstras, I desire to say something.*

* ¹ विविदिषा, the desiderative of the root विद्, to know, is erroneously rendered as 'by the wise' by Wilson.

Having bowed to Soul, Nature teachers and preceptors, Nārāyaṇa expounds the Text of Sāṅkhya in the Sāṅkhyachandrika.

This science has four Objects, [viz.,] ¹ what is fit to be abandoned, the cause thereof, ² the act of abandoning and the means thereto, ³ [here specified] because enquired after by people desiring salvation. Of these, 'what is fit to be abandoned' is suffering, because disliked by all; 'the cause thereof' is failure to discriminate between Soul and Non-Soul; 'the act of abandoning' consists in the complete cessation of pain, the supreme end of the Soul; and 'the means thereto' is the science that leads to a discrimination between the Object and the Subject. Well, now, the supreme end of the Soul being desired on its own account, there is on the part of the wise an enquiry into the science which will point out the means thereof, because they know that the said end is to be thereby accomplished. Therefore it is said, **On account of, &c.**

The three sorts of pain are intrinsic, extrinsic and supernatural. Of these, that which arises in connection with self, [that is,] body and mind, is intrinsic pain, due to discomposure of wind, bile, &c.,¹ as well as to passion and the rest.² That which arises in connection with the created beings or living animals is extrinsic pain, [it] has for its cause a tiger, a thief, or the like. Similarly that

¹ And phlegm, that is, the three humours.

² i. e., wrath, avarice, insensibility, fear, envy, grief and non-discrimination. In this passage, as in the major portion of his commentary, Nārāyaṇa follows Vāchaspati rather closely.

which arises in connection with divinities,¹ as fire &c., is supernatural, [*e.g.*,] that caused by burning, cold and the like, or owing to possession by evil spirits (*Yaksha*, *Rákshasa*, *Vináyaka*), the influence of planets, &c. Though all sorts of pain arise in the mind, yet the distinction mental and non-mental is made according as it is produced wholly in the mind or not so.

On account of **the attack** of the three-fold pain, [that is], an intolerable connection therewith, an enquiry is necessarily made by the wise into the following science, [which explains] the means of the removal or extirpation of the said suffering through a discriminative knowledge of Nature and Soul.

Although the gross pain will of itself cease in another moment, and the pain in the past has already gone, yet to prevent that in the subtle form, which is yet to come, [adequate means should be sought]. For though according to the theory that effect is existent (or effect pre-exists in its cause,) there can be no such thing as destruction [व्यस] and prior-privation [प्रागभाव] [of pain], still prevention here means the existence of pain in the subtle form in the past state or its unfitness to assume a gross form.² Nor is there want of proof of

¹ It is a mistake to render देव by God. The proper translation is a divine or spiritual being. Whenever the Hindu meant the Supreme Being he said ईश्वर. If the word 'god' be used in English, it should always be remembered that it is with a small 'g.'

² According to Sāṅkhya nothing which was previously non-existent could be created by causal agency. (See *S'loka 9. post.*) Such being the case, destruction or creation of a thing means, according to it, simply the assumption of a subtle or of a gross

future pain, for the existence of such pain during the existence of the mind may be inferred from its [mind's] power of producing effects as long as it exists.

Surely suffering might be remedied by obvious means, [e.g.,] bodily pains by the use of drugs, &c.; mental by recourse to lovely women, wine, luxuries, and the like; extrinsic by a study of moral and political science and by inhabiting secure places; and supernatural by the employment of gems, charms, amulets and so forth. With reference to this [possible remedy] it is doubted, **If superfluous, &c.** There being obvious means,¹ that is, well-known remedies, the enquiry is superfluous since the object may be [otherwise] gained. If [this be urged] it is contradicted, **no.** **Absoluteness**, necessary removal of pain; **finality**, non-revival of pain; neither of these [objects] is attained by [the employment of] the obvious means.

form respectively. Thus there can be, according to Kapila, no real annihilation of pain. So the question arises what the word निवृत्ति (prevention or cessation) in the text means. प्रागभाव or prior privation of a thing implies its creation or birth in future, and as, according to Sāṅkhya, nothing can be really created, there can be no prior privation of दुःख or pain. It is not necessary to add here that अस्त (destruction) and प्रागभाव are admitted by Naiyāyikas and other schools who admit real creation and destruction.

¹ Wilson's copies had दृष्टे सति, which makes the construction quite clear, and completely disposes of Lassen's strictures upon Colebrooke's rendering, "nor is the enquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist."

.ANNOTATIONS.

Iśvara Kṛṣṇa plunges at once into the midst of the subject. There are three sorts of pain which afflict us, and their removal we desire. So the first aphorism of the *Sāṅkhya Pravachana* is, "Well, the absolute end of Soul is complete cessation of three-fold pain." Iśvara Kṛṣṇa then tells us that there is pain, and this of three kinds ; that this pain afflicts us ; and that it is possible to remove this pain. Unless there was the *experience of pain* there would be no desire for its removal ; and unless the *removal of pain* was possible, the desire would be fruitless and all enquiry after means would be vain.

This *pain is three-fold*. It may be either

1. intrinsic, or
2. extrinsic, or
3. supernatural.

The first kind is that due to one's self, and is either bodily or mental, the former being caused by disturbances of the three humours, the latter by passion. The second kind is the pain due to beings of the outer world, *e.g.*, birds, beasts, &c. The third is due to supernatural influences, and may be caused by planets, demons and other preterhuman beings.

The Soul cannot have repose till this pain is removed. Now, some means of removing it are obvious, but do they suffice? Apparently not. If they did, no further enquiry would be necessary. But the so-called obvious remedies are only palliatives, they do not radically cure

the evil. And unless there be a radical cure, the pain will recur, and we shall be no better off than before. So it is said in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, "This [cessation of pain] is not effected by visible [means], for even after suppression the recurrence [thereof] is seen" (I. 2). What is wanted is that pain should cease completely and for ever. Not only should there be an alleviation of this or that suffering, but of *all* suffering, and that of a permanent character. But how is this consummation to be achieved? It is obvious that the visible means are limited in their application to particular forms of present evil; but may not the religious ceremonies enjoined by the holy Scriptures help us to a *final and absolute* emancipation from pain? This is the question dealt with in the second *Kārikā*.

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिश्चयातिशययुक्तः ।

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

2. The revealed [mode] is like the apparent, since it is connected with impurity,

destruction and excess. A [mode] different is preferable, because of the discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing [that it consists in].

[GAUDAPÁDA.] ‘ Though enquiry be made into means other than the visible, yet [the object] is not so [to be gained], because the revealed means are destructive of the three-fold pain.’

What is heard successively is *anuśrava*; what is thence produced is *ānuśravika*, which again is that established by the Vedas: *e.g.*, “ we drank the *soma*, became immortal, acquired effulgence, learnt divine [things], can then foes harm us at all? What can decay do to an immortal?” At some time there was a discussion among the gods, Indra eto., as to how they had become immortal. [They] decided, “ because we drank the soma-juice therefore we became immortal;¹ what else? attained or acquired effulgence, that is, heaven; [and] came to know divine [things]; then assuredly, how can an enemy harm us any more than grass? what can disease or envy do unto the immortals?”

¹ Prof. Cowell in a foot-note in his edition of Colebrooke's *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 251, says, “ *Rigveda*, VIII. 48.3—*amrita* is properly an epithet, ‘ Oh immortal one! sc. Soma.’ ”

Again in the Vedas we hear of pre-eminent recompense [being allotted] to animal sacrifice : “ One who performs the horse-sacrifice, conquers all the worlds, overcomes death, expiates sin, and atones for the crime of killing a Bráhman.”¹

‘ The means indicated by the Vedas being final and absolute, the enquiry is superfluous.’ That is not so; [for the text] says, **the revealed is like the apparent**: similar to the obvious [means]. Why is the revealed means [ineffectual] like the apparent? because **connected with impurity, destruction, and excess**. Connected with *impurity* on account of the slaughter of animals, for it is said, “ according to the ritual of the horse-sacrifice, six hundred animals *minus* three are offered at mid-day.” Though this is the pious practice enjoined by tradition (the Vedas) and law, yet it is tainted with impurity on account of the presence of harmfulness.² Again, “ many thousands of Indras and other divinities have, in course of time, passed away with different cycles; time is hard to overcome.” It [the revealed mode] is thus, through the death of Indra and the rest, associated with *destruction*. It is further connected with *excess*, that is, special difference. From beholding the special advantages [of a favoured individual], another [less favoured] is pained. Thus the revealed means are also [ineffectual] like the obvious. If [it be] then [asked], which is preferable? [the text] answers, **that which is different**, other than both the visible

¹ Cf. Taittirīya Sanh. V. 3. 12. 2. (Cowell).

² मिश्रीभावात्, literally ‘because of its mixed or miscellaneous character,’ not being unadulterated with injuriousness.

and the revealed [means], is preferable, because unconnected with impurity, destruction, and excess.

How is that? **Though a discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing.** In this, the Manifested mean *Mahat* and the rest, [*viz.*], Consciousness, Self-consciousness, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs, and the five gross elements. The Unmanifested is the *Pradhána* [Prime cause]. The Knowing is Soul. These twenty-five principles are said to comprise the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing. This [last mode] is superior on account of the [said] discriminative knowledge; for, it is said, "he who knows the twenty-five principles," &c.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] 'But since heavenly bliss has no connection with pain and is not perishable after a time, the enquiry is to be made after [sacrificial ceremonies like] *Jyotishtoma* and the rest [by means of which such bliss can be attained']. Upon this [objection, the author] says, **The revealed, &c.**

What is heard from the mouth of the preceptor is the *revealed*, [that is], the Vedas comprising chapters on rites and ceremonies; *Jyotishtoma* and other [sacrifices] therein enjoined [constitute] the "revealed mode." [This is inefficacious] **like the obvious**, like drugs, &c., [for instance].

The reason of this is stated, **since it is, &c.** *Hi* means since. **Impurity** : defect in the performance of some subsidiary act; also injury, from the text "Injure not." Because at any rate, [there is] a likelihood of leaves of trees as well as small animals being destroyed through proximity to fire. Hence it is a source of pain. **Loss** since the fruits of these actions perish; there is no

permanent obviation of suffering. On the destruction thereof pain again sets in ; this is the sense. **Excess** (or inequality) : since happier men are to be seen ; there is an increase of one's suffering through jealousy and intolerance, this is inequality.

‘ But what is enjoined¹ can not form the subject of a prohibition the two being contradictory to each other ; otherwise there would be the fault of co-existence of action under a mandate and forbearance under a prohibition. Such being the case, as the mandate enjoining *homa* in the *āhavaniya* sacrifice avoids in its application the text relating to the prohibition of *homa*, so prohibitions like ‘ Injure not,’ &c. avoid in their application (or operate without affecting) the sacrificial injury, which forms the subject of mandates like, “ The animal dedicated to Agni and Soma should be slaughtered,” &c. And so it is harm unconnected with sacrifices that is sinful, and not [harm] so connected.’ If [you argue thus, the answer is], it is not so. In (sacrificial) injury, the fact of its being the means for the accomplishment of a desired object under a mandate being consistent with that of its being instrumental to a harm under a prohibition, [even] admitting the small evil done by slaughter of animals, like pain due to expenditure of wealth, exertion, &c., the exertion [for the performance of sacrifices] would still be proper on account of the great merit achievable by them, [and so] there is no room for the fault due to the co-existence of action under a precept and forbearance under a prohibition.² The root

¹ Literally, touched by a positive mandate, विधि

² The objection is that a precept may conflict with a prohibition, and so there be an end to action. It is pointed out in reply

hisi signifies sin, therefore even sacrificial injury is a sin, [and] so *Jyotishtoma* and the rest, involving such injury, are impure. So it is said in the colloquy between father and son in the *Mahābhārata*, "Father, I have studied again and again in successive rebirths the religion [embodied] in the three *Vedas*. [It is] full of impurity and does not strike me as good." For a further discussion of the question my commentary on the *Yogasūtras* may be referred to.

The opposite thereof is preferable : Means, different from the obvious and the revealed, discoverable from [this] science alone, and effective of a knowledge of the soul, is preferable, [since it is] competent to the absolute and final extirpation of pain.

How is that [means] attained? In answer it is said, **from a discriminative knowledge, &c. Manifested** are beings and the like, [that is, creatures of all sorts], **Unmanifested** is [unmodified] world-stuff, **the knower** is Soul; from a discrimination of these knowledge springs; this is the meaning. On the attainment of a discriminative knowledge of the ego and the non-ego, agent-hood and all other egoistic feelings cease, and the effects thereof, [*viz.*,] anger, hatred, virtue, vice, &c., not being [re-] produced, and the stored-up fruits of actions in previous existences not taking effect, on account of the consumption of their subsidiaries like

that this is not probable, for so great is the inducement to the performance of a sacrifice that a man would risk the (comparatively) small evil it entails, rather than leave it undone. And the action will in every case be connected with harm, and so impure.

ignorance, passion, &c., there is no re-birth after the completion of the current existence,¹ and liberation characterised by the absolute cessation of three-fold pain follows. [Therefore] the wise investigate the science which leads to the attainment of such¹ [knowledge], and which comprises a discussion [on the subject].

ANNOTATIONS.

No, the revealed means are no better than the obvious remedies. As present objects of sense may gratify us for some time, so the performance of religious ceremonies may place us in a station of bliss for a temporary period. The period is a temporary one in both cases, the only difference being in the duration of the pleasure we enjoy.

According to the Sāṅkhya teachers, the performance of sacrifices is open to three objections :—

1. It transgresses against the holy rule, "Injure not." For according to the Hindu, "there is no religion higher than harmlessness." And if there be no shedding of blood, no causing of pain, still there is the chance of your making a slip, of leaving some part of the ceremony imperfect; and serious are the consequences of such a failure.

2. It gives rise to misery and heart-burning, for it is not given to all men to perform these ceremonies and thereby acquire equal merit, whereas it is given to all to feel and resent differences.

3. Nor does the merit it brings entail a complete removal of pain. By the due performance of sacred

¹ 'प्राक्त', literally 'the originated,' life which has begun.

rites man may be exalted to a higher and happier sphere, and be transformed into a being superior to man, almost divine [cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 95]. But then we read that even Indras pass away, none of the so-called divinities can withstand time.

So it is said in the Aphorisms that liberation “does not result even from scriptural [means; what is gained thereby] is not Soul’s aim, because it is brought about [by acts], and therefore, [the performer] is liable to repetition [of births].” (I. 82.) To quote Aniruddha the commentator, “since [liberation, on this view], is a product [of actions] and as such not eternal, the liberated would be exposed to a continuance of new mundane existences” (Garbe’s Translation, p. 46).¹

¹ It is useful to remember in this connection that there is here no “reste de respect pour l’écriture sainte” as St. Hilaire fancies. And when the French critic proceeds to say of the first two *kārikās*, “Never has the authority of reason been more distinctly affirmed; never its supremacy more boldly proclaimed,” he surely gives Iśvara Kṛishṇa more credit than is his due. As Dr. Hall points out, “All revelation is not here contemplated. The commentators are of opinion, and rightly, that only the Vaidika ritual is animadverted upon. What is inculcated is, that a man should not restrict himself to sacrifice and like observances, the promised requital whereof is confined to the inferior bliss of Elysium, and stops short of ensuring a period to the grand evil of existence, metempsychosis. Those works which the Hindus style non-voluntary,—among which sacrifice is comprehended,—are, indeed, said to be attended with sin: nevertheless, whatever the sin of performing them, there would be greater sin in abstaining from them. Being prescribed, they must be done; and the consequences must be endured, and duly atoned for. The Sāṅkhya simply takes a flight beyond the legalistic

What is wanted is some means that will enable us to extirpate pain *finally and absolutely*. And such a complete emancipation cannot be obtained by the employment of any means that does not apply to the root of the evil. Now, what is this root? What is it that causes the existence of pain? It is non-discrimination. There are two objects which are continually seen to posit themselves in relation to one another; one is Soul, the ego, the other is Cosmic Stuff, the non-ego. All ordinary knowledge springs from a union of the two; it is only when the knower cognises an object of knowledge that there is perception. Now, the unthinking mind is constantly led to confound these two, and to fancy the soul, which is in its essence "eternally pure, intelligent and free" (*Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 19), as bound by corporeal and cosmic ties. It is this illusion which philosophy has got to combat, and it is this non-discrimination which must be set aside by a clearer insight into the truth before liberation can be attained. As Aniruddha puts it, "without non-discrimination bondage never belongs to the Self, but from non-discrimination springs the egotizing delusion (*abhimāna*) that there is bondage." (Garbe, p. 13). When Soul will be known in its real nature and as distinct from the non-spiritual cosmos, then only will the root of the evil be cut away and the delusion of pain cease to exist.

Mīmāṃsā; and so does the Vedānta; no more than which does the Sāṅkhya cut itself away from the Veda, or lay a ban upon the rites and ceremonies which it is thought to enjoin. In a word, the Sāṅkhya would only dissuade from content with a lower grade of future happiness.' (*Sāṅkhya Sāra*, Pref., pp. 25-9.)

¹ It is difficult to define Soul and Nature. They are described in the next *káriká* from the development point of view. It may be roughly said that 'Soul' or 'Self' is the immortal part of man, the principle of intelligence, and 'Nature' (this is the ordinary translation of प्रकृति, and probably as good as any other yet proposed) is the non-ego, the world-stuff, the Prime Cause of which all things non-spiritual are made. Some scholars prefer to render प्रकृति as 'Matter' or 'Primordial Matter.' But the connotations of the word 'matter' are rather misleading, and an adoption of it into an exposition of the Sāṅkhya philosophy is likely more to confuse than to elucidate. It may suggest a crude form of Dualistic Realism (if not Materialism), which we believe Kapila was far from accepting. If the word be used, as Huxley suggested, as only "a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness,"¹ it should be remembered that Kapila's "Absolute" is neither wholly unknown nor merely hypothetical.

¹ *Lay Sermons*, p. 124.

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥

3. Nature, the root, is no effect ; the Great One and the rest are seven, causing and caused ; sixteen are the evolutes ; the soul is neither a cause nor an effect.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Then [the author] goes on to explain the difference between the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing [categories].

Radical Nature is the chief, being the root of the seven causing and caused [principles]. It is the root as well as the prime evolvent.¹ **No effect**, not produced by another ; therefore Nature is not a product (or change) of anything else.

The Great One and the rest are seven, causing and caused. Great is Intellect ; Intellect and the rest are seven : 1. Intellect,² 2. Self-consciousness, 3-7. the five rudiments ; these are the seven causing and caused [principles]. Thus, from the Chief [Nature] is produced

¹ 'Evolvent' and 'evolute.' For these happy renderings we are indebted to Dr. F. Hall.

² I have kept to these words, Intellect and Self-consciousness, first, because they have been long in use and so are familiar to students of Hindu Philosophy, and secondly, because it is so difficult to substitute anything more accurate and more exact. I have, however, also used 'Consciousness' for Intellect, and 'Egoism' and 'Self-apperception' for Self-consciousness. These principles will be discussed more in detail later on.


Intellect, [it] therefore, [is] an effect, that is, an evolute of the Chief; it again produces self-consciousness, [it], therefore, [is] a cause. Self-consciousness, too, is produced by Intellect and is therefore an effect, it also produces the five subtle principles and is therefore a cause. Again, rudimental sound as produced by self-consciousness is an effect, as originating ether¹ is a cause; similarly rudimental touch as derived from self-consciousness is an effect, as producing air is a cause; rudimental smell as derived from self-consciousness is an effect, as generating the earth is a cause; rudimental form (or colour) as produced by self-consciousness is an effect, as giving rise to light (or fire) is a cause; rudimental taste as derived from self-consciousness is an effect, as originating water is a cause. Thus the Great One and the rest are seven [principles, which are both] causing and caused.

Sixteen are the evolutes: the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, the eleventh mind, and the five gross elements, these are the sixteen effects or evolutes.

The Soul is neither a cause nor an effect.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] With a view to explaining the nature of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing principles, the characteristics of each are specified: **Nature, the root, &c.**

¹ आकाश. The correspondence between the two, however, is not quite complete, for आकाश, as ordinarily understood, has only one quality, *vis.*, sound. The point is well discussed by Mahámahopádhyaṃy Prof. Chandra Kánta Tarkálañkára in his Śrī Gopál Vasu Mallik Fellowship Lectures, IV, 2, 402.



Radical Nature [is] the originator of all, and [yet itself] uncaused. Nature-hood consists in creativeness in the uncreated.

The Non-manifest having been described, the Manifest [principles, which are] of two kinds, are next described, **Mahat and the rest**: Consciousness, Self-Apperception and the five elemental rudiments are causing and caused. This means that they are effects and at the same time possess a causality [which is] co-extensive with the inherent attributes of the classes that divide the principles.¹

The sixteen, [viz.] the eleven organs and the five gross elements (ether and the rest) are evolutes. That is to say, they are products and possess not a causality [which is] co-extensive with the inherent attributes of the classes that divide the principles.

Soul is the experiencer of all, neither causing nor caused ; non-creating and yet uncaused. The first attri-

¹ Each of the 25 principles recognised by Kapila with the affix त्व attached to it is a तत्त्वविभाजकोपाधि, as प्रकृतित्व, महत्त्व, अहङ्कारत्व, &c. Hindu philosophy, especially the Nyāya, makes a sharp distinction between a class and the inherent attribute of that class, which marks it out as a separate entity. In plain English the passage means that the seven principles in question become causes as such, without undergoing any modification. An illustration will make the necessity for this limitation of causality plain. Take a tree. Now this is an effect, being the product of one of the elements; it is also a cause, inasmuch as it produces seeds. Should then the tree be regarded as a cause-effect? No, for it becomes a cause as a tree, and not as one of the elements. Cf. Vāchaspati's commentary.

bute excludes Nature; the second the generic qualities, &c., of the supersensible principles.¹ The above [make up what] have been called the twenty-five principles (or categories).

According to the theory of the theistical Sāṅkhya, the term 'soul' includes also God, 'illusion' describes the will of God or the destiny² of created things, and 'ignorance' means error of living beings (or embodied souls) and nothing else. The omission to mention these here is, in brief, no defect.

ANNOTATIONS.

Íśvara Kṛishṇa divides all things into three classes, the Unmanifested, the Manifested, and the Knowing. The idea that underlies the Sāṅkhya epistemology is of development. We have seen that this philosophic system, like all others, posits a duality.³ There is the ego and the non-ego, or to use words established by English translators, there is Soul and Nature. Soul is the knowing principle, Nature is the object principle. But Nature as known is very different from Nature in its pristine simplicity. When we know it, it has undergone many modifications, and has gained a definite shape, 'a local habitation and a name.' Nature originally lies in an embryonic condition, when all its constituents (of which

¹ i. e., *Mahat* and the rest.

² अदृष्टं, literally 'the unseen,' that is, the accumulated effects of past actions; the merit or demerit acquired by these dominate a man's life and, in vulgar parlance, is called 'fate.'

³ We are not at this stage concerned with the question as to how far reality should be ascribed to the two poles of knowledge.

more anon) are in equilibrium, and when the mighty heart of creation, so to speak, is asleep. Then it gradually begins to assume form, the nebular cosmic stuff loses its homogeneity as it gains in concretion, and the world blossoms forth around us in all its beauty and all its variety. So Nature is subject to a development in form. Soul, too, has its development, its knowledge grows from more to more. As the Soul begins to know, the unmanifested indiscrete World-stuff assumes manifest and discrete forms.¹

There is, however, another way of viewing the sum-total of principles, viz., from the standpoint of causal relationship. In what the relationship of causality consists that we shall be told later on. What we have here got to consider is in what relation the several principles stand to one another. Now, there are four ways in which objects may be classified from this point of view. An object may be a cause, it may be an effect, it may be both a cause and an effect, and it may be neither.² So the verse we are discussing tells

¹ Ancient verses describe Nature thus :

यथाश्रत्यकर्णिकायामन्तर्भूती महाद्रुमः ।
 निष्पन्नी दृश्यते व्यक्तमव्यक्तात् सम्भवस्तथा ॥
 शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तत् रूपादिभिरसंयुतं ।
 विगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययं ॥

Plato also had a similar idea of a universal invisible source of all material forms. Wilson and Davies cite *Timæus*, 24.

² Colebrooke points out that Erigena adopts the same four divisions: "That which creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; that which is created and creates not; and that which neither creates nor is created." *De Divisione Naturæ*, lib. 5.

us that there is only one principle which is solely a cause, *viz.*, Nature; there are sixteen products thereof which are only effects, there are seven modes which are products not wholly devoid of causal potency, and there is only one principle which stands alone, having nothing causally prior or posterior to it.¹

Now, bearing in mind the intimate relation, if not identity, of the idea of development or evolution with that of causation, we may lay out Kapila's twenty-five principles in the following table:—

1. Soul			
+			
2. Nature, indiscrete=Discrete			
Super-sensible set	Elemental rudiments	a. Evolvent-evolutes	β. Evolutes*
		3. Consciousness	10. Mind
		4. Self-apperception	11. Eye
		5. Rudiment of sound	12. Ear
		6. " touch	13. Nose
		7. " smell	14. Tongue
		8. " form	15. Skin
		9. " flavour	16. Voice
			17. Hands
			18. Feet
		19. Organ of ex- cretion	
		20. Organ of gen- eration	
		21. Ether	
		22. Air	
		23. Earth	
		24. Light	
		25. Water.	

¹ It should not be hence supposed that there is only one soul. Souls are individual and many.

² The original is विकृति or विकार, which shows that it is only a change or modification.

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्व्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥४॥

4. Perception, Inference, and Authoritative Statement are the three kinds of approved proof, for they comprise every mode of demonstration.¹ The complete determination of the demonstrable is verily by proof.²

[GAUDAPĀDA.] Of these three [classes of] principles, the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing, by what and how many kinds of proof and of which by what proof, is a complete determination effected? In this world, a demonstrable thing is established by proof, as, [the quantity of] grains of rice [is determined] by *prastha*,³ &c., sandal and the like [are] by weight. Therefore proof is to be defined.

¹ Nārāyaṇa gives a different interpretation, which Colebrooke thus embodies in his translation, "for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode," &c.

² Colebrooke has, "it is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results." Wilson thereupon notes that सिद्धि "is explained by *pratiti*, 'trust, belief.'" Davies questions this, and invokes the Petersburg Dictionary to his aid. Without entering into the psychological question of the relations of knowledge and belief, it may, however, be said that belief in a thing follows so closely upon its establishment by demonstration, that any attempt to discriminate between the two cannot serve much useful purpose.

³ A particular measure of capacity=4 *kuḍavas*=48 handfuls.

Perception ; as, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue [and] the nose are the five organs of perception, whose objects of sense are sound, touch, colour, flavour and smell respectively. The ear apprehends sound, the skin touch, the eye colour, the tongue taste, the nose smell. This proof is called sense-apprehension.

An object that may not be apprehended by perception or inference is to be accepted on authoritative testimony. As, Indra the king of the gods, the Kurus in the north, the nymphs in heaven, and the like objects, which are not determinable by perception or inference are accepted on authoritative affirmation. It is also said : "Authoritative testimony is an affirmation made by a person of authority, known as such from his immunity from faults.¹ A person without faults will not speak an untruth, any incentive [thereto] being absent [in his case]. He who is devoted to his own work, devoid of partiality or enmity, and ever respected by those like him, such a person is known as a man of authority."

In these [three] proofs are comprised all modes of demonstration. There are six kinds of proof according to Jaimini. Well, what² are those proofs? The six kinds are presumption, equivalence, privation, intuition, tradition, and comparison.² Of these, "presumption" is two-

¹ आगमो ह्यप्रवचनमात्रं दीपक्षयाद्भिदुः. Wilson renders, "They call scripture right affirmation ; right, as free from error."

² This enumeration differs from that given in the leading textbooks of the Mīmāṃsā school. The usual list is perception, inference, comparison, presumption, authority, and privation. The list given by Aniruddha in his commentary on *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 88, will, however, be found substantially to agree with Gaudapāda's. (On the various modes of proof see Colebrooke's *Essays*, (Cowell), Vol I, pp. 328-9.)

fold, 'seen' and 'heard.' 'Seen,' [as], where the existence of the soul being admitted in one case, it is presumed to exist in another. 'Heard,' *e. g.*, Devadatta does not eat in the day and yet looks fat, thence it is presumed that he eats at night.¹ "Equivalence," as by the word *prastha*, four *kuḍavas* are signified. "Privation": 'prior,' 'reciprocal' 'absolute' and 'total' are the styles thereof.² 'Prior privation,' as, Devadatta in childhood, youth &c.; 'reciprocal privation,' as, of a water-jar in cloth; 'absolute privation,' as, the horns of an ass, the son of a barren woman, the flowers of the sky, &c.; 'total privation' or destruction, like burnt cloth, [or] as want of rain is ascertained from seeing withered grain. Thus "privation" is manifold. "Intuition," as, "Pleasant is the country [lying] to the south of the Vindhya and to the north of the Sahya, [and] stretching to the sea."

¹ अर्थापत्तिः is an "assumption of a thing not itself perceived but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard or proved." The illustrations of the two kinds in the text are not luminous. In the *S'āstra Dipikā* (*apud* Wilson) the first ('seen') is exemplified by the case of a man known to be alive, who is presumed to be abroad when not found at home, and the second ('heard') by Vedic directions, which, when enjoining the use of a particular article, are to be interpreted as implying that something similar may be substituted if necessary.

² 'Non-existence,' that which is known in relation to its counter-entity. Cf. *Tarka Saṅgraha*, 8,69, Mehendale's edition, with the editor's notes. Put positively, 'prior privation' is future existence, 'total (or posterior) privation' is past existence, 'reciprocal privation' is the relation that obtains between two non-identical things, and 'absolute privation' is eternal impossibility. The two last correspond respectively to 'contrary' and 'contradictory opposition' of Western logic.

When this is said, the comprehension arises that in that country the quality of pleasantness exists; intuition is the knowledge of one who knows.¹ "Tradition," as people say on this fig-tree a she-devil dwells. "Comparison,"² as, the nilgai is like a cow, the pond like a sea. These six kinds of proof are comprised in the three kinds, perception, &c. Thus, presumption is included in inference; equivalence, privation, intuition, tradition and analogy in authoritative testimony. Therefore, since these three comprise all modes of demonstration, [the author] speaks of "three approved"³ forms. 'From these three methods the establishment of proof follows,' this [has to be added] to complete [the sense of] the sentence.

The complete determination of the demonstrable is verily by proof. The demonstrable are the Chief One, Intellect, self-apperception, the five elemental rudiments, the eleven sense-organs, the five gross elements, and the Soul. These twenty-five principles are spoken of [collectively] as the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing. Of these, some are demonstrable by perception, some by inference, and some by revelation. Thus proof [which is] three-fold has been described.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The principles have been enumerated.

¹ प्रतिभा च जानतां ज्ञानं. Wilson's MS. had प्रतिज्ञात्वासंज्ञानं, which hardly makes any sense.

² 'Recognition of likeness.' "This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness." (*Tarka Saṅgraha*, 47, Ballantyne's Translation.)

इष्टं may mean 'intended.'

They are demonstrated by proof. But the determination of all of them is not possible by one mode of proof; hence the necessity of several forms of proof. What and how many are the proofs are next explained: **Perception, &c.** २, १०२

Perception [is] knowledge by means of the senses. **Inference** [is] that which leads to a conclusion, 'the consideration of the sign'. **Authoritative statement** [is] verbal testimony, as, *e.g.*, said by the lord Kapila.

Why? **Because admitted by all authorities;** perception, inference, and testimony are accepted as modes of demonstration by all authorities, Patanjali and the rest. "Comparison," &c., are not accepted by all authorities, this is the sense. The Vaiśeṣikās do not admit "testimony," but they are no authorities; such is the meaning. Similarly others again deny "perception," &c.; [they also] are not authoritative teachers; this is to be understood. "Comparison" is included [in testimony], as, the word *gavaya*¹ signifies a nilgai; there being no other application, it is employed therefor. Similarly "presumption" too [is included in inference], as, Devadatta is fat [but] does not eat in the day; hence [it is inferred that, he eats in the night, because of the stoutness unaccompanied by taking food in the day. "Non-perception" is subsidiary to perception [and] not an independent method of proof. "Tra-

¹ Properly, a gayal or *bos gavaeus*. One may not know this animal but may have been told about it. When he sees it, he may recognise it from the description. This will be a 'comparison' or 'inference from similarity.'

dition " and " equivalence " ¹ are [divisions of] testimony. " Action " ² is a form of inference; this is the gist [of the discussion].

The complete, &c. Since the determination of the demonstrable is by means of proof, therefore proof properly is three-fold.

ANNOTATIONS.

Having sketched the outlines of the Sāṅkhya theory of development, Íśvara Kṛishṇa proceeds to define the dialectic of this school of thought. There are some principles we have got to know, some entities whose nature we shall have to investigate. But how are we to know them, and on what lines are we to investigate? ³ Knowledge properly is of what is not previously known. Therefore it is said in the Aphorisms, " The determination of something which has not [previously] been in connection with both [Soul and Intellect], or with one or other of them, is ' right cognition or notion ' (प्रमा). What is most conducive thereto is that [which we mean by proof, प्रमाण]." (I. 87.) *Pramāṇa*, thus, is a means of knowledge or form of evidence. The next Aphorism ⁴

¹ संभव is by the Paurānikas understood to mean ' probability ' or ' a cognition dependent on a plurality of concomitances, ' as, learning is probable in a Bráhmaṇa.

² ' Exertion to gain what is desired and avoid what is not. ' Or simply ' gesture. ' This is not an independent form of evidence, being only शब्दानुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुः (*Dīpikā* on *Tarka Saṅgraha*), अनुमानप्रयोजनकैव (*Siddhānta Chandrodaya*).

³ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 102.

⁴ Ballantyne's translation, p. 106.

tells us that there are three such different means, and "there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs]."

It should be carefully¹ noted here, first of all, that these proofs are means by which we may learn what is not already before our mind or in it. The aphorist is careful enough to say, "something not [previously] lodged in both or either," and the commentator brings this out when he notes, "it is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination,' [which excludes doubt]."¹ It is true that we gain our knowledge by perception or reasoning, but then it is *we* who perceive or reason, and only an inaccurate psychology would lose sight of this the most important factor. We should not therefore hastily conclude that a particular philosophy does not take count of anything innate, because it does not mention it in so many words.² At any rate, there is no doing without the innate capability of knowledge, the potency within, in the absence of which the most skilful machinery would avail not in the matter of acquisition of knowledge.³

Different systems recognise different means of knowledge. Nyāya recognises four, *viz.*, Perception, Infer-

¹ Ballantyne's *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms*, p. 105.

² Davies says, "By the latter part of Distich 4, Kapila limits all possible knowledge to his three methods of proof" (p. 24).

³ Cf. McCosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*, p. 20 *et seq.*

ence, Testimony and Analogy; *Mimāṃsā* and *Vedānta* add Presumption and Privation. *Vaiśeṣikā* reduces them to two, Perception and Inference; and *Chārvāka* would omit even the latter.¹ *Kapila*, as we have seen, believes that there are three ways by which anything cognoscible may be determined. It may either fall within the purview of our senses, or we may discover it by reasoning, or some person of authority may tell us about it. So the holy writ lays down, "Soul is either to be perceived or learnt from authority or inferred from reasoning."²

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो^१ दृष्टं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकमाप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥५॥

5. Perception is the mental apprehension of particular objects; Inference, which is by means of a mark and the marked,³ is declared to be three-fold; authoritative statement is true revelation.

¹ *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, 2. 4. 5; 4. 5 6. Manu also mentions these three as the sources of right knowledge, XII. 105.

² बुद्धिव्यापारी ज्ञानं (*Vāchaspati*), अध्यवसायते निश्चीयतेऽनेन (*Nārāyaṇa*). Colebrooke renders 'ascertainment,' Lassen 'intention (*sensuum*),' St. Hilaire and Davies 'application.' In the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* the synonym employed is विज्ञानं, "that discernment (*Ballantyne*) or cognition (*Garbe*) which being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof" (I. 89).

³ Colebrooke gives, "premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it."

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The characteristics of the three-fold proof are now stated.

The application of the senses, ear, &c., to the particular objects thereof, sound and the like, is sense-apprehension or **perception**.

Inference has been declared to be three-fold, [*viz.*,] prior, posterior, and generic. 'Prior' is that which has an antecedent,¹ as, one infers rain from the gathering of clouds from past experience. 'Posterior,' as, from finding salt in a drop of water from the sea, [one infers that] the remainder also is saltish. 'Generic,' as, from noticing them to have moved from one place to another, [one infers that] the moon and the stars have locomotion like Chaitra,—as a person named Chaitra is [inferred to be] moving by seeing him transfer himself from one place to another, so [also] the moon and the stars. So, by analogy, we infer that the mango-trees must be in flower elsewhere because we see them in blossom [here]. This is 'generic inference.' What else? **It is by means of the mark and the marked.** Inference is by means of the mark, where from the mark (predicate) the marked (subject) is inferred, *e.g.*, the mendicant from the staff. [It is,] again, by means of the marked, where the mark (predicate) is inferred from the marked [subject], *e.g.*, seeing a mendicant [you say], this is his triple staff.²

True revelation is authoritative Statement. *Āpta* [means] holy teachers, Brahmā and the like, *Śruti*

¹ That is, is from the cause to the effect.

² This account of Inference differs from that ordinarily given in Hindu Logic.

[means] the Vedas; what is said by holy teachers or in the *Śrutis* is authoritative statement. Thus the three-fold proof has been explained.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] The characteristics of the [several] methods of proof are now specified, **Perception, &c.** :

Perception (or sense-apprehension) is that by means of which particular or appointed objects are determined, [that is], made certain. Since colour and the rest have been [respectively] assigned to the eye and the other [senses], these have appointed objects.

But the knowledge of an effect like rain from a cause like cloud, and of a cause like fire from an effect like smoke,¹ is not by Perception. It is next stated by which method of proof such knowledge is to be acquired : **Inference, &c.** Those two cases then fall under inference. And it is said in Gautama's *Sútras* : "Inference preceded thereby is three-fold, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, and by analogy."² 'Preceded thereby,' that is founded upon invariable concomitance [of the major and the middle terms] and other perceived [relations]. 'A priori,' [that is], inference of effect from cause; 'a posteriori,' inference of cause from effect; 'by analogy,' [that is, inference], in which the 'mark' (or middle term) is distinct from both effect and cause,³ as, the *champaka*

² That is, knowledge *a priori* and *a posteriori*.

³ The illustrations given of the three kinds in *Nyāya Sūtra Vṛtti* are respectively as follows: (1) inference of rain from the gathering of clouds, (2) the same inference from the swelling of a river, (3) inference of anything being a substance from its being earthy.

³ सामान्यतोदृष्टं, lit., by perception of generality. This expression has been differently explained by different writers from

particles, wafted by wind, are, on account of their fragrance, [inferred to] possess form and other [qualities].

A feature common to the three-fold inference is now specified : **by means of a 'mark and the marked.** The 'mark' (or sign) is what is pervaded by the predicate, the 'marked' is what contains the mark [that is,] the subject inclusive of the pervaded sign ; that cognition of which these form the cause, that is, the apprehension of the subject as possessing the predicate-pervaded mark, a consideration, *e. g.*, that the hill has fire-attended smoke, &c., [is called] inference, because it produces ratiocinative knowledge. Such is the sense.

In order to specify the characteristic of testimony, it is said : **Authoritative statement**, &c. 'Authoritative statement' is trustworthy speech ; a set of words marked by completeness, proximity, compatibility, and sense ; this indicates the subject (or thing defined). 'True revelation' is the predicate (or definition). *A'pta* is one who possesses true knowledge regarding the real meaning of words. What is heard is *śruti*, that is, speech ; hence the definition, 'words spoken by a trustworthy person,' is reached. Of truth spoken by a boy or a parrot, the theistical Sāṅkhya supposes God to be the authority (or guarantee) ; according to the other theory such speech has no validity ; this is the gist. In fact, according to this theory, the senses, &c., are no proofs, but the functions induced by the senses are ; for *pramā* is true cognition or knowledge of principles at

Pakshila Svāmi downwards. What Nārāyaṇa suggests seems to be that it is a form of inference which is not based upon any causal relation.

first hand;¹ that which effects either [knowledge] by a necessary connection, is the common mark of *pramāṇa*.

Perception is the function (or operation) of the mind which, owing to the influence of external things and by the path-way of the senses, determines the specific objects connected therewith; as, that is a pot, &c. Inference is the (mental) process which has the predicate (of the conclusion) for its object, and proceeds upon an apprehension of the middle term, the concomitance whereof [with the predicate] has been established in the subject which includes [such] predicate, as, the mountain has fire, &c. Revelation is the function in the hearer interpretive of² words spoken by reliable personages. As the saying, "Sacrifice desiring heaven," [gives rise to the idea] that people desirous of going to heaven should perform sacrifices. All these have for their end cognition which arises in the soul and which leads people to say, "I know," &c. Let further expatiation cease. The sense of the text is that Perception is knowledge produced by the senses³ determining, making certain, or objectifying particular things; Inference is a knowledge of the predicate dependent upon the mark and the marked, and gained by means of the middle and minor terms through an apprehension of their concomitance; [and] true revelation is verbal knowledge gained from authoritative speech.

¹ Lit., of such as were not perceived before; not things remembered, for instance.

² Lit., which takes the form of the meaning of words.

³ According to Sāṅkhya, when an object comes in contact with the organs of sense, the forms of the former are imposed upon the mind, and perception results; this change in the mind is here spoken of as वृत्ति.

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥६॥

6. The knowledge¹ of sensible things is by perception, of the non-sensible by inference ; ² what is not ascertainable even thereby and is imperceptible is determined by revelation.³

¹ Gauḍapāda's text has प्रसिद्धि.

² This version is according to Nārāyaṇa and Rāma Kṛishṇa and is adopted by Colebrooke, Lassen and Davies. Wilson and St. Hilaire follow Gauḍapāda and Vāchaspati, who construe सामान्यती दृष्टात् together and with अनुमानात्, the sense in that case being, " It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained." This explanation is supported by reference to *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 103, " The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by inference from analogy." The context, however, strongly favours the view that all the three kinds of proof are referred to here, and, so, we believe, does the wording of the text ; there is no reason why the first line should be confined to only one particular form of inference. (Davies is not quite right when he says, " In the Sāṅkhya Bhāshya it is maintained that *sāmānya* here means " analogy," and that *drishṭāt* is put in apposition with *anumānāt*," for it is the whole सामान्यती दृष्टं and not any part thereof that signifies analogy or induction.) Davies translates सामान्य as " formal or generic existence" and cites *Tarka Saṅgraha* (Ballantyne, § 89). It is, however, doubtful if the author had only the Nyāya category of Community in his mind, and the following अतीन्द्रियाणां makes for the view of the Hindu commentators (here followed). Even the Naiyāyikas do not confine sensuous perception to this particular category.

³ So Colebrooke and Lassen ; St. Hilaire has ' une information legitime,' Davies, ' fitting means.' What is meant is 'authorita-

[GAUDAPÁDA.] [The author] next proceeds to show what is demonstrated by which kind of proof.

By inference from analogy [proceeds the knowledge] **of non-sensible** [things], [that is], the demonstration of things that exist beyond the sense. Nature and Soul are super-sensible, and [therefore] demonstrated by inference from analogy. For, since the Great One and the like are modes composed of the three constituents, that of which they are products with trine properties¹ is the Prime Cause (Nature); again, since the irrational appears as rational it has a separate controller, namely, Soul.

The manifest is ascertainable by perception.² What is not demonstrable by that, [that is, inference, and is] imperceptible, is determined by revelation; as, for instance, Indra the king of the gods, the Kurus in the north, the nymphs in heaven are not perceptible, but ascertained by sacred authority.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Now the objects of the three kinds of proof are specified, **The knowledge, &c. :**

Sāmānyata has the affix *tasi* of the sixth (genitive) case. Therefore, the determination of all objects apprehensible by the senses, whether actually under consideration or not,

tive or trustworthy testimony.' अज्ञः is defined in *Tarka Saṅgraha* as यथार्थवक्ता, a speaker of the truth (Mehendale, §48).

¹ यस्येदं विगुणं कार्यं तत् प्रधानं, which Wilson renders, "so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (Nature), have the three qualities." See the argument in detail in the Annotations.

² The necessity for this sentence might have been obviated if Gaudapáda had adopted Nárāyaṇa's construction of the first hemistich.

is by perception ; wherefore earth and the other [elements] are ascertained by perception ; such is the sense.

Of the non-sensible, that is, of Nature and the rest, the ascertainment is by Inference ; as, Intellect being an effect, like a jar, has a cause, [which] Nature is demonstrated to be, since there is no other cause, and Soul cannot be said to be one because it does not undergo modifications and so creates not.

[The establishment of] **what is not demonstrable even thereby**,¹ [that is], of the super-sensible, for example, the attainment of heaven by [the performance of] sacrificial ceremonies, and the like, is from revelation or proof by testimony.

ANNOTATIONS.

The several methods of proof have been specified. The author proceeds next to define and apply them.

1. Perception is a source of knowledge that is admitted by all schools of Hindu thought. Our senses have been furnished to us in order that we may know through them, and it is when they are applied to their proper objects or brought in contact with them, that perception follows. And we are told that no theories can avail when they conflict with the evidence of the senses.²

2. But all that is cognoscible is not necessarily perceptible. We may, for instance, see a man but not in a dying condition. How can we then know that he is mortal ? By a process of reasoning which extends our

¹ *i. e.*, by inference.

² *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 25.

knowledge to matters that do not lie immediately within the purview of our senses. This process of reasoning is called Inference, and it is defined in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* as "the knowledge of the connected through perception of the connection" (I. 100). Suppose here is Rāma and we want to predicate mortality of him. We have got to establish a relation between Rāma and mortality, and if we cannot do this *immediately* by perception, we must do it *mediately* by finding out something which will serve as the connecting link and unite the two poles together. We then consider Rāma as a man and bethink ourself of the fact that humanity and mortality always go together. This 'humanity' is, therefore, the middle term that was wanted, and it will enable us to link Rāma with mortality, to subsume him in the class of mortals. Here then we have mortality which we wanted to connect with Rāma, and we have done this through a knowledge of the connection or constant accompaniment that subsists between humanity and mortality.¹ Thus, there can be no inference unless we can lay hold of a mark or sign which belongs to the subject and which invariably attends on the predicate, and the grand principle of the Hindu syllogism has been enounced as, "the pervader (व्यापक) is predicable of everything of which the pervaded (व्याप्य) is." Annambhatta gives the following definitions in his compend : "Inference is what leads to a conclusion (अनुमिति). Conclusion is the knowledge that results from judgment (परामर्श). Judgment is a recognition that the

¹ The Hindu logician has a very wholesome dislike for abstract terms and prefers to use the concrete. I have, however, for the convenience of foreign readers tried to adapt my illustration to Western modes of thought.

subject (पक्ष) possesses an attribute characterised by universal concomitance (व्याप्ति) [with something else, which is thus seen to belong to the subject—साध्य].”¹ Thus the परामर्श, which lies at the base of all inference, will be seen to comprehend two propositions, viz., (1) a universal proposition connecting the middle with the major term, and (2) a minor premiss connecting the middle with the minor term. These two premisses are condensed into one, and thereby the organic unity of the syllogism in thought is clearly brought out. Thus, taking the stock instance, a Hindu logician would say, वक्रिव्याघ्रधूमवान् पर्वतः, ‘this mountain is attended by fire-pervaded smoke.’

Many European critics have not seen this. Sir W. Hamilton, e.g., in his *Discussions* says: “The Aristotelic Syllogism is exclusively synthetic; the Epicurean Syllogism was exclusively analytic; whilst the Hindu Syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter-forms, being nothing more but an operose repetition of the same reasoning enounced, 1°, analytically, 2°, synthetically.” There never was a greater mistake. The learned critic here confounds the two forms of Inference which Hindus carefully discriminate as logical and rhetorical. Hark what the most elementary and widely read text-book of Hindu Logic says on the subject:² “The

¹ *Tarka Saṅgraha*, § 40. The word परामर्श has been variously rendered: logical antecedent or syllogising (Ballantyne), observation or experience (Wilson), groping (Max Müller), mediate judgment (Mehendale). The Bombay editor's notes on the Section should be consulted.

² *Tarka Saṅgraha*, § 41-3. I quote Prof. Max Müller's trans-

act of concluding is two-fold, it being intended either for one's own benefit or for the benefit of others. The former is the means of arriving for oneself at conclusive knowledge, and the process is this. By repeated observation, as in the case of culinary hearths and the like, we have obtained the general rule (व्याप्ति) that wherever there is smoke there is fire. We now approach a mountain, and wonder whether there might not be fire in it. We see the smoke, remember the general rule, and immediately perceive that the mountain possesses fire-pervaded smoke. This is, as yet, called only groping after signs (लिङ्गपरामर्श). But from it arises the conclusive knowledge, that the mountain itself is fiery. This is the actual process when we reason with ourselves. If we try, however, to convince somebody else of what we know to be conclusively true, then we start with the assertion, The mountain is fiery. Why? Because it smokes; and all that smokes, as you may see in a culinary hearth, and the like, is fiery. Now you perceive that the mountain does smoke, and hence you will admit that I was right in saying, that the mountain is fiery. This is called the five-membered form of exposition, and the five members are severally called,¹

1. Assertion, the mountain has fire ;
2. Reason, because it has smoke ;
3. Proposition, all that has smoke has fire ;

lation in the Appendix on Indian Logic communicated by him to Thomson's *Laws of Thought*. In this valuable essay several misconceptions common among European scholars are exposed.

¹ Ballantyne gives the names as (1) Proposition, (2) Reason, (3) Example, (4) Application, and (5) Conclusion. They are explained in a commentary on the *Vais'eshika Sūtras* to mean in order, Promise, Pretext, Authority, Scrutiny, and Repetition. (Max Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 298).

4. Assumption, and the mountain has smoke ;
5. Deduction, therefore it has fire.

The means of inference in both cases is the same. It is what was called the groping after signs, or the handling of the demonstrative tokens, 'in which the essential process of inference consists.' The Hindus knew perfectly well that the syllogism proper consists only of three propositions.

What is, however, peculiar to the Hindu inference is the apparent mixture of the processes of Deduction and Induction. But this is only apparent. We should remember that the object of all inference according to the Indian logician is truth, right knowledge (प्रज्ञा);¹ And if there is any savour of induction, it is because the Hindu is anxious that no deduction should be without a guarantee of its truth, that we should not start from baseless premisses and thereby multiply error. The Hindu is very particular that the व्याप्ति, the universal concomitance, the general rule, should be carefully established. In order that there might be a sound generalisation to found our conclusions upon, earnest efforts were made to formulate rules, to lay down methods of induction. And these rules roughly correspond to our modern Methods of Agreement and of Difference. The invariable concomitance was held to be proved and a relation of causality established if (1) wherever the product was found the (supposed) material cause was also found, and (2) wherever the one was not found the other was also absent. Thus, what smokes is always fiery, and what is not fiery never smokes. And in an argument the Hindus always took

¹ Thus it will be seen that the Hindu logic is a material and not a formal science.

care to illustrate the general rule by instances. The intention was not to induce the general rule from these instances, but simply to show that it was a valid induction and to afford an opportunity to the opponent for refutation. A little consideration will here show that the Hindu syllogism gained in strength by the introduction of these instances, and ceased to be open to the charge of being a *petitio principii* in the same sense in which the Aristotelian syllogism is.

We might here explain in what way the super-sensible entities, Nature and Soul, are established by inference. It is said in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, "The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy¹" (I. 103). The arguments may be set out thus :

A. Nature :—

- (1) What is a product is possessed of the qualities of the cause, that is, the peculiarity of the product is conditionate by the qualities of the cause ; as, a gold bracelet or the like partakes of the characteristic properties of gold ;
- (2) The product in question, *viz.*, the whole empirical world has the nature of the three constituents (that is, has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion) ;
- (3) Therefore a cause, being the totality of the three constituents, exists. Q. E. D.

B. Soul :—

- (1) Whatever is a combination is for the sake of

¹ So Ballantyne. Garbe says "induction." The following arguments are taken from the commentaries on Aphorism 103 (as translated by Ballantyne and Garbe).

some other, as a house, which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant ;

- (2) Nature, being a ' combination, is for the sake of another ;
- (3) Therefore something other, for the sake of which the compound Nature exists, *viz.*, Soul, is.

Q. E. D.

Other passages in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, however, show that Kapila based our knowledge of these two entities upon Recognition and Intuition. They exist as real because we intuit them, and they are not momentary sensations but permanent entities because we can identify them when we see them again.¹

3. The third source of knowledge is authoritative testimony. There may be objects which we can neither perceive nor establish by a valid process of reasoning. In such cases we must fall back upon statements made by others, upon such information as may be furnished to us by persons who speak with authority, upon whose knowledge and honesty we can rely.² Thus it will be seen that Kapila does not reject revelation. And the expositors of his system, at any rate, are fond of supporting with the authority of Scripture any conclusion established independently by reasoning.³ It should be borne in mind, however, that Kapila will not accept anything

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 35, 42, &c.

² As Colebrooke points out, *आप्तवाक्* "comprises every mode of oral information or verbal communication whence knowledge of a truth may be drawn" (*Essays*, Vol. I, p. 254).

³ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 5, 36, 53, &c.

merely upon authority. So long as you confine yourself to what is reasonable and intelligible, he will go with you and assent to authority; but no amount of scripture and holy texts will persuade him to accept what is manifestly absurd and self-contradictory, what on the face of it has neither sense nor reason.¹

वाधितमर्थं वेदोऽपि न बोधयति ।

Even the Vedas cannot render intelligible what is unmeaning. In modern times Hegel has familiarised us with the idea that 'the rational alone is real.' It would appear that great minds in all ages and at all places think alike.

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातात्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्म्यादवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥७॥

7. [A thing may be imperceptible] on account of excessive distance, [extreme] nearness, defect of organs, inattention of the mind, minuteness, interposition [as well as] predominance [of other objects], and intermixture with like [things].

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Here some one objects, 'neither is Nature nor Soul perceived [by sense], what is not [so] perceived does not exist in the world; therefore these two

¹ So it is said in *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 26, "Though there is nothing prescribed, yet what is unreasonable cannot be accepted, else we should sink to the level of children, lunatics, and the like."

also do not exist, like a second head, a third arm.' To which [the author] replies, there are eight causes in the world which prevent the apprehension of existing objects. They are [as follows]:—

The non-perception of existing objects is here seen to be **from** [their] **remoteness**, as, of Chaitra, Maitra, Vishnu and Mitra residing in another country. **From nearness**, as, the non-perception of the collyrium [on the lids] by the eyes. **From destruction of the organs**, as, the non-perception of sound and colour by the deaf and the blind [respectively]. **From inattention of the mind**, as, a distracted (person) does not comprehend even what is said distinctly. **From minuteness**, as the atoms of smoke, vapour, and frost are not perceived in the sky (or atmosphere). **From interposition**, as, an object concealed by a wall is not perceived. **From predominance**, as, obscured by the light of the sun, the planets, asterisms, and stars are not perceived. **From intermixture with the like**, as, a bean cast in a heap of beans, a lotus amongst lotuses, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a pigeon amongst pigeons, is not perceived [or distinguished], being confounded amidst a mass of [similar] things. Thus non-perception of existing things here is seen to be in eight ways.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] With a view to [explaining] why Nature and the rest are not apprehended [like objects of sense], the causes hindering perception are enumerated. **Because of extreme distance**, *scilicet*, perception operates not, [as], a bird soaring very high is not seen on account of remoteness. This defect is found only occasionally, [that is, at some places and in some cases], or

the solar and other spheres could not be perceived. [On the other hand], camphor, &c., placed within the orbit of the eye, are not perceived **because of extreme proximity**; the word 'extreme' is to be understood here also. **Because of the destruction of organs of sense.** Because of mental inattention, there being an absence of the mind's connection with the [particular] organ of perception, owing to its conjunction in another place. **Because of minuteness**, being not apprehensible by the senses. **Because of interposition**, [to wit], of a wall and the like. **Because of predominance**, the over-powering influence of [objects of] the same class, as, the light of the moon, being overpowered by the glare of the sun, is not seen. **Because of blending with the like**, of intermixture with [objects] possessing similar properties, as the milk of a cow is not discriminated when mixed with the milk of a buffalo or the like.

ANNOTATIONS.

It has been indicated that there are three means of knowledge. Those, however, who rely wholly on the testimony of the senses (like the ancient Eleatics) may contend that anything that we do not perceive does not exist. The author here points out how erroneous this idea is. Ordinary experience proves that there are many causes that may stand in the way of perception, and make even a sensible object imperceptible. And, of course, as to those objects that lie beyond the scope of our senses, they can give us no information.

सौक्ष्म्यात् तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात् कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं^१ विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

8. The non-perception of [Nature] is owing to its subtilty [and] not non-existence; its apprehension is through its effects. Consciousness and the rest are its products, like and unlike to Nature.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Let this be so.² Yet what then ? Of Nature and Soul what is it that prevents an apprehension, and what leads to it ? This is [next] explained.

Owing to its subtilty is its non-apprehension, [to wit], of Nature ; that is, Nature is not apprehended on account of its subtilty, as, the particles of smoke, vapour and frost, though existent, are not perceived in the atmosphere.

How then is it to be apprehended ? **It is apprehended through its effects**. On seeing the effect, the cause is inferred, ' There is Nature the cause, of which this is the effect.' Intellect, self-apperception, the five elemental rudiments, the eleven organs of sense, and the five gross elements are its effects (or products). These effects are **unlike Nature**, dissimilar to it ; **like also**, similar too ; as, in the world a son may be [at the same

^१ Lassen's text gives स्वरूपं (following Rāma Kṛishṇa), an obvious slip. He translates correctly enough, 'dissimile et simile.'

^२ That is, be it granted that whatever is to be apprehended by any means exists.

time] like and unlike the father. The reason why like and unlike we shall explain later on.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] 'This opinion of yours that the non-perception of these things is due to their being subject to any one of these [influences] is not correct; for the non-perception is due to the non-existence of Nature and the rest.' To this [objection] it is replied, **The non-perception, &c.:**

On account of subtlety, because, being formless, they are non-apprehensible by the senses; [it is], therefore that Nature and the rest are not perceived, and not because they are non-existent.

How? **They are apprehended**, determined, **by means of** [their] **effects**; because the inference thereof, by means of the effects, is unimpeded. Such is the drift.

What effects? It is answered, **Mahat, &c.** *Et cætera* implies egoism, the five rudiments, and the gross elements. Of these, **like** are the seven beginning with Consciousness, since they possess a causality which is limited by the attribute of being divisors of principles.¹ **Unlike** are ether and the rest, since they have no such causality. All this is said with a view to a discriminative knowledge, of effects. As will become clear hereafter, a cognition of the products in the form of similarity and dissimilarity, by differentiating the essential from the non-essential, creates a desire for a knowledge of soul, and thereby indirectly leads to salvation.

ANNOTATIONS.

Because we do not perceive the Cosmic Stuff in its

¹ See Náráyana's gloss on verse 3 *ante*, with footnote (p. 22).

primal form, we are not to suppose that it does not exist. It is by the second means of knowledge that we cognise it. We perceive the effects and thence infer the cause. We shall investigate the causal relation more in detail presently. It will suffice to say here that the Sāṅkhya advocates the essential identity of cause and effect, and consequently holds that the effect must present certain features that are like and certain features that are unlike those of the cause.

In the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* aphorisms 135-137 of the First Book also seek to establish the existence of the Primal Agent from a consideration of its evolutes. The aphorist says, "The cause is inferred from the effect, because it accompanies it. The undeveloped [Nature is inferred] from its emergent effect, which has the nature of the three constituents. There is no denying that Nature *is*, since its existence follows from its products, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source]."

The first line of our *Kārikā* should, however, be compared with Aphorisms 109 and 110 of the First Book :

सौक्ष्मात्तदनुपलब्धिः ।

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ।

The commentators explain that the subtlety which renders Nature imperceptible is not atomicity—it is all-pervasive—but difficulty of conception.

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।

यत्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम्¹ ६॥ ॥

9. An effect [pre-]exists [in its cause], because of the non-existent being uncaused, of the employment [by men] of material means, of the absence of universal production, of the effecting of the possible [only] by a competent agent, and of the nature of a cause.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] On account of the conflicting opinions of teachers, a doubt arises whether the effects, consciousness and the rest, [pre-]exist in Nature or

¹ These last two words formulate the proposition that Iśvara Kṛishṇa seeks to establish in this distich. They have given rise to some difference of opinion among European translators. E. g., Colebrooke renders, "Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause), for what exists not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence," &c.; St. Hilaire, "Ce qui prouve bien que l'effet provient de l'être, c'est que le non-être ne peut être cause de quoit que ce soit," &c.; and Davies, "Existing things (*sat*) are (proved to be) effects from the non-existence of (formal) being by the non-existence of cause," &c. The last critic discusses the other interpretations at some length, and lays down that the general argument here is "that formal existence *is* an effect, implying a cause not that effect exists antecedently in its cause" (p. 29). But that is precisely the point. The context should be considered. Distich 8 tells us that Nature is to be apprehended through its effects, and that these effects are Intellect &c., which are like and unlike to their cause. This would naturally lead to an examination of the causal relation. And that the verse in dispute

not. For, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, effects [pre-]exist; according to the Bauddhas, they do not; [but] if existent they cannot cease to be, and if non-existent, they cannot begin to be; here is a contradiction. Therefore it is said : [An effect &c.].

From there being no production of the non-existent, that which exists not is non-existent; what is non-existent cannot be called into existence; therefore effect subsists. In this world there is no production of the non-existent, for instance, the production of oil from sand [is impossible]; therefore [only] what [already] exists comes from an operative cause, having previously originated therein. [Thus] the manifest [principles exist] in Nature; hence effect is.

What else? **From the employment of materials**, from the taking of material means. In this world each man selects [appropriate] materials for his [particular]

deals only with an abstract question is further shewn by the fact that the following verse, which returns to a consideration of the entities under discussion, starts with a reaffirmation of the proposition that the discrete principles have a cause. Moreover if Mr. Davies' proposition be accepted, neither the relevancy nor the cogency of several of the arguments advanced in the verse in question is apparent. And in this connection the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* may be referred to. There we find that the same arguments are used to substantiate the proposition that there is no production of an effect which did not exist previously (see I. 113-118). What is even more significant is that quite other arguments are used to prove that Intellect and the rest are products (I. 129-134). Thus it seems clear to me that though Wilson got rather mixed up in his criticism of Lassen, he was not wrong when he said that सत् कार्य' meant 'existent effect prior to the exercise of the (efficient) cause' (p. 34).

end ; for instance, he who desires curds [takes] milk, not water. Hence effect subsists.

Again, **from the absence of universal production.** Every thing is not possible everywhere, as, gold [is not possible] in silver and the like, in grass, dust or sand. Hence, because of the absence of universal possibility (of everything), effect subsists.

Further, **from the production by the capable of what it is competent to.** Here a [particular] potter, [who is] a competent agent, or the material means [he employs, *viz.*], the lump of clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c., produce out of a clod of earth the practicable pot. Hence effect subsists.

Lastly, **effect subsists because it is [nothing else than] the cause.** Whatever the character of the cause, such is the character of the effect, as, from barley [is produced] barley, from paddy rice. If effect were not pre-existent, rice might grow from pease¹. But it does not. Therefore effect is.

Thus by five arguments, Intellect and the other modes [are shown to pre-]exist in Nature. Consequently, production is of what is and not of what is not.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] According to the logicians the non-existent springs from the existent ; so long as the effect has not been produced, the cause is non-existent because of indemonstrability ; then, how does it afterwards become existent, for the effect cannot create existence for the non-existent ? It is said accordingly : **An effect, &c.**

The effect must have been existing before causal action, and was not then non-existent ; the reason of this

¹ शालिः is a kind of superior rice, कीदृवः of coarse grain.

is assigned : **Because the non-existent cannot be produced**, the production of the previously non-existent being impossible, like that of a man's horn ; otherwise a man's horn will also come into existence, the non-existent being non-specific.¹

Another reason is stated, **because of the employment, &c.** : because of the adoption of material means by one desirous of producing ; as, one desiring curds employs cream and nothing else ; if effect were non-existent, then he might use water, but he does not ; hence from [the fact] that means have to be selected it is seen that the effect [pre-]exists in the cause.

Another reason : **because of the absence of universal production.** From observing pot and the like being produced from earth and the rest, one can say that in the world that which pre-exists in any thing, that alone is evolved therefrom. If the effect were non-existent, then every thing would be possible out of every thing, for the non-existent is non-specific. It should not be said that an object is produced only where there was a prior privation of it ; where yarn is non-existent, where is the prior privation of cloth ? Nor should it be said that it is in time ; since prior privation is non-active,² it cannot come into thread, and so it cannot exist

¹ Since the non-existent has no specific marks ; it may be the same in all cases. In fact, it is not possible to predicate anything of it except mere negation of being, consequently any attribute that we assign to a particular non-existent thing may be extended to every other.

² According to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools activity or motion belongs only to a substance and not to what is merely a negation like **प्रगभाव**.

therein. Nor is this prior privation the form of its receptacle thread ; for, the quality of being a receptacle is unqualified,¹ and so the thread-form would also be the prior privation of pot and the rest. Nor is causality as determined by cloth the limiting attribute [here],² the determinative character being not possible of non-existent cloth, &c., since the existent and the non-existent are unconnected³. If of determinativeness &c., determination be considered the form, the defect remains as bad as ever.⁴ For the effect being non-existent in the cause, there is nothing to appoint the specific causality⁵ thereof [of the pot, that is.] in earth and nowhere else. This has been explained at large elsewhere.

Another reason : **Because of the effecting, &c.** Material causality consists in competency to [produce] the

¹ That is, has no particular determinations, is the same in all cases.

² This being a particular species of causality, one which is restricted to cloth and does not extend to pot, the prior privation in question would be limited to cloth as desired.

³ पटनिरूपितकारणत्वं means simply 'the causality of cloth.' For if causality be determined by cloth, the latter becomes the determinant of the former, or (to use the language of modern Nyāya) the attribute determinativeness resides in it. The argument is this: there can be no connection between what is existing and what is not; now the cloth here is non-existent, how can you then assign the positive attribute of determinativeness to it? Consequently this cloth can not determine the causality of anything, and the suggested limitation fails.

⁴ If determination as such—abstract and unqualified by anything—be taken to define the prior privation, matters are not mended, for there is nothing to determine specific differences.

⁵ That is, causality determined by the effect.

effect, it being hard to predicate the same of anything else [*viz.*, the incompetent]. Power is the potentiality of the product ; otherwise, if [conceived as] unconnected with the effect, the result, would be confusion, if [conceived as] connected, there can be no relations for the non-existent ;¹ whence the production of the practicable by the capable also [shows that] effect subsists.

Another reason : **because of the nature of a cause.** Because the *Śruti*, “then surely it [Nature] was without modifications,”² indicates the identity of cause and effect even before phenomenal creation, and since effect has cause for its essence, it exists. If it did not, the identity of the existent and the non-existent would not arise, such is the sense. Moreover, in the world the effect is seen to follow the nature of the cause, as, grain produces grain, rice rice ; if non-existent were the product, then rice might come from grain and *vice versa* ; but such is not the case ; whence from effect being of the essence of cause, the [pre-]existence of effect once more [follows].

Nor should materials be spoken of as useless because of the eternality of the effect, for those are for the purpose of manifestation. Nor would there be a conflict with the theory of [pre-]existence of effect if manifestation be considered a product ; for were it eternal it should be constant, whereas if it depended upon a prior

¹ If power be not a potentiality then it must be either connected with the effect or not ; the first case would lead to confusion by making the production of everything out of anything possible, the second case is negatived by the consideration that there can be no connection with a thing non-existent.

² *S'ātrīa-bhāṣya*.

manifestation there would be a regress to infinity. For although eternal, the manifestation of particular effects, which is practically effective, being identical with the force of goodness inherent in those effects, ceases to be so owing to the opposition of darkness. But the materials which lead to manifestation serve as an exciting cause and prevent, like the jewel [which is supposed to neutralise the burning power of fire], the operation of darkness, whence follows practical efficacy.¹ Hence all objection to the theory of [pre-]existence of effect is removed by merely admitting the urgent character of the materials.² Therefore even in the identity of cause and effect, practical effectiveness resides in the effect when manifested as such, and not elsewhere ; and this is open to no exception. Let this suffice.

ANNOTATIONS.

We have been told that Nature is to be inferred from its effects. We shall now be shown by an investigation

¹ The idea is that though there is no production of the effect as a distinct and previously non-existent entity, yet the materials have a useful end to serve, inasmuch as without them there would be no manifestation of the effect. The factor of darkness obstructs manifestation, but the materials, through the force of inherent goodness, neutralise the effect of darkness and, by their exciting character, render manifestation practically effective. The allusion is to a certain jewel which was supposed to neutralise the burning power of fire, but the effect of which being counteracted in its turn by another jewel, the said power was revived. See *Bhāshāparichchheda* and *Muktāvali*.

² The relation between production and manifestation is discussed in Aphorisms 119-123, Book I, *Sāṅkhya Pravachana*.

into the nature of an effect that such an inference will be valid and legitimate.

The question 'what is the significance of the causal relation?' has been differently answered by different schools of Hindu thought. The several theories fall into four broad divisions.¹

1) The Bauddhas maintain that that which is proceeds from that which is not, and thus the existent is produced from the non-existent.

(2) The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeshikas, on the contrary, hold that the process is the other way, --before the operation of the cause where is the effect?--and therefore the (previously) non-existent is produced from the existent.

(3) The Vedāntists assert that the effect is not a separately existent thing, but that it is only an illusory emanation from the cause which alone exists.

(4) The Sāṅkhyas affirm that the cause and the effect are both real and both existent, that *ens* proceeds from *ens*.

It is necessary to clear up certain misapprehensions before we can be in a position to understand either Kapila's own doctrine or his criticisms of other doctrines. The Hindus were fully conscious of the fact that the word 'cause' had not always the same application, that it was employed to signify very different things. E. g., when considering a pot, we speak sometimes of the potter *who made it* as the cause, sometimes of the clay

¹ This is the classification that Mādhava Āchārya (*Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha*, Cowell and Gough, pp. 224-6) and Vāchaspati Miśra (*Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* on *Kārikās* 8-9) adopt.

out of which it was made as the cause, and sometimes of the shape *which made it what it is* as the cause. These three causes are distinguished in Hindu Logic as नैमित्तिक (instrumental), समवाय¹ (of intimate relation), and, असमवाय (of non-intimate relation) respectively. This division, a student of philosophy will at once see, corresponds to Aristotle's distinction of causes into Efficient, Material, and Formal. There is another possible use of the word 'cause.' Taking the instance of the pot again, we may say that the purpose *for which it was made* is the cause why it was made at all. This the great Greek calls the Final Cause. But a little consideration will show that this is properly not a cause at all. It is *the end* why the object was made. The Hindus took this view and did not denominate it a *cause*. The distinctions that they made, however, they were fully alive to. As Vijnána Bhikshu puts it, "that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed ;"² and it is upon this ground that the Aphorist lays down that works, the unseen power of merit and demerit, cannot replace Nature as the cause of the world as perceived ; each is a cause, but in a different way.³

This will make it evident that when the sages in Ancient India spoke of the identity of cause and effect, they did neither talk nonsense nor did they confound the potter with the pot. What they meant by that phrase we shall now examine.

¹ The more common word in Sāṅkhya works is उपादान.

² Ballantyne's *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms*, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 97 ; l. 81.

(1) The opinion of the Buddhists is clearly erroneous. For how can that which is non-existent and unsubstantial operate as a cause at all? And, next, what identity of nature is there between the existent and the non-existent so as to lead to the establishment of a causal nexus being them? From nothing nothing can proceed.¹ The Buddhists hold that all existence is momentary, and their theory of causation is a necessary consequence of this fundamental fallacy. All things being momentary, when the antecedent departs, it leaves no residue behind, the consequent is therefore not competent to arise and survive it.² And the causal relation can hardly obtain between things that arise simultaneously, for it is matter of ordinary experience that a man has to take a lump of clay and mould it before a jar can be produced.³

(2) The Naiyāyika view is not also sound. How can the non-existent be produced from the existent? What is production but a transformation? And nothing can be developed or transformed into what is essentially different from it, what is foreign to its nature. E. g., you cannot change a man into a horse, a fish into a fowl. If one thing is to cause another, it must be by virtue of some relationship established between them, some community that makes it possible for the one to operate upon the other. A thing that does not exist cannot possibly be made to exist. The property of being

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 78, 80.

² *Ibid.*, I. 39. The similarity between the doctrine criticised and that enounced in recent times by David Hume is, to say the least, remarkable.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 38.

an entity does not belong to it, and it cannot be superimposed upon it *ab extra*. E. g., there is no such thing as a man's horn. Now, no amount of human ingenuity will be able to bring it into being.¹ If you say that it is not necessary that there should be any connection between the cause and the effect, we demur. If there were absence of such connection, how could we assign any particular effect to any particular cause? Any thing could then produce anything. But it is not so.² Only particular materials can yield particular products. You press sand ever so much, not a single drop of oil will thence come out. Only sesamum seeds can yield oil.³ Both the cause and the effect must be suited to one another; the former must be competent to produce the latter and the latter must be capable of being produced by the former.⁴ A piece of cloth is to be made out of yarn, not earth, and the weaver must make it, not the potter. It is for these reasons that a Sāṅkhya teacher said, "From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an utter want of determinativeness."⁵ •

3) The Vedāntic doctrine is also untenable. You attribute all these multifarious forms of existence to a *single* cause. But oneness is not compatible with multitude. How can then this manifold existence have

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 114.

² *Ibid.*, I. 116.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 115.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 117.

⁵ Quoted by Mādhava Achārya, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

sprung from that which is not itself manifold? You further say that this sole cause of yours is intelligent, that it is none other than Brahmá himself. But the so-called material creation is devoid of intelligence. Here again we have a cause and an effect between which there is no sort of community. How can then one be attributed to the other as an *emanation*? Lastly, you describe the world as an *illusory* emanation from Brahmá. But this is directly contradicted by the evidence of our senses, and cannot be correct.¹ If our senses gave false information, they would be liable to confutation by subsequent experience. E. g., on first sight I may mistake a rope for a snake, but a closer inspection would discover the error. Or on account of jaundice I may be led to fancy a white conch-shell to be yellow. But in the case of the world such a faulty cause, any temporary or occasional depravity of the senses, is out of the question for the cognition of the world as genuine is with all and always.² If we were to deny the reality of the world, we shall have to declare for a void.³ For it is intuition which apprises us of either the external (*objects*) or the internal (*thoughts*), and if we deny its validity in the one case, we cannot consistently maintain it in the other. Thus absolute nihilism would result.

(4) We have now by exclusion reached the fourth theory, that of Kapila. This is that the effect is as much real as the cause, that what is proceeds from what is. As is said in *Bhagavad Gítá*, "there is no existence for the

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 42.

² *Ibid.*, I. 79.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 43. Nihilism is combated in Aphorisms 45 and 46.

non-existent, nor non-existence for the existent " (II. 16). Thus the causal relation in ultimate analysis resolves into a relation of identity. Cloth is made out of threads because it already exists there.* It is not meant that the threads are cloth; obviously they are not; but a particular arrangement of them is,—when they are arranged in this particular way cloth-hood is *manifested* in them and they become capable of performing the office of clothing. Thus all production is but manifestation,¹ all causation is only the transformation of a *potentiality* into *esse*. Nor when we speak of *destruction* should we be understood to mean anything more than the dissolution of the thing spoken of as destroyed into the cause from which it was produced. There is no such thing as annihilation; the wise can trace resurrection everywhere. "For example, when thread is destroyed, it changes into the form of earth,² the earth changes into the form of a cotton-tree, and this [successively] changes into the form of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]."³

Such briefly is the Sāṅkhya doctrine of causation.

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 120. As Aniruddha points out, "the differences in the employment of words as well as in the practical use depend on the manifestation." E.g., if the jar is not manifested, we speak of clay; but if it is manifested, we call it a jar; we cannot fetch water with it in the former case, in the latter we can. (Garbe, *op. cit.*, p. 68.)

² "As when burned to ashes" Ballantyne adds within brackets (p. 142).

³ Aniruddha on I. 121 (Garbe, p. 69). This adumbration of the modern doctrine of conservation of energy is interesting. Cf. also I. 11 with commentary.

There is one point in which the Sāṅkhist and the Vedāntist agree. It is that the effect in its essence is identical with the cause. Where they differ is in the reality that each attaches to the effect. The Hindu pantheist believes that this effect is only an illusion, that the world is nothing but a waking dream. The sole reality that lies underneath is the Supreme Universal Spirit. The Hindu dualist, on the other hand, is not prepared to give up the reality of the world so easily; he believes that the formal existence we perceive is not illusory, that it is made up of things which have an actual existence, temporary, if not permanent. The ultimate entity they are symbols of is the formless Non-ego. Kapila stops there.

This doctrine of causality being a fixed relation, a relation of identity, has been misapprehended and much criticised. It is useful to remember, however, that it has been reaffirmed in quite modern times by Hegel in Germany and by Hamilton in Scotland.¹ But in saying this we should not forget that the problem has presented itself to the Hindu and the European mind in very different lights; while the latter has viewed it from the *subjective* point of view, the former has viewed it

¹ See the view of the modern idealists powerfully yet lucidly presented by Prof. Watson in his *Comte, Mill, and Spencer*, Ch. V. He says, "in discovering the cause of the event we are simply discovering an *identical relation*. The difference between a cause and an effect is not the difference between one phenomenon and another, but consists in the discovery of the fixed nature of the one single fact or phenomenon" (p. 95).

from the *objective*.¹ It is curious to note how the so-called 'dreamy Hindu' ever falls back upon experience and busies himself with things as distinct from theories.

It remains to notice how completely Cousin failed to understand the Sāṅkhya theory of causation. What he says is this: "The argument of Kapila is, in the history of philosophy, the antecedent of that of Ænesidemus and Hume. According to Kapila there is no proper notion of a cause, and what we call a cause is only an apparent cause relatively to the effect which follows it, but it is also an effect relatively to the cause which precedes it, which again is an effect on the same ground, and thus for ever, so that the whole is a necessary series of effects without any real and independent cause." Comment is needless.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयव' परतन्त्र' व्यक्त' विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥१०॥

10. The Manifested is caused, non-eternal, limited, changeful, multiform, depend-

¹ This point is emphasised by Rajkrishṇa Mukherji in his *Lecture on Hindu Philosophy*, p. 30 [1870].

ent,¹ attributive,² conjunct [and] subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] It was said "like and unlike Nature" (verse 8). How it is so is now explained.

The **manifested**, that is, Intellect and the other products, are **caused**, furnished with a cause (*hetu*, *upādāna*, *kāraṇa*, and *nimitta* being synonymous terms). Nature is the cause of the manifested. Therefore all the perceptible principles, inclusive of the gross elements, have a cause. [Thus,] intellect finds its cause in Nature, self-consciousness in intellect, ether in rudimental sound, air in rudimental touch, light in rudimental colour, water in rudimental taste, earth in rudimental smell. Hence the Manifested up to the gross elements have a cause.

What else? **Non-eternal**, inasmuch as produced by another; as, a pot is non-eternal, because made from a clod of earth.

Also, **non-pervading**, that is, not entering everywhere; for instance, Nature and Soul are omnipresent, not so the discrete principles.

¹ Colebrooke renders, "supporting," which is not quite exact. The idea rather is (in Wilson's words), "supported by, referable to." Lassen gives "innixum," St. Hilaire "accidentel."

² The word लिङ्ग has caused some difference of opinion. As the *Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhāṣya* puts it, "An effect is termed लिङ्ग either from its being the ground of inference of cause, or from its progress to resolution" (I. 124). Gauḍapāda and Aniruddha (followed by Colebrooke and Ballantyne), adopt the latter view; Vāchaspatī and Nārāyaṇa take the former view. This is more in consonance with the ordinary terminology of Hindu Logic.

What else? **Changeful**, [it] moves [from one body to another] at the time of dissolution; furnished with the thirteen instruments and indwelling the subtle frame it migrates; hence is endowed with motion.

What else? It is **multiform**, [comprising] Intellect, egoism, the five elemental rudiments, the eleven organs of sense, and the five gross elements.

What else? **Dependent**, supported by its cause, [thus,] consciousness is supported by Nature, self-apperception by consciousness, the eleven organs and the five subtle principles by self-apperception, and the five gross elements by the five subtle principles.

Also, **mergent**, perishable; at the time [of (general) dissolution, the five gross elements merge into the subtle principles, these together with the eleven organs of sense into self-consciousness, this into intellect, which, again, into Nature.

Further, **conjunct**, accompanied by properties, [*viz.*,] sound, touch, taste, colour, and smell.

Moreover, **subordinate**, not self-governed; for example, intellect is governed by Nature, egoism by intellect, the rudiments and the sense-organs by egoism and the five gross elements by the rudiments. Thus it is subordinate or dependent. The Manifest category has been [now] described.

We shall now describe the unmanifested: **The unmanifested is the reverse**. It is contrary with reference to the qualities specified. [*E.g.*], the Manifested has been said to be caused, [but] there is nothing prior to Nature, whence it is unproduced; therefore the unmanifested is uncaused. Again, the Manifested is non-eternal, [but] the unmanifested is eternal because unoriginated; it

is not like the elements produced from any where,—thus it is Primal Nature. Further, the Manifested is non-pervading, Nature is universal, because all-pervasive. The Manifested is movable, the unmanifested is not, owing to the [same] omnipresence. Moreover, the Manifested is multiform, Nature one, because it is the (Prime) Cause; “Nature is the sole cause of the three worlds,” and hence it is single. Again, the Manifested is dependent, the unmanifested is self-supported, because not an effect; there is nothing beyond Nature of which it can be an evolute. Again, the Manifested is subject to resolution, the unmanifested is indissoluble, because eternal; *Mahat* and the other modes will at the time of general dissolution resolve into one another, not so Nature; therefore it is immergent. Again, the Manifested is compound, the Unmanifested is uncompounded,—sound, touch, taste, form and smell subsist not in the Prime Cause. Finally, the Manifested is subordinate, the Unmanifested is independent, governed by itself.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] In a previous verse (8) Intellect and the other products were described as like and unlike Nature. This is now explained [more] particularly¹:
The Manifested, &c.

The manifested principles, twenty-three in number, beginning with intellect and ending with the earth, are **caused**, [that is], they appear only occasionally (or intermittently). **Non-eternal**, that is, apt to disappear at times. **Non-pervasive**, not extending everywhere, [for]

¹ Literally, with a view to [enable one to acquire] special knowledge [of the same].

if pervasive they would not be subject to change.¹ **Changeful**, possessed of motion like [that involved in] entrance &c.; intellect and the rest leave one body and enter into another.

Multiform, possessing individual inter-specific distinctions through differences of individuals. And this attribute means the property of possessing principle-differentiating class-marks, which have the same substratum as the reciprocal privation of the things which contain the inter-specific individual differences.² This definition is applicable to *mahat* and the rest, because the mutual negation of a particular *mahat*, and [the generic] *mahatva* both reside in another *mahat* [from which the first *mahat* is contradistinguished]. But it applies not to Nature, since [it being one], the reciprocal privation thereof does not exist in itself; and although such negation exists in Soul, the generic mark of Nature is absent therefrom. In order to exclude an undue

¹ A thing like ether, time, &c., which is all-pervasive, is called **विशु**, and as such has no motion or activity. See *Bhāshāparichchheda* and *Muktāvali*.

² The point is that *Mahat* &c., are all different in different individuals, or, in the language of Nyāya, they possess **सजातीयभेद**, which means the difference that subsists between two objects which belong to the same class and are yet individually distinct. Let us suppose, for instance, that **महत्त्व** in A is different from **महत्त्व** in B. Here **महत्त्व** abstractly is the same in both cases and is a **तत्त्वविभाजकीपाधि**: (see p. 22), but with reference to the individualistic difference it possesses **सजातीयभेद**. The substratum of this difference is the **महत्त्व** in A, and the reciprocal privation thereof is the **महत्त्व** in B, the two being different from one another.

extension [of the definition] to [the case of] Soul, supply the epithet 'composed of the three constituents.' Or multiformity is difference due to disparity of creation, that is, characterised by absence of community between two creations.¹ This will restrict too wide an application [of the term].

Dependent, existing (as conditioned or concomitant), as, intellect in Nature, egoism in intellect, the rudiments in egoism, the elements in the rudiments: thus it is to be understood as far as possible.

Attributive, that which characterises or makes known, it is the basis of inference, for this product [of Nature] is the parent of the inference that a cause, the World-stuff, exists, as also of the inference that an experiencer, the Soul, exists, because it (the world) is an object of experience.

Conjunct, invested with properties. **Subordinate**, the essence as well as the modifications [of the evolutes] being directly or indirectly dependent upon Nature.

The contraries of these are said to be in Nature. **The Unmanifested**, World-stuff, is the reverse: uncaused, since causality is admitted to be restricted to² Nature; permanent, because of non-produced character; universal, because all-pervasive; immutable, because free from soothing and other changes;³ single, [that is,]

¹ According to this explanation, *Mahat* &c. are many not because they are different in different individuals, but because they are different in different creations.

² Lit., 'to rest in.' That is, it does not extend any further, else Nature would become an effect, and thereby an infinite regress of causes be given rise to.

³ This passage is rather obscure.

without specific differences; self-supported, because without cause; non-attributive, not demonstrating a cause, —thus there is no harm even if it supports an inference of Soul; uncompounded, being without cause; independent, being competent to work by itself. Since¹ these characteristics belong also to Soul, the epithet, 'composed of constituents,' should be introduced to restrict an over-wide application. This is the substance.

ANNOTATIONS.

After having investigated the nature of the causal relation, the author proceeds to specify the characteristic marks of the three principles, a discriminative knowledge of which is the goal of philosophy. And, of course, in such an enquiry it is only natural that that should be first described which is best known and most readily cognoscible. Neither the Ego nor the Non-ego in its pristine simplicity, as it is in its essence, is matter of ordinary knowledge. The non-ego we are familiar with is not the non-ego as it actually is, but the non-ego *as we know it*—the non-ego reflected and transformed in order that it might become an object of knowledge to the ego. It is this cognoscible non-ego, or, more accurately, this synthesised condition of the ego and the non-ego, which simplicity, as it is in its essence, is matter of ordinary knowledge. The non-ego we are familiar with is not the non-ego as it actually is but the non-ego *as we know it*, the non-ego reflected and transformed in order that it might become an object of knowledge to the ego. It is

¹ Lit., though.

this cognoscible non-ego, or, more accurately, this synthesised condition of the ego and the non-ego, which is called 'अव्यक्त' in Sāṅkhya Philosophy. The non-ego as soon as it is brought near, the ego assumes certain forms and becomes manifest unto it. In its formless unknown condition it can only be described as the unmanifest objective ('अव्यक्त'). The change of condition, the passage from the uncognised to the cognised state, must, however, entail some diversity in the attributes. There must surely remain a certain number of attributes which are common to both conditions, but the contact with the ego must give rise to some new features. These new features which a perceiving mind superinduces are detailed in the verse under consideration. The non-ego as we see it is an effect, a mode or modification of the original cosmic stuff due to perception. As a mode it can neither be permanent nor universal, nor constant, nor uniform, nor independent of condition or government. It is further invested with properties and is fitted to serve as a basis for inference.¹ Being the result of a union of the ego and the non-ego, it can furnish us with no uncertain indications of the nature of either. And, in fact, it is upon the 'व्यक्त' that sciences and philosophies have generally been built.

It is interesting to note here that, as observed by Dr. Hall the corresponding aphorism in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* (I. 124) is to a syllable the first half of this *kārikā*. The question of the relation between these two works we must for the present reserve for fuller treatment elsewhere.

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 135-136.

But parallelisms and coincidences like these are instructive.¹

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः² सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तम् तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

11. The Manifested has trine constituents, and is indiscriminative, objective, generic,³ irrational and productive. So also is Nature. Soul is the reverse in these respects as in those.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Thus having specified the differences between the Manifested and the Unmanifested principles, [the author] proceeds to describe the similarities, for it was said, "it is also like" [verse 8].

The Manifested has three constituents, [viz.], goodness, passion and darkness. It is **indiscriminative**, without power of differentiation; it is not capable of distinguishing, for instance, that this is the Manifested

¹ Compare Hall's Preface to *Sāṅkhya Sāra*, pp. 7-12.

² Some editions read विषयम्.

³ "Common" (Lassen, Colebrooke). Davies, who gives "generic," explains, "it possesses generic or specific forms," and questions Gauḍapāda's interpretation. The objection proceeds upon a misapprehension. The meaning is not that "each may form, with others, things that have common properties," but that no mode of Nature is restricted to any particular subject (or object), but that any may come into existence with reference to any ego. The Hindu commentators seem to be unanimous on the point.

and these are [its] properties, that that is a cow and the other is a horse, that as are the properties so is the manifested principle, as is the principle so are the properties, and so forth. Again, the manifested is **objective**, that is, an object of enjoyment (or use), being an object [of experience] for all souls. The Manifested, again, is **generic**, since it is, like a harlot, common to all. The Manifested is **irrational**, it does not feel pleasure, pain, or insensibility. Lastly, the Manifested is **productive**, thus, Intellect produces self-consciousness, which produces the five rudiments and the eleven organs, and which rudiments, again, produce the five gross elements.

Thus have the characteristics of the Manifested been detailed up to 'productive', and it is in them that the unmanifested is similar,—as are the discrete principles, so is Nature. Thus like the Manifested, the Unmanifested has three constituents, [and] of this Intellect and the rest, similarly constituted, are products; in this world, the effect is of like quality with the cause, as, of black threads a black cloth is made. So, the Manifested is undiscriminating, Nature also cannot discriminate between the constituents, cannot distinguish that properties are one thing and the world-stuff another; hence the Prime Cause is undiscerning. Again, the Manifested is objective, so also Nature, being an object for all Souls.

Again, the Manifested is generic, so is also Nature, being common to all [things]. Moreover the Manifested is irrational, so is also Nature, unconscious of pleasure, pain, or dulness; whence is this inferred? [From the irrationality of its effect, because] from an unconscious lump of clay an (irrational) pot is produced. Finally, the Manifested is productive, so is also Nature, for from

it Intellect springs. Thus Nature has also been described.

Now **soul is the reverse in these respects as in those**, [this] is explained, Soul is the reverse of both the Manifested and the Unmanifested. Thus : those two principles possess three constitutive factors, soul possesses none ; they are indiscriminative, it is discriminative ; they are objective, it is not [an object of sense or fruition] ; they are generic, it is specific (or individual) ; they are irrational, it is rational, being conscious of pleasure, pain and insensibility ; they are productive, it is unprolific—nothing is born of Soul. Hence it is said, “ the soul is the reverse.”

It is also said **as in those** ; in the preceding verse as Nature was explained to be without cause, such also is Soul. There it is stated, the Manifested is caused, non-eternal, &c., the Unmanifested is the reverse. That is, the Manifested is caused, the Unmanifested uncaused, so also is Soul uncaused, because not produced. The Manifested is non-eternal, the Unmanifested eternal, so also is Soul eternal. The Manifested is non-pervasive, the Unmanifested is all-pervading, so also is Soul, through omnipresence. The Manifested is changeful, the Unmanifested unchanging, so also is Soul, because all-pervasive. The Manifested is many, the Unmanifested one, so is the Soul one (uniform). The Manifested is dependent, the Unmanifested independent, so also is Soul independent. The Manifested is dissoluble, the Unmanifested immergent, so also is Soul irresolvable, it never is decomposed. The Manifested is compound, the Unmanifested is uncombined, so also is Soul uncombined, in it no parts [like] sound and the rest exist. Finally, the Manifested

is subordinate, the Unmanifested self-governed, so also is Soul self-governed, ruled by itself.

Thus the common properties of Nature and Soul were explained in the preceding verse ; the common properties of Nature and the Manifested, and the dissimilar of Soul, have been explained in this verse, " the Manifested," &c.¹

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Having specified the points of difference between the Manifested and the Unmanifested principles, [the author] now proceeds to enumerate the points of likeness.

The Manifested are *Mahat* and the rest ; the Unmanifested is Nature. The three constituents are goodness, passion, and darkness ; they are possessed by Nature, since that is the equipoised condition of the constitutives ; and by Intellect and the rest, since they are evolutes of Nature, and hence composed of them.

Indiscriminative, indiscrete from Nature. In *Mahat* and the rest there is this absence of separation from Nature, because of the identity of cause and effect ; Nature, on the other hand, is so *per se*.

Objective, distinct from knowledge. Not of the form of knowledge, as the Yogachāris say ; if it were so, it would not be possible for what is one to be enjoyed (*i.e.*, acquired) by many ; knowledge of each being particular and individual.

Common, being alike through the constitutive factors ; or because enjoyable (*i.e.*, experiencable) by all souls, like a harlot.

¹ In Pandit Bechanarāma's edition the original of this is printed as forming a part of the commentary on the next verse.

Irrational, not possessing self-illuminative intelligence through lack of insight (luminosity).

Productive, causing the evolution of others ; since from Intellect spring Egoism and the rest, and from Nature springs Intellect.

Thus the points of likeness between the Manifested and the Unmanifested principles have been described. Now the points of likeness and unlikeness between these principles, [on the one hand], and the soul, [on the other], are specified : **Soul is**, &c.

Soul is the opposite of the Manifested and the Unmanifested since it is devoid of 'qualities,' not objective, non-generic, intelligent and unproductive. It is further like Nature being uncaused and so forth, and it is also like the discrete principles through multiplicity. This is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

In the preceding verse we have been told in what respects the non-ego as known differs from the non-ego as unknown. We are now told in what respects they agree. It is not difficult to find the principles which underlie and govern all the agreements and differences. The features that are peculiar to the perceived Objective may all be traced to its being a mode or a product. As so it cannot naturally share them with the Prime Evolvent, the formless Objective. But the properties that belong to it as the Objective must belong to it whether it is perceived or not. These essential features are common. For instance, Nature is the equiposed

condition of three factors¹ (about which more presently); its evolutes must consist of the same three constituents, and possess all attributes that result from such constitution.²

Soul or the Ego, however, as was to be expected, differs in all material respects from the Non-ego. It is the knowing subject as distinguished from the known object, and it is the very contrariety of the two which brings them together. There is one feature, however, which requires some consideration. The manifest principles we are told are many, the unmanifested is only one. Is soul one or many? It will be noticed that with reference to this question the two commentators differ, and it may be added that Vāchaspati supports Nārāyaṇa's interpretation. The Sāṅkhya strongly enforces the plurality of souls.³ What then does Gauḍapāda mean by saying that the soul is *one*? We believe the explanation is to be found in Aphorism 154 of the First Book. It declares that wherever the Scriptures speak of the oneness of Soul "the reference is to the genus," to Soul in general, to the sameness of all Souls. Soul is further 'single' in the sense of being an absolutely simple, essentially fixed, unqualified entity. Colebrooke, followed by Wilson, understands Gauḍapāda to mean the "individual" Soul, "which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation."

¹ Compare *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 61.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, I. 126.

³ Cf. *Ibid.*, I. 149-157, where the question is discussed.

प्रोत्यप्रोतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।

अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

12 The constituents are [respectively] characterised¹ by pleasure, pain and dulness, and are adapted to manifestation, activity and restraint; [they] mutually subdue, support, and produce each other, as also consort and function together.²

[GAUDAPÁDA.] For a more specific realisation of the three constituents that were described there [in verse 11] as possessed by the Manifested and the Unmanifested [alike], it is [now] said as follows:—

The constitutives, goodness, foulness and darkness are [respectively] pleasant, unpleasant and stupefying. Thus, goodness is pleasant, of the essence of happiness, that is, **pleasure** meaning happiness; foulness is painful, **pain**

¹ More properly, have for their essence or internal reality. The word आत्मन् has a special significance, it suggests that pleasure, pain and dulness are realities, for, as Váchaspati puts it, "negatives could not be essential ingredients in any thing."

² This is the construction indicated by Gaudapáda, and is adopted by Colebrooke (who translates "are reciprocally present"), St. Hilaire (who renders "se suppléent reciproquement"), and Davies (who gives "take each other's condition"). The later commentators, however, understand वृत्तयः (functioning) as going with the four foregoing terms. This change of construction does not seem to affect the general sense materially. The meaning, according to Davies, is that "each *guṇa* may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others, or be the same in effect." Cf. note 5, p. 91 *post*.

meaning unpleasantness; darkness is dulling, **dulness** meaning stupefaction.

Next, **are adapted to manifestation, &c.** The word *artha* signifies competency. Goodness is adapted to manifestation, that is, is capable of it. Foulness is adapted to activity; darkness to restraint, that is, it is fit for immobility. Thus the qualities are [respectively] characterised by manifestation, action, and inertia.

Further, **they mutually subdue each other, &c.** They are mutually dominant, sustaining, productive, consorting, and co-existent. **They mutually subdue each other**, [that is], domineer over one another by means of their [respective] properties of pleasure, pain, &c.; thus, whenever goodness is paramount, it conquers foulness and darkness by its properties, and subsists in the form of light and joy; whenever foulness [predominates], it [subdues] goodness and darkness, and exists in pain and action; whenever darkness [triumphs], it [overpowers] goodness and passion, and exists in dulness and immobility. The constituents are further **mutually supportive**, like diads.¹ They are **mutually productive**, as a clod of earth produces a jar. Next, **mutually consorting**, as the male and the female associate together, so [do] the constitutive factors; so it is said, "Goodness is the consort of foulness, foulness of goodness; and of both goodness and foulness darkness is termed the consort."² That is, they help

¹ द्वयुक्त "binary atoms" (Wilson).

² Vāchaspati cites a parallel passage from the Vedas, and adds, "All universally present are the associates of each other, ... their original conjunction or disjunction is never observed."

one another. They are **reciprocally co-existent**, are present together, from the text, "qualities deal with qualities."¹ As, a beautiful and amiable woman, [who] is the source of all happiness, is a cause of misery to co-wives, and of stupefaction to the dissolute; thus goodness [becomes] the cause of the [concurrent] action of the other constituents. So also a king, always employed in protecting his subjects and repressing the wicked, causes happiness to the good, sorrow and mortification to the evil; thus foulness (or activity) occasions the [co-operant] action of goodness and darkness. Similarly, darkness, by its investing nature, produces the effects of the other two factors; as, clouds, by covering the atmosphere, occasion happiness to the world, while, by means of rain, [they] promote the labours of the agriculturer and, [at the same time], overwhelm with sorrow the separated lover. Thus the constituents are mutually co-existent.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] The three constituent factors have been spoken of; their nature, objects, and functions are next explained, **The constituents, &c.:**

The constituent powers, goodness, passion and darkness, are respectively pleasant, [painful and dull]. **Pleasure** [or] happiness comprehends simplicity, soft-

¹ Cf. *Bhagavad Gītā*, III. 28, XIV. 23. What is there meant is that one who has learnt the distinction between self and the 'qualities' never thinks that his soul is the agent, because he knows that all so-called work is the result of the senses (which are composed of the 'qualities') being applied to their objects (which again owe their being to the 'qualities'). Wilson's explanation, however, is, "the same qualities may be regarded as different, according to their different effects."

ness, modesty, reverence, forgiveness, compassion and the like. **Pain** [or] misery comprehends hatred, violence, malice, censure, humiliation, &c. **Dulness** [or] stupefaction comprehends deceit, fear, impiety,¹ wickedness, imbecility, ignorance, &c. Where any of these is to be found, the corresponding constituent is to be presumed, this is the sense.

The characteristics having been specified, their [respective] objects are [next] enumerated, **are adapted**, &c. **Manifestation**, [that is], illumination, **activity**, and **restraint** are the respective ends or objects of goodness, passion, and darkness. Thus, goodness directed by passion produces effects, unless restrained by enveloping darkness; so obstructed by darkness the other fails in its object; therefore this obstruction is to be considered as the end of the [third constituent].

Mutually, &c. "Mutually" and "functioning" are to be construed with all the four.

Have mutual subjugation for their function; thus, the prevalence of goodness, by the repression of passion and darkness, brings about soothing (or solace); similarly, passion, by overpowering the rest, produces terror, and darkness stupefaction.²

Have mutual support for their function; [that is], any one of the constituents, with a view to effecting its own end, proceeds after taking the other two for its associates.

Have mutual production for their function; that is, are mutually productive, because all products contain within them the three constitutive factors.

¹ Literally 'atheism.'

² Cf. verse 38 below.

Have mutual intercourse for their function ; that is, consort together like male and female. The peculiarity here is that if one is dominant the others become feeble ; this has been observed.

सत्त्वं लघुः प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं¹ चलं च रजः ।

गुरुवरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥१३॥

13. Goodness is considered light and illuminating ; passion exciting and mobile ; darkness is heavy and enveloping. Their [co-operant] action, like that of a lamp, is purposive².

[GAUDAPĀDA.] What else ? **Goodness is light and enlightening.** When goodness predominates, the limbs feel light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses exultant.

Passion is exciting and mobile. What urges is "exciting," as, an ox displays violent excitement on seeing another ox ; this is the influence of passion. Passion is also seen to be "mobile," a passionate man is fickle.

Darkness is 'heavy and enveloping. When darkness triumphs, the limbs feel heavy, and the senses are dull, incapable of performing their functions.

¹ Lassen reads उपस्तम्भकं, which Wilson has sufficiently demonstrated to be a grammatical error. Moreover the root ष्म which the former suggests would make the sense 'opposing, hindering', but all the commentators are agreed that here the word means 'impelling or urgent.'

² अर्थतः may also mean 'in encompassing an object.'

Here [the objector] may say, 'if the 'qualities' are mutually contrary, what [common] effect can they then produce by their united agency?' Why thus? **Their action is purposive, like that of a lamp**¹. Like a lamp, their operation aims at a common end; as, a lamp, [though] composed of the mutually contrary oil, fire and wick, illuminates objects, so goodness, passion and darkness, [though] reciprocally opposed, accomplish a [common] end.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] With a view to explaining the peculiar characteristics of the constituent powers, it is said, **Goodness, &c.**

Light, endowed with lightness, and **luminous**, [i. e.,] on a sense being brought in contact with its object, it illuminates that object. Since when goodness triumphs the limbs are found to be light, and the senses capable of apprehending their objects, the marks of goodness are lightness and luminosity; of these the former is considered by the Sāṅkhya teachers to form the cause of effect-origination.

Exciting, leading to contact; **mobile**, changeful. Since the passionate is found [to co-exist] with union and action, excitability and changefulness are the marks of this constituent; such is the sense.

¹ This passage illustrates how absence of punctuation in ancient MSS. may cause diversity of interpretation. The original reads, अत्राह यदि गुणाः परस्परं विरुद्धाः स्वमतेनैव कमर्थं निष्पादयन्ति तर्हि कथं प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः, and Wilson translates, " But here it may be said, if these qualities are contraries to one another, what effect can they produce by their several purposes, and how therefore can it be said, *they co-operate like a lamp, for a (common purpose).*" Pandit Bechanarāma tries to introduce some punctuation, which I have modified.

Heavy, endowed with heaviness, **and enveloping**, obstructive under the influence of darkness, the limbs are found to weigh down, and the perception of objects is impeded. Thus heaviness and obstructiveness to the proper effects by restraining the operation of the sense are the marks of this factor; this is the meaning.

But this statement creates specific differences among the constitutive powers; now, if they be thus mutually opposed, how can they energise together, for we never see foes so opposed working for the same end? To this it is replied, **Their action**, &c.: Like a lamp, which illuminates with the aid of oil and wick, though the three are mutually opposed; this is the sense. Oil is opposed to light, since if it falls upon it, it extinguishes it; similarly the wick, if too small, puts out the flame.

ANNOTATIONS.

We have heard about the constituents. Nature is said to be the compound of them in a state of equipoise, and its modes or evolutes are necessarily constituted of them. These *guṇas* therefore are important, and Iśvara Kṛishṇa proceeds to explain their character and functions.

The word गुण in ordinary parlance means a quality, and this term has been frequently used as the English equivalent. But it is misleading and should be discarded. What a Sāṅkhya teacher means is not that goodness, &c. are attributes or properties of the Cosmic Stuff, but that they are elements which go to the build of it, without which the non-ego would not be.¹ Nature

¹ "Goodness and the others are not properties of it [*viś.*, Nature], because they are its essence, [that is, they are what constitutes Nature]." *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, VI. 39.

is like a string composed of several strands, and all manifest differences in the conditions of what have been called formal existences are due to the varying degrees in which these strands are blended together. In most things, notably human beings, three different conditions may be distinguished, *viz.*, (1) a spiritualising and elevating tendency, (2) passion or force, and (3) a state of inertia or apathy.¹ This triad in a state of perfect equivalence and equilibrium Kapila conceives to constitute Nature. As soon as the proximity of Soul introduces an element of disturbance, this state of repose ceases, the formless Objective is developed into modes, and the ego cognises the resulting world.² Vijnāna Bhikshu explains, "Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, *viz.*, those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c. In this [Sāṅkhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 'Quality' is applied to these, [*viz.*, goodness.

¹ Mr. Davies points out that in a similar way Valentinus the Gnostic divides all men and substances into three classes, *viz.*, the spiritual, the vital, and the material, and suggests that this was "probably an importation from India."

² This is not unlike the old Greek idea that all things originate from changes produced on one unaltered substance by the affections of primary matter. Prof Wilson refers to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, I. 3. He further suggests an analogy between सत्त्वं and रजः (identified with प्रीति, affection, and अप्रीति, aversion) and 'love' and 'strife,' the principles of creation of Empedocles, which represent respectively the source of good and of evil. A happier suggestion is the analogy that he draws between रजः, passion, and the *perturbatio* of the Stoics.

passion, and darkness], because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the *corde*s [which the word *guṇa* also signifies], viz., • ‘Mind,’ &c., which consist of the three [so-called] ‘Qualities,’ and which *bind*, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.”¹

The nature and functions of these constitutive factors are detailed clearly enough in the commentaries. So instead of going over the same ground again I shall place before the reader an extract from the *Bhagvad Gītā*. The account given there deserves a careful comparison with that in the text. I quote Telang’s translation. “Goodness, passion, darkness, these qualities born from nature, O you of mighty arms! bind down the inexhaustible soul in the body. Of these, goodness, which, in consequence of being untainted, is enlightening and free from (all) misery, binds the soul, O sinless one! with the bond of pleasure and the bond of knowledge. Know that passion consists in being enamoured, and is produced from craving and attachment. That, O son of Kunti! binds down the embodied (self) with the bond of action. Darkness (you must) know to be born of ignorance, it deludes all embodied (selves). And that, O descendant of Bharata! binds down (the self) with heedlessness, indolence and sleep. Goodness unites (the self) with pleasure; passion, O descendant of Bharata! with action; and darkness with heedlessness, after shrouding up knowledge. Passion and darkness being repressed, goodness stands, O descendant of

¹ Ballantyne’s *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms*, p. 72. Cf. Vedāntin Mahādeva’s commentary in Garbe’s *Aniruddha*, p. 38.

Bharata! Passion and goodness (being repressed), darkness; and likewise darkness and goodness (being repressed), passion. When in this body at all portals¹ light (that is to say) knowledge prevails, then should one know goodness to be developed. Avarice, activity, performance of actions, want of tranquillity, desire, these are produced, O chief of the descendants of Bharata, when passion is developed. Want of light, want of activity, heedlessness, and delusion, these are produced, O descendant of Kuru! when darkness is developed. When an embodied (self) encounters death, while goodness is developed, then he reaches the unstained worlds of those who know the highest.² Encountering death during (the prevalence of) passion, he is born among those attached to action. Likewise, dying during (the prevalence of) darkness, he is born in the wombs of the ignorant.³ The fruit of meritorious action is said to be good⁴, unstained; while the fruit of passion is misery; and the fruit of darkness, ignorance. From goodness is produced knowledge, from passion avarice, and from darkness heedlessness, and delusion and ignorance also. Those who adhere to (the ways of) goodness go up; ⁴ the passionate remain in the middle; while those of the qualities of darkness, adhering to the ways of the lowest quality, go down. When a right-seeing person sees none but the qualities to be) the

¹ *i.e.*, the senses of perception. (Telang.)

² The highest manifestations of Brahman. Nilkantha suggests that the so-called gods are meant.

³ Lower creation, such as birds, beasts, &c. (Telang).

⁴ *i.e.*, are born as gods; 'middle' as men, &c.; 'down' as brutes, &c. (Telang.)

doers (of all action), and knows what is above the qualities,¹ he enters into my² essence. The embodied (self), who transcends these three qualities, from which bodies are produced, attains immortality, being freed from birth and death and old age and misery.”³

It is worthy of note that in a footnote to the above passage while explaining that the ‘qualities’ compose nature, the eminent scholar, from whose translation I have cited, endorses Dr. Bhandarkar’s opinion that nature is to be understood as “the hypothetical cause of the soul’s feeling itself limited and conditioned.” “By means of knowledge of the soul, the unreality of these manifestations is understood and nature destroyed.”⁴

As to the reciprocal relations of the three constituents, I may add here a reference to a passage in the *Anugītā*, where the three are described as “all coupled with one another, and which likewise serve one another, depend on one another, and attend on one another, and are joined to one another.”⁵

¹ *i e.*, what has been called Kshetragna before, the supervising principle within one. (Telang.)

² It is, of course, the Deity who is speaking.

³ *Bhagavad Gītā*, XIV. Telang’s translation (“Sacred Books of the East”), pp. 107-109.

⁴ Telang, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁵ Telang, *op. cit.*, p. 318. The learned translator explains in a foot-note: “coupled = always existing in association with one another; serving = being necessary to the operations of one another; depending = supporting one another like three staves, says Nilkantha, upholding, says Arjuna Miśra, as the total absence of one would lead to the absence of the others also;

अविवेक्यादिः सिद्धस्त्रैगुण्यात् तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

14. Want of discrimination and the rest are an inference from the [presence of the] three constituents and the absence thereof in the reverse¹. The Unmanifested is also de-

attending = becoming subordinate to whichever is dominant for the time being; joined = so as to become one organic whole."

¹ This is Colebrooke's translation of a difficult passage, and it is in agreement with the views of Vāchaspati and Nārāyaṇa. What the author is trying to prove here is that the evolutes of Nature are indiscriminative and so forth (as stated in verse 11 *ante*). 'This is proved first by a direct or affirmative argument based upon the constitution of the said evolutes,—these properties follow from the three factors,—and secondly, by an indirect or negative argument based upon the absence of these attributes in soul,—contraries possess contrary qualities, consequently what the ego possesses the non-ego does not, and *vice versa*. This two-fold method of proof is so common to Hindu dialecticians that one would almost naturally expect to find it employed here. Gauḍapāda, however, understands the passage differently. He confines it to Nature and its modes, and from the absence of contrariety between the two infers that to hold of the former which holds of the latter. As Wilson explains, "the absence of indiscriminateness, he observes, as deduced from the influence of the three qualities, relates in the first instance to *vyakta*, 'discrete matter', not to *anyakta*, or 'indiscrete': but the same must apply to the latter also, because there is no property belonging to it which is incompatible with, or the reverse of, the properties of the *vyakta*, or 'discrete matter', *mahat*, &c.; as in the case of the cloth and the threads of which it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them" (p. 59). Vāchaspati also indicates this view in the alterna-

monstrated [to possess them] by the effect having the same properties as the cause.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The [last] question implies another. Nature and the Manifested have been described as possessing three 'qualities,' indiscriminative, objective, &c. [verse 11]. But how is it ascertained that Nature and the perceptible [evolutes], Intellect and the rest, are so characterised?¹ Therefore it is said: **[want of discrimination, &c.]**

The attribute of indiscriminative, &c., is established to be in [the discrete principles], Intellect and the rest, from [the presence of] the three constituents [in them].² [But]

tive. Mr. Davies, on the other hand, follows Lassen, and translates, "the absence of discrimination and the rest (the other conditions of material forms) are a conclusion from the three modes, and by the absence of the reverse of this (the modal existence)." This is not very happily expressed, but if the third view suggested is (as it appears to be) that we infer indiscriminateness, &c., of the Objective because (1) it is constituted of the three 'modes' and (2) it is not a non-modal existence, the argument seems to us to be reduced to a tautology that is neither instructive nor illuminating.

¹ तत्र प्रधानमुपलभ्यमानं महदादि च...कथमवगम्यते, which Wilson translates: "Admitting this to be true of the chief one (or nature), how is it ascertained that Intellect and the rest have also the three qualities," &c.

² The Benares edition prints, योऽयमविवेक्यादिगुणः स त्रैगुण्या-
महदादौ व्यक्ते नायं सिध्यति । अवीच्यते तद्विपर्ययाभावात् । There seems to be some corruption here. Wilson gives महदादौऽव्यक्ते. This emendation offends against the rules of euphony, but has the merit of making sense. We might put a stop after महदादौ, and read, अव्यक्ते.

this is not proved of the indiscrete. It is therefore said, **from the absence of contrariety**, there being no contrary relation between [the discrete and the indiscrete], the Unmanifested is established. As, where there is yarn, there is cloth, yarn is not 'one thing and cloth another; why? Because there is no contrariety. Thus the Manifested and the Unmanifested are demonstrated.¹ Nature is remote, the Manifested near; he who perceives the latter perceives also the former, for there is nothing contrary between the two.

From this also is the Unmanifested demonstrated: **from the effect possessing the properties of the cause**. In the world such as is the nature of the cause, such also is that of the effect; as, of black threads a black cloth is made. Now, Intellect and the rest are characterised as indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational and productive; and as the modes are, so the unmanifested is demonstrated to be.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Indiscriminateness, &c., have been spoken of as attributes common to Nature and the rest. It is now explained how they are demonstrated to be there, **Want, &c.**

Indiscriminative here stands for indiscriminateness. Want of discrimination and the other qualities mentioned before are not excluded in the case of *Mahat*, &c. Why? **Because of** [the presence of] **the three constituents**, since they possess those factors, same as Nature.

For those who prefer inference by the method of difference it is said, **from the absence, &c.** From the

¹ This is a doubtful passage.

absence of the three constituents in the contrary, soul, where the opposite of this want of discrimination [is to be found]. Thus, where there is an absence of indiscriminateness, there is also the absence of the three constituents, as in the case of Soul.⁹ Therefore there is a logical discontinuance. Consequently there is nothing to prevent the establishment [of the attributes in question] in *Mahat* and the rest.

But Nature has been described as non-distinct from *Mahat*, &c. Now, how is Nature established? It is replied, **by the effect**, &c.: If consciousness and the rest be without cause, then their permanence must follow, whence also non-liberation of soul. Therefore they must be products. If they are products, then they must have a cause with like qualities, for such alone is perceived to be the case. The cause also must be eternal, [or] from [the necessity of] premising a cause thereof, an [endless] series would result. Thus, Nature, the indiscrete One, is established, and by the use of the word **too**, it is demonstrated to possess the three constituents. This is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

In verse 8 we were told that consciousness and the other modes of Nature were in some respects similar to it and in others dissimilar. Verse 10 specified the attributes in which the modified non-ego differed from the unmodified, and verse 11 enumerated those in which they agreed. Now, among these points of likeness the first is constitution,—the Manifested, like the Unmanifested, is composed of the three factors. What these factors

are has been explained in the two following verses. It is now shown how the other predicateṣ set out in distich 11 follow from the very constitution of the non-ego. The manifest principles, inasmuch as they are products of the three factors, cannot possess any qualities that do not belong to these constituents. They cannot transcend their constitution, and nothing that is contrary to such constitution can pertain to them. The factors are not intelligent and so cannot lay claim to discrimination, subjectivity and other similar characteristics. So the modes of Nature are indiscriminative, objective, and so forth. But the properties of a cause and its effect are essentially alike. Therefore the evolvent and the evolute must be marked by similar features. Thus the undeveloped inchoate Nature is also proved to possess these attributes. Vāchaspati puts the point thus: "Effect is seen to be the same in its properties with cause. As the properties of the threads, &c., are identical with those of cloth and the like, so the attributes of pleasure, pain, and insensibility, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished as *mahat* and the rest, are proofs that similar conditions must belong to their cause: the existence of *pradhāna* or *avyakta*, as a cause of which pleasure, pain, and insensibility are the conditions, is consequently established."¹

¹ I quote Wilson's translation (*Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 59).

भेदानां परिमाणात् समव्यात् शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेषु ।

कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

15. Because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, because of production being from energy¹, because of discreteness between cause and effect, and because of unity in the universe.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] It should not be argued that [the proposition, "as from the] three constituents the property of wanting in discrimination, &c., is demonstrated in the case of the Manifested, so from there being no opposition, and from the essential identity of the nature of the effect and of the cause the Unmanifested is demonstrated," is false, because what may not be apprehended in the world does not exist. For as there is smell in stone but unapprehended, so Nature also exists though unperceived. Hence it is said, **Because**, &c. :

'There is a cause, the Unmanifested,' thus is the subject and the predicate connected. **From the finitude of specific objects**; in the world wherever there is an agent limitations are perceived, as, a potter

¹ Mr. Davies puts a slightly different construction and understands the phrase to mean "from the energetic action (*s'akti*) of production or development (*pravṛitti*)," that is, "from the active energy of evolution." The argument, however, is that there must be a cause, because nothing that exists could have come into being without the operation of some causal force or energy. Colebrooke translates, "since effects exist through energy." M. Hilaire, on the other hand, has, "de l'activité de tout ce qui a puissance d'agir."

makes pot only of a certain size and with limited portions of clay. So Intellect also ; Intellect and the other modes are limited because [they are] specific evolutes of Nature ; intellect is one, self-consciousness is one, the subtle principles are five, the organs of sense eleven and the gross elements five ; because of the limitations of these objects, Nature exists as their cause, producing the limited manifested principles. If Nature were not, then unlimited the discrete modes also would not exist ; from the limitations of the evolutes, then, Nature exists, whence the manifested principles spring.

Next, **from homogeneity.**¹ In this world we observe what is well-known ;² as, from seeing a boy observing the vow of a religious student, we infer his parents were certainly Bráhmaṇs ; so, noticing that consciousness and the other modes possess the three constituents, we conclude as to what their cause may be. Thus, from homogeneity Nature is [seen to exist].

Again, **from production through energy.** Here each tries to compass that only for which he is competent ; as, a potter, capable of making a pot, makes a pot only and not a piece of cloth or a chariot.

So, Nature exists as cause. Why ? **From the cause and the effect being separate.**³ That which makes is the cause, that which is made is the effect.

¹ Gauḍapāda apparently takes समन्वयः to mean 'inference' (connected sequence).

² i.e. what is notoriously connected together by association.

³ This will show how wrong it is to say that in laying down the great metaphysical truth that cause and effect are identical the Hindu philosophers were oblivious to patent facts.

Cause and effect are distinct, as, a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water, and milk, not so the material cause, [*viz.*,] the clod of earth; whereas it is the clod of earth which makes the pot, and not *vice versa*. Similarly, observing intellect and the other modes we infer there is a separate cause, whose discrete evolutes these manifested principles are.

Moreover, **from the universe being undivided.** The "universe" is the abstract [total] of the manifest cosmic forms; from its being undivided, Nature exists,—since there is no mutual separation between the universe and the five gross elements, earth and the rest, that is, the three worlds are comprised in the gross elements. Earth, water, fire, air and ether, these five gross elements will at the time of general dissolution attain in the order of creation to a state of non-separation, being converted into the subtle principles; these latter with the eleven sense-organs will become one with self-apperception; self-apperception with intellect; intellect with Nature. Thus at the period of general dissolution the three worlds will become one with Nature. From which reunion of the Manifested and the Unmanifested principles, like that of curds and milk, Nature is [demonstrated to be] cause.¹

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Nature is next established as the cause from the nature of *Mahat* and the other modes, **Because, &c. :**

This [verse] is to be construed with the following, "there is a cause, Nature." Whatever is divided² is a

¹ In accordance with this interpretation Colebrooke translates the text, "since there is a reunion of the universe."

² i. e., whatever, is distinguished from something else.

difference [or kind, *e.g.*,] intellect, &c. **Because of their finitude**, their limited non-pervasive character, or because distinctively characterised through multiformity. That which is multiform and non-pervasive is an effect; consciousness and the rest, as assigned to individuals, are multiform and non-pervasive; therefore they have for their cause eternal and single Nature, [which is] competent thereto.

Another reason is stated : **Because of homogeneity**, that is, possession of the common quality of being marked by pleasure, pain and dulness. It is necessary for these mutually distinct [evolutes] to have a common cause possessing a like nature. This cause, because of its competency, is the Prime Evolvent and that alone; such is the meaning.

Nature, further, exists **because of production through energy**, because the activity of causes conducive to production [of works] is owing to competency. And Nature forms the material of ¹ Power, [and] from it the evolute consciousness proceeds, as from transformation of earth seed sprouts into sapling; such is the sense.

Moreover, Nature exists **because of discreteness between cause and effect**. Though the effect subsists in the cause, yet by emerging therefrom, like the limbs of a tortoise, it becomes different through separation. Thus, the sense is that Nature is the sole cause of the particular conditions of the products, intellect and the rest.

¹ That is, it is Nature which transforms itself into force.
 आपूर्ण means transformation; See *Yoga Sūtras*, IV. 2.

Nature also exists **because of undividedness in the universe**. In *vaiśvarūpya*, the affix (अच्) changes not the sense [of the base]. Because of the non-existence of the three worlds as a distinct entity ; in consequence, that is, of their dissolution by the assumption of the same form as their cause at the time of universal destruction. If there be no such cause the dissolution of these 'kinds'¹ cannot be in the same form ; this is the meaning. It should not be said that Brahmá is such cause, and Nature need not be postulated. It is, in short, more proper to conceive Nature, as a force, than to conceive causality in the form of a thing possessed of force.²

¹ Entities characterised by generic differences.

² This sentence of Nárāyaṇa is important in two ways. First of all it shows the non-theistical character of the argument. By the law of parcimony the postulation of God is unnecessary for all phenomena before us we can explain by means of Nature alone. It is more philosophical therefore to conceive the cause of the universe as force rather than as *ens* possessed of force. It shows, in the second place, what is the prime characteristic of Nature in the Sāṅkhya cosmogony. Nature is Force ; the ultimate fact in the so-called material universe is not inert matter, mere extension, it is energy or force. This dynamic conception of the world has been re-affirmed in later times by Leibniz and Herbert Spencer, and has been adopted and proclaimed far and wide by Modern Science.

कारणमस्य यत्प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।

परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

16. There is a [general] cause, Nature, [which] operates by means of the three constituent powers, by conjunction and by modification, [varying] like water with the particular receptacle of the several powers.¹

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Now, the unmanifested is well known as the cause, whence intellect and the other modes proceed.

By the three constituents. That in which the factors of goodness, passion and darkness subsist is the aggregate of the three constituents. What then is that? The equipoised condition of the three constitutives is the Prime Cause.

Next, by mixture. As the waters of the Ganges falling from the three heads of Rudra form but one current, so Nature, the aggregate of the three constitutives, produces one Manifested [Cosmos]; or as [many] threads combining together produce one piece of cloth, so the

¹ Colebrooke renders, "for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities respectively."

The influence of Kapila has sometimes been traced in Kālidāsa's writings. The fancy, therefore, is not far-fetched that the great poet had this verse in his mind when he wrote in *Raghuvamśa*, X. 17,

रसान्तराख्येकरसं यथा दिव्यं पयोऽनुते ।

देवे देवे गुणेष्वेवमवस्थास्त्वनविक्रियः ॥

Unmanifested, by the blending of the component powers, produces Intellect and the rest. [Thus] from the three factors and by conjunction the world of sense springs.

‘Because the Manifested proceeds out of Nature, which is one, therefore it should be one (or uniform).’ There is no such defect. [Because] **by modification, like water, through the diversity of the receptacles of the several factors**, the three worlds, [though] produced from one Nature, are not alike; [*e.g.*,] the gods are happy, men miserable, and animals insensible. The Manifested principles proceeding out of one Nature, are modified, like water, by the particular supports with which particular constituents are associated [for the moment]. The repetition of *prati* signifies successive action. The speciality of the receptacle of the qualities; by modification therefrom the Manifested is produced. As the uni-flavoured water falling from the atmosphere is diversified as various liquids according to various combinations, even so the three worlds produced from the [same] one Nature are different in character : among the divinities, goodness triumphs, passion and darkness retire, they are therefore pre-eminently blessed ; among men, passion predominates, goodness and darkness are inactive, they are therefore pre-eminently miserable ; among animals, darkness prevails, goodness and passion are inert, they are therefore pre-eminently stupid.

In these two *A'rya* stanzas the existence of Nature has been determined. In the next place, in order to demonstrate the existence of Soul, it is said : **[Since the assemblage, &c.]**

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] But if Nature be one, how can it produce various effects, for one single thread does not make a cloth? It is replied, **There is**, &c.:

The Unmanifested, which is the cause of the universe, operates or produces effects by means of the three constituent powers, goodness, &c. Now, since Nature is composed of the three factors, it has multiplicity within it; thus there is origination: this is the sense.

Whence similitude in production? It is replied, **by conjunction** [or] mixture. The meaning is that by coming together as principal and accessory. [it] produces a uniform effect, just like a picture [which is made of many colours].

Let consciousness and the other evolutes be uniform, whence comes diversity in other products? The answer is, **with the receptacle**, &c.; from the difference due to the receptacle of particular constituents: that is, the diversity is owing to inequality of constitutives.¹ For instance, **by modification like water**. As the same one liquid getting into a cocoanut or a citron is changed and acquires a sweet or bitter taste, so this also becomes diverse through the difference of associates. Such is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

We were told in Distich 8 that Nature is to be apprehended through its effects. These effects were then

¹ It will be noticed here that the two commentators differ as to what the diversity is to be attributed to, Gaṇḍapāda finds it in the object, Nārāyaṇa (and Vāchaspati) in the constituents. The difference, however, is only an apparent one. In neither case is the variety a different thing; it is only a modification of the same Cosmic Stuff.

discussed. We now come back to the Primal Evolvent and have got to investigate the necessity of postulating it as the cause.

The proposition that Iśvara Kṛishṇa sets himself here to prove is that there is a general¹ cause of the world of sense, an original thereof which may not be perceptible to our ordinary senses, but which must be postulated for a satisfactory explanation of cosmic phenomena. This he proves by five arguments, which are as follows :—

1. There must be a cause because all specific objects that we come across are finite in their nature. If these objects were without a cause they would not be subject to any limitations in point of space or time. But they are; it is the very nature of an effect to be conditioned by that from which it is produced. A pot, for instance, must be limited by the earth of which it is made. The fact, therefore, that the varieties of the manifest principles have a definite measure proves that they are nothing more than products.

2. Next we see that things though different have certain common properties; they all, for instance, in some way or other act upon what is called the emotional part of our nature, and¹ produce a feeling either of pleasure, pain or insensibility.¹ The existence of the common properties proves that of genera and species, and leads us to the conception of a *summum genus*.

3. We next perceive that there can be no production unless there be a productive power at work behind. Thus the existence of all that exists proves that there must be something which has brought it into existence.

¹ If there can be such a thing as a feeling of insensibility.

4. This causal nexus will bear further examination. We have seen that there is a living energy in evolution. Let us now consider this evolution. What occurs when there is an evolution? There is a parting of the effect from the cause. Just as a tortoise puts forth its limbs, so the manifest world has been produced. But the limbs are not the tortoise, similarly the world as we perceive it is not the world as it is (unperceived by us). And in the same way as the limbs betoken the tortoise, the manifest principle betokens the unmanifested.

5. But the limbs of the tortoise are separate from the tortoise in no greater sense than they are united with it. There is nothing in the world that stands absolutely alone. The varied forms that crop up in the theatre of human experience have all their setting in a causal chain. No particular mode of Nature can exist independently of another. Nothing that we perceive can either in its inception or its existence or its dissolution work itself free from that which gave it birth. A lump of clay by superimposition of a particular form may be transformed into a jar, but it cannot cease to be of the earth, earthy. From earth it springs, earth it remains, and when it breaks (when the individualistic determination is at an end) into earth it is reduced. The catena of phenomena is, therefore, an additional proof of the existence of a fundamental cause. Thus the effect proves the cause by being *one* with it as well as *other* from it.

A general cause having been established, it is next to be explained how such varied effects follow from it. This general cause is a compound of three factors, perfecting (or harmonising), impelling, and retarding. It is

from the mixture and the modification of these factors that diversified products result. As, on the one hand, different colours may be mixed together and one picture produced, so, on the other hand, the same simple water may be placed in different vessels and various kinds of liquids obtained.¹ Objects and their constituents must act and react upon one another.

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।

बुर्रषोऽस्ति भोक्तृमावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

17. Since the assemblage [of sensible things] is for the sake of another, since there is a converse of the three constituents and the rest, since there must be superintendence, since there must be an experiencer, and since there is a striving for isolation,² the Soul exists.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] Since it is said, "From a discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and

¹ Prof. Wilson points out that the Italic philosophers, according to Cudworth, entertained a similar idea: "The same numerical matter, differently modified, causing different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things, as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice." *Intellectual System*, III. 426.

² Colebrooke gives, "a tendency to abstraction, which hardly brings out the full sense."

the Knowing, salvation proceeds," and of these, after the Manifested, the Unmanifested, like it, has been [shown to be] determined by five arguments [verse 15],¹ the inferred existence of Soul, which too is subtle, is next demonstrated.

Soul exists. Why? Because the assemblage [of things] is for another's use. The concourse of intellect and the rest is for the use of Soul; this is inferred from the irrationality thereof,² like that of a bed. As a bed, which is composed of bedding,³ props, cord,⁴ cotton, coverlet and pillows, is for another's use, not for its own—[any benefit] of the bed—none of these [members] serve any mutual purpose; hence it is inferred that there is a person who sleeps on the bed, for whose use the bed is; thus for the sake of another this body, consisting of an aggregate of the five gross elements, exists,—there is a self, for whose enjoyment the enjoyable body, comprising a collocation of intellect and the rest, has been produced.

Again, soul exists, because of the existence of the converse of the three constituents, &c. As was said in a previous verse [11], "[the Manifested] has three constituents, and is indiscriminative, objective."

¹ व्यक्तादनन्तरमव्यक्तं पञ्चभिः कारणैरधिगतं व्यक्तवत् (Benares edition). Wilson's text has अव्यक्तवत्, which he connects with the following पुरुषः. His translation is; "whereas the undiscrete has been shewn to be distinct from the discrete by five arguments (verse 9), so Soul being, like the undiscrete principle, subtle" &c.

² That is, of Nature and its products.

³ गात्रोत्पलक°, a doubtful word.

⁴ पादवट° (Wilson), पादपौठ° (Benares ed.).

&c., the converse of that, of which it is stated, "the opposite thereof &c. is soul," [exists].

Because [of the necessity] **of superintendence.**

As a chariot drawn by horses, capable of curveting, prancing and galloping, proceeds guided by a charioteer, so is the frame directed by self. To that effect it is said in the *Shashthilantra*, "Nature, guided by Soul, proceeds."

Further, soul exists, **because there must be an enjoyer.** As there must be one to partake of food flavoured with the six flavours sweet, sour, salt, pungent, bitter, and astringent, so, on account of incapability of enjoyment in intellect and the other modes, Soul exists, whom the body serves for enjoyment.¹

Moreover, **because of the striving for isolation.** "Isolation" is the state of being alone; from the striving for that state it is inferred that soul exists,—because all, whether wise or unwise, desire permanent release from the cycle of mundane existence.

By these arguments the existence of a soul apart from the body [is established].

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Having specified the proofs [of the existence] of Nature, [the author] proceeds to detail those of soul, **Since the assemblage, &c.** The five reasons in the oblique case are to be construed with "soul exists."

Assemblage, the series ending with the earth (the gross elements); on account of this being for the sake

¹ The word भोग, which is not infrequent in Sāṅkhya textbooks and is usually translated as 'enjoyment' or 'fruition,' does not seem to mean anything more than experience or actual cognition.

or need of another, just as a bed and the like ; “ need ” is enjoyment in the form of experience of either pleasure or pain ; since this is not possible in the irrational, the rational, that is, the intelligent soul exists ; this is proved by reasoning. Such is the sense.

Another cause is assigned, **because of a converse** &c.: because of the negation or privation of the set started by the three constituents [*viz.*, Intellect &c.]. Since the three constituents and their products are irrational and stand in the relation of cause but to particular effects, it is necessary that, as in the case of a jar and the like, they be correlative to a negation existing in something ;¹ the absence of all products of the three constituents is possible [only] in soul ; which is devoid of them ; therefore soul is necessary as a support of a privation of the constitutives. Such is the meaning.

Another cause is stated, **because of superintendence**, that is, because of being a superintendent. As a chariot proceeds, guided by a driver, so all this too, being irrational, moves directed by Soul,—this [fact] must

¹ The idea is that a thing which is irrational and can cause only effects of a particular description must stand in correlation to a negation existing in some other thing. Take a pitcher ; this as an individual object has its peculiar and limited features, it will, *e. g.*, hold water but serve no other purpose ; it therefore by its very limitations posits a counter-entity which is characterised by the absence of pitcher-hood. Similarly objects constituted by the three factors presuppose something which is not so constituted (*viz.*, Soul), and thus form the necessary correlate thereof. Any thing of which a negation is predicated is, in the language of Nyāya, the प्रतियोगी (counter-entity or correlative) of that negation. Thus if the absence of A is in B, A is the counter-entity of the absence of A, that is of a negation existing in B.

be admitted, even if not desired. Hence soul, which superintends [the operations of] the three factors, exists; such is the sense.

[Yet] another cause is mentioned, **because of an experiencer**, an on-looker. Soul is necessary, as [a subject] which will apprehend all the manifested and the unmanifested principles, like the six flavours; such is the purport.

Another cause is specified, **because of action for liberation**. The good are seen energising for salvation, which is not possible in the case of Nature or any production thereof, because being composed of the three constituents they are invested with pleasure, pain and apathy. Therefore Soul is demonstrated to be, since it is connected with liberation, towards which an aspirant thereafter strives. This is the gist.

ANNOTATIONS.

The non-ego in both its forms, modified and unmodified, having been dealt with, the third grand principle of being remains to be investigated, and Iśvara Kṛishṇa now takes it up. It is Soul, the principle of intelligence,¹ and is not to be confounded with the body, its material investure.² How do you prove that this soul exists? By five arguments again.³ Let us hear them.

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 145.

² शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः प्रमान्, *Ibid*, I. 139

³ It is interesting to compare the corresponding Aphorisms (I. 140-144). The wording as well as the order of the *Sūtras* strongly suggests that the Aphorist had the *Kārikā* before him. The only alteration that he has made is the substitution of संघतं for संघातं in the first hemistich. (Cf. also I. 66.)

1. Because all objects of sense are compounds, and nothing that is a compound exists for its own sake. Whenever any thing is made up by bringing several objects together, it is so made up for some particular purpose, in order that it may serve some special end. Every combination thus suggests and pre-supposes what may be called its final cause. This is the monadic soul.

2. The object-world is made of the three constituents. The subject which cognises this must be differently composed. It is matter of ordinary consciousness that I cannot be the pleasure I enjoy or the pain I suffer.¹ Moreover for an object formed of the three factors the principle of contradiction leads a metaphysician to posit a subject not so constituted. This is the principle of intelligence in the absence of which the whole universe would be without light.

3. The Cosmic Stuff is not informed and animated by a principle of rationality and intelligence. In order that there might be a harmonious and orderly evolution it is therefore necessary that such a principle should supervene. Unless intelligence be at the helm and control² the development of modified Nature, chaos would reign and all knowledge be impossible for us. This will show what a grievous error those men³ have

¹ This is rather loosely put. It should be remembered that Kapila emphasised, at least as strongly as Kant, the difference between the transcendental and the empirical Ego.

² Since the soul never acts, Mr. Davies asks, how can it control? It is the proximity of soul, however, which brings about a modification in Nature and *determines* the character of the evolute which is manifested thereupon.

³ *e. g.*, Cousin.

committed who have branded the Sāṅkhya philosophy as materialistic. If there be one thing more needful than another in Kapila's theory of evolution it is the presence of Intelligence.

4. Soul exists because the non-ego presupposes the ego. When there are objects of experience there must be a subject to experience. One cannot subsist without the other. The existence of either without the other would be futile.¹

5. Lastly, we find there is a universal yearning for a better, a higher state. This existence is full of misery and men everywhere are constantly seeking to emancipate themselves from the trammels of pain. Now, there would be no such yearning if our bondage were necessary and irrevocable; nor would the exertions have any meaning if it were impossible for us to obtain liberation. It is because the soul is a spirit essentially free, which gets bound only by accident, that we feel conscious of the instinct for isolation² within us and are naturally urged to strive for it. Liberation is not possible for

¹ Davies says, "this is substantially the same as the first proposition," and suggests that "the first refers to an arrangement of utility," "the fourth indicates ownership or possession". This is not quite correct. The first proposition embodies an argument from the *character* of the non-ego, while the fourth enforces one from its very *existence*. What was then said was that since the non-ego is complex it has been combined for some one's use; what is now said is that there is an ego because there is the non-ego.

² This is the literal translation of the original word and signifies 'abstraction from all contact with the not-self' (or its constituents). St. Hilaire interprets it as an absolute liberation from the three species of pain.

Nature, because the three constituents are its very essence, and it cannot work itself free from them without putting an end to itself.

—

जन्ममरणकरणानां^१ प्रतिनियमादयुगपत् प्रवृत्तेष्व ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

18. Because birth, death and the organs are severally allotted, and because activity is not simultaneous, and also because the factors are found unequally, the multiplicity of souls is established.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Now, is soul one, presiding over all bodies, like a thread uniting a string of gems ? or is it many, each directing a separate frame ? To this it is replied, [**Because**, &c.]

Birth and death and the vital instruments, by the several allotment of these. If soul had been one, then at the birth of one all would have been born, at the death of one all would have died, at the occurrence of a deformity in the organs of one, for instance, at the deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation or lameness of one, all would have become deaf, blind, dumb, maimed or lame; [but] this does not happen, therefore the separate allotment of birth, death and the organs proves the multiplicity of souls.

¹ Gauḍapāda reads जनन° for जन्म°, but there is not much difference either in sense or metre.

Again, **because activity is not simultaneous**, not [the same] at the same time. Since occupations, virtuous or otherwise, are seen to be non-contemporaneous, [for instance,] one applies himself to virtue, another to vice, one cultivates indifference [to the world], another wisdom; hence from the non-universality of occupations multiplicity [of souls] is proved.

What else? **Also from diverse conditions of the three constituents**, from the contrariety of their affections the multiplicity of souls is demonstrated. For instance, in birth in general, one endowed with goodness is happy, another possessed of passion is miserable, and a third invested with darkness is stupid. Thus, from the inequality of the constituents multiplicity is proved.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Having established the existence of soul, [the author] next proceeds to establish its multiplicity, **Because birth, &c.**

The multiplicity of souls is established. How? **Because, &c. Birth** is the union of soul with body; **death** its desertion thereof; **the organs** are eye and the rest. From seeing that they are severally allotted. If soul had been one this would not have been so; with the birth or death of one all would have been born or dead, on one possessing the eye all would have possessed it, on one seeing all would have seen, [and so on]. But it is not so; therefore souls must be many; this is the sense.

A second reason is assigned, **because activity is non-simultaneous**. Because there is diversity of energy; thus, while one applies himself to virtue, another does to knowledge, a third to dispassion, a fourth to power, a fifth to lust, and so on. If soul had been one,

there would be a simultaneous activity of all for the same end. It is not so; therefore souls are many; this is the sense.

A third reason is stated, **because of diversity in the three constituents.** *Eva* is to be here construed after *siddham*, [the sense being], established [conclusively]. From the difference due to modification of the three constituents, as, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, and sometimes distress [predominates]. Or from the diversity (good, bad or dull of souls) due to [inequality of] the constitutive powers. If soul had been one, this would not be so, but all would be happy or miserable, and there would be no difference of high, low or middling conditions, through inequality of factors. It should not be argued that this is due to internal diversity, for that diversity itself has for its origin individual difference; otherwise that diversity would be not proven. This is the significance.

ANNOTATIONS.

We have ascertained that soul exists. It now remains to find out how many souls there are. The scriptures of the Hindus seem to preach generally the universality of one supreme Soul in the world, that all are but parts of one stupendous whole, and it is only delusion that blinds us to the essential unity. Kapila, however, felt that in the path of pantheism personality was the rock ahead, that no mere theorising could circumvent it, and that it had to be faced squarely.¹ So he pronounced in no indistinct

¹ Kapila's followers try to reconcile his view with the scriptural one by suggesting that the texts attribute oneness to Soul.

terms in favour of the multiplicity of souls. He could not quite merge the individual in the universal.

Iśvara Kṛishṇa here sets out three considerations which go to establish that souls are many. The real ground is that individual existence cannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained. This proposition is presented from three different stand-points.

1. Soul is eternal. It comes upon the plane of human experience when brought in contact with a frame,—we say a person is born; it passes out of such plane when the connection with the frame is severed,—we say the man is dead. The frame again is not alike in all cases. Now, if there was only one soul, these conditions of life should approximate to a dead similarity; there should, for instance, be one universal birth, one universal death. But this is contrary to experience.

2. Not only do the material conditions of life vary, but the psychic conditions also do. We find that different men are differently inclined and take to different occupations. What we now do is certainly the result of what we did in a previous existence. But why did we do it in the previous existence? If souls were not individually distinct, all should act alike.

3. Different men are also differently affected; their very constitutions apparently differ. This diversity of composition must be due to something beyond the constituents which combine—to the speciality of the individual soul, in fact, which necessitates a particular corporeal determination.

A question that deserves study here is how far the above arguments apply to the transcendental as distinguished from the empirical ego.

—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १८ ॥

19. And from that contrariety [before specified] Soul is proved to be a witness, solitary, neutral, perceiving, and inactive.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Soul is not an agent. This is now said. **And because of that contrast**, the contrary character of the three constituents before indicated, soul is devoid of them, [and is] discriminative, experiencing and so forth. The contrast is that described in regard to these attributes of soul. From the activity of goodness, passion and darkness, **Soul is proved to be a witness**. This is grammatically connected with [what was said about] multiplicity [above]. The constituent powers, being agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists from action.

What else? **Isolation**, the quality of being separate, [that is], distinct from the three constituents.

Neutrality, the quality of being a middle-man (or looker-on). Soul is a bystander, like a wandering mendicant. As such an ascetic simply looks on¹ while

¹ "Is lonely and unconcerned" (Wilson).

the villagers are employed in cultivation, in like manner soul does not act while the constituents operate.

Hence also [proceed] **perceptiveness** and **inactivity**. Because neutral, Soul¹ is a spectator and not the agent of the acts [it contemplates]. The three constituents, goodness, passion, and darkness engage in action in the relation of agent and act,—not soul. Thus the existence of soul is proved.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Having thus established the multiplicity of souls, its characteristics are [next] stated, since it is a fit object for discriminative knowledge; **and from that, &c.**

Because of the opposition to the three constituents is the absence thereof [in soul], that is, [the presence of] discriminativeness, non-objectiveness, non-generality, and non-fecundity. It is **perceiving**, because rational, knows the nature of its proper self, is aware that 'it is the Prime Cause which causes my migrations,' 'I am not migratory, but am untouched like a lotus-leaf.'¹ From being without modes, it is **isolated**, emancipated from extreme pain. Also [is marked by] **neutrality**, inability to do either good or evil. **Non-activity**, inaction, devoid of desire, hatred, exertion, &c. Therefore it is a **witness**, being the one sole form of knowledge. In objects that are active there is not this sole form of self-illuminating knowledge, wherefore a lamp, which is devoid of activity, &c., is seen to illuminate jars and the like.² This is the purport.

¹ Soul is compared to a drop of water on a lotus-leaf in *Mahabhārata S'ānti Parva*, ccxli, 18.

² The point is that nothing which is active is self-illuminative.

ANNOTATIONS.

Having established 'multitudinousness' of soul, the author proceeds to specify its other characteristics. And it will be noticed that these qualities agree with those declared in the scriptures. For instance, the *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* describes soul as "witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] constituents" (VI. 11). What is important to bear in mind is that soul is the principle of intelligence and as such stands apart from the Objective, and perceives and takes cognizance of the various forms in which it presents itself. It is through its connection with sense-organs that soul appears as a witness, but it is essentially free and indifferent to pain and pleasure alike.¹ It is not an agent in the popular sense; the ego is not the motive force which causes the cosmic forces to operate. But it should not, therefore, be supposed that it is without an activity of its own, viz., the activity of thought. And so the Aphorist says, "this [soul], in the shape of thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent."²

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 161-163.

² *Ibid*, VI. 50.

तस्मात् तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि¹ तथा कर्त्तेव भवत्युदासीनः² ॥ २० ॥

20. Therefore, through union therewith, the insensible products seem intelligent ; [and Soul, though] indifferent appears like an agent, though the activity is of the cosmic factors.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] If Soul is inactive, how does it exercise volition,— [for instance,] determines ‘I shall practise virtue, avoid vice’? Thus, it seems to be an agent but it [really] is not. Both suppositions then are faulty; this [the author] now proceeds to explain.

Here Soul [alone] is sentient, [and it is] owing to union therewith that intellect and the other evolutes, invested with an appearance of intelligence,³ seem sentient. As, in the world a jar through the conjunction of cold feels cold, through that of warmth feels warm, so intellect and the other modes, **through conjunction** with Soul, **appear as intelligent**. Therefore [it is] the constituents [which] exercise volition, not Soul.

Though in the world Soul is spoken of as an agent, as moving, &c., yet it does not act. How is this? While the constituents operate, Soul, though indifferent, appears as the agent, which it is not. Here is an illustra-

¹ Gauḍapāda reads च for अपि.

² Wilson, following Vāchaspati Miśra and other texts, prints भवतीत्युदासीनः.

³ Lit., ‘which possess the reflection of sensibility,’ owing to their being mirrored in the intelligent substance of Soul.

tion : as a person who is not a thief, when taken up along with thieves, is suspected to be one of them, so through union with the three constituents, which are active, even Soul, which is non-active, 'looks like an agent.

Thus has the difference between the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Knowing principles been described, from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] But [if] agency resides in Intellect and sensibility in Soul, whence do the two appear to have the same receptacle [when it is said] 'I know,' 'I do this'? To this it is replied, **Therefore**, &c. :

Since sensibility and agency have been demonstrated by reasoning to possess different receptacles (or substrata), this is an error; this is the sense. The root of the error is **conjunction therewith**. The conjunction, proximity, or reflection of Soul, thence is the [seeming] sensibility of the **unintelligent modes**, [viz.] intellect and the rest, [which], **as if intelligent**, appear to cognise, 'I know.' Thus the constituents, the factors of goodness, misery and dulness, being active, their activity, which is in intellect, gets reflected in Soul, which, though **indifferent**, [thereupon] **appears like an agent**, [saying] 'I do.' Whence cognitions like 'I know,' 'I do this,' are errors, which result from an interchange of attributes due to non-perception of difference between the two entities [Nature and Soul], because this [erroneous] character of the two [cognitions, 'I know,' 'I do,'] has been ascertained, This is the gist.

ANNOTATIONS.

The characteristic features of the Ego have been described. The question now considered is in what rela-

tions it stands to the non-ego. The Aphorist tells us, "the being the seer, &c., belongs to the Soul ; the instrumentality belongs to the sense-organs.¹" This means that it is not the Soul which acts. Our organs act, but the Soul by consociation, *seems* to act. So it is said elsewhere,² " Agency from influence, intelligence from proximity." Vijnána Bhikshu explains, " the agency which seems to belong to Soul is owing to the influence (or operation) of Intellect ; the intelligence that seems to belong to Intellect is owing to the proximity of Soul ; neither is actual, this is the sense. Their mutual transfer of properties is from reciprocal conjunction as in the case of fire and iron or water and sun." The Soul is placed like a king ; he does not move, but at his order all movements take place. Similarly the Self is quiescent ; but, owing to proximity, it moves the organs of vision, &c., to action, and thereby becomes a seer, a speaker, a judge, and so forth.

It is necessary to point out that apparent intelligence is here attributed to all modes of Nature, and is not restricted to the subtle body only. Mr. Davies understands the rudimental vehicular body³ to be referred to by the word *लिङ्गं*, and says that Wilson, who takes the traditional view, is mistaken.⁴ But the word has always been taken to mean the evolutes collectively, and

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 29.

² *Ibid*, I. 164. I adopt Vijnána's interpretation. Ballantyne follows Aniruddha and renders, " [Soul's *fancy* of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature], from the proximity of Intellect " (p. 182)

³ See *Kārikā* 39 *et seq.*

⁴ *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 51.

not without reason, for it literally means 'a mark,' 'that which indicates.'¹

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

पङ्गुत्वदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

21. In order that Soul may contemplate Nature and be separate, the union of the two, like that of the lame and the blind, takes place; [and] thence creation springs.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Now the reason why Nature and Soul come together is explained.

The union of Soul with the Prime Cause is **for the purpose of experience**; Soul contemplates Nature and its products to the gross elements inclusive. For this end also does Nature unite with Soul.²

The said union is, moreover, **with a view to isolation, like that of the lame and the blind.** As a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their friends (who, while journeying with great difficulty through a forest, had been dispersed by robbers), and by accident wandering about, happen to encounter one another, and by inspiring mutual confidence by conversation, enter into a compact for the purposes of walking and seeing, the blind man takes up the lame man upon his shoulders, and thus they both move on, the former directed by the

¹ See verse 10 *ante*.

² Pandit Bechanārāma punctuates, प्रधानस्यापि पुरुषेण संयोगः कैवल्यार्थम्, सच संयोगः.

latter and the latter carried by the former ; so Soul, like the lame man, can see but not move, [and] Nature, like the blind man, can move but not see. Moreover, as the lame man and the blind man, after accomplishing their object and reaching their destination, part, so Nature also ceases to act after effecting the liberation of Soul, and Soul too attains isolation by contemplating Nature ; thus with the fruition of their [respective] objects they separate.

What else ? **Thence creation proceeds**, from that union, [that is]. As the union of the sexes leads to the birth of offspring, so that of Nature and Soul gives rise to creation.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] The reason of this conjunction is now explained, **In order**, &c. :

The construction is that the conjunction of Nature and Soul has for its ends, contemplation and liberation. **Contemplation** is experience of Nature by Soul. **Liberation** is salvation of Soul arising from recognition of otherness between it and Intellect. This is impossible without Nature. Hence of the two **union**, or proximity causing the relation of experiencer and experienced, follows. Such is the sense. To illustrate how the action of each needs the support of the other : **like the lame and the blind**. Similar to the union of the lame and the blind, the former shows the way to the latter, the latter carries the former ; this is the meaning.

It is then said that from conjunction follows creation, which is like a door to experience and absolution, **Thence**, &c. : Evolution, which has intellect and the rest for its products, is due to conjunction ; such is the

sense. Consequently there shall be no evolution at the period of general dissolution, there being [then] an absence of such conjunction of the two. This is the drift.

ANNOTATIONS.

It has been explained that intelligence belongs to the ego and activity to the non-ego. It is when the two approach one another that there is a mutual reflection of qualities, and thence we are led to attribute the properties of the one to the other. But why is there an approach, an approximation? Because otherwise the purposes of neither can be fulfilled. The object as such depends upon a subject in order that it may be known; the subject as such depends upon an object in order that it may know. Without a synthesis of the two there can be no cognition; one must supplement the other.¹ And until and unless the ego knows the non-ego in its fulness and recognises it as distinct from itself, it cannot be free. But the ego cannot know the non-ego until it is modified into a cognoscible condition. Thus the discrete principles, the manifest forms, come into existence. It is thus that the union of Soul and Nature gives rise to a creation, that it brings about an evolution.

The author of the Sāṅkhya Aphorisms discusses creation in the beginning of the Second Book. It is there

¹ The mutual dependence of Nature and Soul is illustrated in the text by reference to the apologue of the halt and the blind. This piece of folk-lore, as Prof. Cowell has noted, is wide-spread; "it is found in the Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrim*, fol. 91, b, and in the *Gesta Romanorum*." (*Sarva-Dars'ana-Saṅgraha*, p. 229, f. n)

pointed out that Nature is led to create for the sake of the liberation of the self or for its own sake, and that the character of the creator is only mediately and fictitiously attributed to Soul. It is passion (or energy) which brings about creation, and this must continue till experience is complete.¹

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारस्तन्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्चभूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

22. From the Prime Evolvent [proceeds] intellect, thence self-apperception, thence the sixteen-fold set; from five out of those sixteen [proceed] the five elements.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] Next the divisions of creation for purposes of contemplation are detailed.

Nature has for its synonyms 'the Chief One,' 'the Supreme One,' 'the unmanifested,' 'the many-comprising,' and 'illusion.' From inchoate (uncharacterised) Nature the Great One is produced, which is also termed 'intellect,' 'the demoniac,' 'understanding,' 'fame,' 'knowledge,' and 'wisdom.' From intellect springs self-apperception, which is also termed 'the origin of the elements,' 'the modified,' 'the effulgent,' and 'egoism.' **Thence**, from self-consciousness, spring **the sixteen-fold set**, which comprises the five subtle principles, *viz.*, the archetypes of sound, touch, form, taste and odour, (all words denoting subtle are syno-

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III 5.

nymys for the rudiments); the eleven organs, *viz.*, the five organs of perception,—the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose,—the five organs of action,—the voice, the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation,—and eleventh, the mind, which partakes of the nature of both [kinds of organs]; this series of sixteen is produced from self-apperception.

What else? **Five elements from five**, that is, from the five subtle principles, out of the class of sixteen, proceed the five gross elements. As has been said, “ether from archetypal sound, air from archetypal touch, light from archetypal colour, water from archetypal flavour, earth from archetypal smell, thus from the five rudiments the five gross elements spring.”

Since it is said, “liberation proceeds from a discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knowing principles,” the twenty-three categories from intellect and the rest to the gross elements have been described; the Unmanifest has also been described [in verses 15 and 16] (as “because of the finite nature of specific objects” &c.) and soul [in verses 18 and 19] (as “since the assemblage is for the sake of another,” &c.). These are the twenty-five principles, and of him who knows these abstract entities¹ as pervading the universe, it is said, “One who knows the twenty-five principles,” &c.² They are Nature, Soul, intellect, self-

¹ Gauḍapāda's derivation of तत्त्व' (category) deserves notice: तस्य भावोऽस्ति तत्त्व'. The Vedānta makes it तत् त्वमसि (thus indicating the identity between the universal and the individual Soul).

² See note 2, p. 4, *ante*. There is a slight difference in reading between the two quotations. Here instead of वसेत् we have रतः.

consciousness, the five rudiments, the eleven organs, and the five gross elements.¹

[NĀKĀYAṆA.] The order of creation is next detailed, **From Nature, &c.**

The manner is this: from one Nature springs the slightly inferior Intellectual principle, itself a part and comprising other parts; the parts thereof being intellects, which are as numerous as souls, of a size fitting them to enter into bodies, and which come into existence for experience by Soul. It is Nature alone that fills them. In like manner, the lesser Egoism springs from *Mahat* and has for its part subtle forms as numerous as souls and similarly subsisting for experience thereby. The **sixteen-fold set** comprises the eleven senses, sound, &c., enumerated below, and the five rudiments.

From five out of these sixteen, that is, from the rudiments, **the five gross elements** proceed: thus, from rudimental sound ether, which has the quality of sound; from rudimental touch, in conjunction with rudimental sound, air, which has the qualities of sound and touch; from rudimental form, in conjunction with rudimental sound and touch, fire, which has the qualities, of sound, touch and form; from rudimental flavour in conjunction with rudimental sound, touch and form, water, which has sound, touch, form and flavour for its qualities; from rudimental smell, in conjunction with rudimental sound, touch, form and flavour, earth, which has sound, touch, form, flavour and smell for its qualities. So the text sums up: "Ether has been said to possess one quality, air two, fire three, water four, and earth five."

¹ I have slightly altered the arrangement of the commentary as given in the Benares edition.

It should not be argued that the five gross elements spring from self-apperception, this being impossible, since they possess the qualities of sound, &c., which egoism does not. Nor is there anything to prove that egoism possesses these qualities; if it did then ether and the rest should each possess all the five qualities.¹ Again, since anything possessing these qualities, which are apprehensible by the external senses, must be a gross element, egoism itself becomes one, and thus a cause of itself, [which is absurd]; this causation of the gross elements is also opposed to the scripture. Nor should it be contended that the elemental rudiments cannot proceed from self-apperception since that is devoid of sound and other [qualities]; for, as on putting together lime &c. with turmeric and the like, from the mixture arises redness, so from the union of intellect and egoism the production of rudimental sound and the rest is not improbable. Nor again, should it be said that the gross elements similarly proceed from egoism, for grossness having for its invariable concomitant causality by objects possessing its peculiar qualities, the inference that it ultimately is rudiment-originated, excludes causation by self-apperception.² This has been elsewhere expatiated upon.

¹ To understand this argument it should be borne in mind that from self-apperception the elemental rudiments proceed whence spring the gross elements.

² The argument is that since effect and cause are in essence identical, the gross elements must spring from a cause which possesses like properties. Now, egoism does not, but the subtle rudiments do. Therefore the latter must be the cause required, and not the former.

The elemental rudiments are elements in which soothing, terrifying and dulling peculiarities find no place or subsistence. *Soothing*, i.e., pleasant, *terrifying*, i.e., painful, and *dulling*, i.e., stupefying. Rudiments, fit for divinities, are wholly sweet, through excess of agreeableness. They are not apprehensible by us, in fact, being unfit [for our senses] on account of their subtlety.

ANNOTATIONS.

In the last verse we have been told that creation follows from a union of Soul and Nature. The author now proceeds to define in detail the order of this creation and to discuss the various evolutes one by one *seriatim*. With this verse may be compared Aphorism 61: "Nature is the state of equipoise of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness: from Nature [proceeds] Mind, from Mind Self-consciousness, from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements, and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs; and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements," &c.¹ We have set out the table of evolution in Annotations on Distich 3. It now remains to consider the several categories.

Of Nature first. The various synonyms of this primordial element that is offered by the commentators deserve study.

- (1) प्रकृतिः, what was before production; the entity which was antecedent to all effects.
- (2) प्रधानं, the principal comprehender of effects.
- (3) बहुप्रधानकं, the comprehender of many (all) things.
- (4) अव्यक्तं, the unperceived, what is not manifest.

¹ *Sāṅkhya Pravachana*, I. 61.

(5) अविकृतिः, the undeveloped, what is not a change or modification.

(6) अजा, the unborn, the unproduced.

(7) ब्रह्म, the source of increase or expansion, that is, the origin of all perceptible evolution. This epithet is to be distinguished from ब्रह्मा, which is a term used to signify the creative energy as personified.

(8) शक्ति, energy, force.

(9) तमः, darkness, primal chaos.

(10) माया, what measures. ('Illusion,' according to the Vedāntists.)

(11) अविद्या, ignorance, that is, the unrationalised.

The two leading ideas that run through these epithets are that Nature is the all-pervasive entity that existed before our world of sense came into being, and that it is the plastic stuff out of which all formal being was moulded. The Vedāntist describes it as illusion or ignorance; the Sāṅkhist is not prepared to deny its reality but prefers to define it as 'the unmodified' or 'the unperceived' without further specification.

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।

सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमेतद्विपर्यस्तम्¹ ॥२३॥

23. Intellect is determination.² When affected by goodness its modes are virtue,

¹ Most editions (including Gauḍapāda and Vāchaspati) read तामसमव्याधिपर्यस्तम्.

² The word अध्यवसायः has here again caused difficulty (cf. *Kārikā* 5). In more modern usage the word generally implies

knowledge, dispassion and power ; when affected by darkness they are the reverse.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] It was said, "from Nature Intellect proceeds." The characteristics of Intellect are now specified :—Intellect is characterised by determination. This is identification, as of the seed with the future germinating shoot. Intellect, which determines 'this is a jar,' 'this is a cloth,' with reference to an existent object,¹ is so defined.

some activity of the will. The *Amarkōsha*, in fact, explains it as उत्साहः, exertion, strenuous effort, perseverance. As used by the Sāṅkhya teachers, however, no determination by the will seems to be suggested. The function of intellect is simply to apprehend an object in such a way as to render it fit for experience by soul. The equivalent which seems to have found most favour with European translators is 'ascertainment.' Dr. Ballantyne gives 'judgment' (II. 13). St. Hilaire has, "la détermination distincte des choses."

¹ Gauḍapāda here seems to be referring to two kinds of अध्यवसायः. The first is what is generally termed अध्यवसानं in Rhetoric, and may be described as an identification of two things (प्रकृत and अप्रकृत). This is illustrated by the case of the seed, which is spoken of as a shoot in anticipation, for the shoot yet is not and will come into existence in some *future* time. In the second kind the subject of the अध्यवसाय (e. g., this pot) is an object existent at the *present* time (सन्). Intellect is an अध्यवसायः of the latter kind, its function is to ascertain a सन्. Wilson translates, however, "Ascertaining (discerning, determining) is ascertainment: as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is a cloth: that intellect which will so determine is so defined."

This Intellect is eight-fold, according to the [double] affection of goodness and passion. Affected by goodness, intellect is of four kinds, *viz.*, virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power. Of these *virtue* comprises compassion, charity, restraint, and duty. The acts of restraint and duty have been specified by Patanjali. "The restraints are of abstention from harm, truth, honesty,¹ continence, and renunciation," "the duties are of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and offering of self to God." *Knowledge* has for its synonyms 'manifestation,' 'perception' and 'flashing of light,' and is two-fold, external and internal. The former comprises [a knowledge of] the Vedas, with the six auxiliary sciences of pronunciation, ritual, grammar, philology prosody and astronomy, [of] the Purāṇas, and [of] logic, theology and law. The latter comprises the knowledge of Nature and Soul, [as], 'this' is Nature, the equipoised condition of goodness, passion and darkness,' 'this is Soul, perfect (emancipated), uncomposed of the constituents, pervading and sentient.' By external knowledge worldly fame or admiration is gained ; by internal salvation. *Dispassion* is also of two kinds, external and internal. 'External' is the indifference of one who is disgusted with sensible things by observation of the defects attendant upon their acquisition, preservation, and destruction, and upon association with and mischief² due to them. 'Internal' is the indifference of one who aspires after liberation and conceives even Nature to be no better than magic or

¹ Lit. 'not stealing.'

² हिंसा includes injury as well as envy.

illusion. *Power* (or mastery) is eight-fold, [*viz.*, capacity for] atomicity, magnitude,¹ lightness, attainment, free will, supremacy, subjugation, and irresistible purpose.² 'Atomicity,' minuteness, [power] to traverse the world in minute forms. 'Magnitude,' [power] to traverse in a colossal form. 'Lightness,' [power] to assume limbs finer than a lotus-fibre or cotton, and to rest on the tops of the filaments of flowers. 'Attainment,' [power] to obtain a desired object while staying wherever one may be. 'Free will,' [power] to effect whatever is desired. 'Supremacy,' [power] to govern the three worlds like a sovereign, 'Subjugation,' [power] to subdue everything.³ 'Irresistible purpose,' [power] to compel the site, rest and motion of all things from Brahmá to a block, agreeably to one's wish.

These are the four forms of Intellect when affected by goodness. Virtue and the rest of these forms are attained by a person when passion and darkness are conquered by the superior factor.

What else? **When affected by darkness they are the reverse**, the forms of Intellect in this case are the opposites of virtue and the rest, that is, [they are] impiety, ignorance, passion and weakness. Thus

¹ Wilson's MS. here inserts गरिमा, 'heaviness.' This was probably meant as a gloss; otherwise the number becomes nine.

² Gauḍapáda gives यवकामावसायित्वं for the usual कामावसायिता.

³ The difference between प्राक्कायं and वशित्वं seems to be that the former implies absence of hindrance by properties of material nature, the latter compulsion upon the elements to remain as determined.

Intellect of the eight forms, according to the affections of goodness and darkness, springs from the unmanifested agent with the three constituents.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The characteristics of Intellect are next specified, **Intellect**, &c. :

Determination in the form that this is to be done by me is a modification or particular condition of Intellect, as flame is of a lamp. Thus synonymously spoken of because there is no distinction between a modification and the modified. The senses are necessary in order to diversify percepts for the homogeneous (or uni-charactered) Soul ; mind is necessary in order to bring about a contact with sense-objects ; egoism in order to render possible a knowledge of the Meum in the mental determination taking the form 'this is for my good' ; and intellect in order to induce determination calculated to restrain exertion in the matter of impossible things, like rain.¹ This should be supplied.

The functions of Intellect are now specified, **Virtue**, &c. : **Virtue** (or piety¹, due to bathing in the Ganges and the like, as also to practising the eight-fold austerities.

¹ Here Nārāyaṇa tries to discriminate between the different functions of the different faculties. Soul is homogeneous ; the heterogeneous mass of material detail must be presented to it. The sense-organs have been appointed in order that different sensations may be received by different channels. Mind is stationed at their head as a controller. It is at its direction that the senses apply themselves to their objects and sensation results. The next faculty that works is Egoism, it cognises the percept as forming part of the subject's stream of consciousness. It is Intellect, finally, that perceives it in its relations, ascertains its true character, and knows what it is and what it is not.

Knowledge, an intuition of Soul. **Dispassion**, which is four-fold, according to the names, 'incipient,' 'discriminating,' 'all but perfect.' and 'perfect'; *incipient* is the beginning of quietism¹ for the purpose of ripening (or dissolving) passion and the like worldly attachments; *discriminating* is separating, like a physician, the ripe faults from the unripe² by the force of discriminative knowledge, [which is] in the process of acquisition; *all but perfect* is a faint longing [after objects of enjoyment, which remains] in the mind [even] after a consciousness that all the passions are ripe; [and] *perfect dispassion* is the quieting even of this [mental] unrest by destroying all worldly attachments. **Power** is eight-fold, *viz.*, "atomicity, magnitude, and lightness of the frame; attainment by the senses, free volition as to the seen and heard; supremacy [or] power to compel; control or non-attachment to the constituents; and getting whatever is desired." Of the frame 'atomicity' [or] minuteness, 'magnitude', expansion over leagues, [and] 'lightness' like cotton; 'attainment' is the power in the senses by the force of which one touches the sphere of the moon with the tip of his finger while standing on the

¹ More properly, renunciation of the world.

² That is, those which are still capable of producing effects. This ripening is a process of sterilising the passions by rendering them incapable of receiving the impression of Soul. The metaphor is taken from the process of dying cloth with colouring matter. So long as the dye is green the cloth receives impressions, but as soon as the colour becomes fast the cloth ceases to do so. Similarly with Soul,—as long as the passions are green it continues to be influenced by them, but no sooner are they sterilised than Soul becomes free. Hence the passions are called 'mental dyes.'

earth; 'free volition' is the non-crossability of purposes in the matter of [objects] seen and heard, as one sinks into the earth as in water, &c.; 'supremacy' [is the power] to compel all beings and their products at a wish; 'control' is independence of the constituents, beings, &c.;¹ is power to carry out resolves is 'getting' or attaining whatever is desired.

The opposites of these are vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. Of these, *vice*, due to adultery and the like; *ignorance*, [e.g.], consideration of house, field and other transitory things as permanent, association of purity with impure [things like] bodies of women &c., association of happiness with the world [which is] full of misery, identification of bodies, &c., which are distinct from Soul, with Soul, [so as to say] 'I am fair,' &c.; *passion* is lust for objects of sense; *weakness* is constraint against one's will.

ANNOTATIONS.

This verse deals with the first evolute of Nature, first in point of time and nearest to Soul. This is Intellect, consciousness, or the judging organ. Cousin describes it as "a sort of a soul of the world." This, if not positively erroneous, is certainly ambiguous. As we shall explain hereafter the evolution of the object may be considered from a genetic and an epistemological point of view. According to neither, however, is Intellect as conceived by Kapila the *soul* of the universe.

¹ The difference between this definition and that given for 'free volition' is not very apparent.

Some of the terms that are used for Intellect by ancient philosophical writers are these :—

(1) महात्, or महत्, 'the great one.' Vijnána Bhikshu explains that "Intellect is 'Great,' because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power."¹

(2) मतिः, 'understanding ;' it is through the agency of this organ that things are understood by Soul.

(3) व्याप्तिः, 'familiar knowledge, cognition.'

(4) ज्ञानं, 'true knowledge,' that by which things are known.

(5) प्रज्ञा, 'true wisdom,' that by which knowledge is gained.

(6) आत्मरौ, this seems to imply some sort of spirituality, either good or evil, but the exact significance is doubtful. It is a very unusual term, and Wilson suggests that it may be a slip in the *Bhāṣhya* for ऐमुषी, which is given as a synonym for बुद्धिः in the *Amarakósha*.

The aphorisms in *Sāṅkhya Pravachana* which correspond to this Distich are the 13th, 14th and 15th of the Second Book.*

¹ Ballantyne, *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms*, p. 197. Mr U. C. Bata-
byal, however, with more probability derives it from the old word
महत्, or महत्स् which signifies 'light, lustre.' See *Sādhanā*, II, 2,
334.

अभिमानोऽहंकारस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

ऐन्द्रिय एकादशकस्तन्मात्रापञ्चकश्चैव¹ ॥ २४ ॥

24. Self-apperception is egoism. Thence proceeds only a two-fold creation, [namely,] the eleven-fold set of sense, and the five-fold set of elemental rudiments.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The characteristics of Intellect have above been described. Those of Self-consciousness are next defined.

The eleven-fold set, [that is], the eleven organs. And the five-fold set of subtle elements, [that is], the five rudiments of sound, touch, colour, flavour, and smell.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The characteristics of Self-apperception are specified, **Self-apperception**, &c. :

Egoism is conceit of self, internal belief that 'I know,' 'I do,' 'this is to serve my end.' 'this I possess.' &c. The cause thereof [is] self-apperception. Since cause and effect are not different, egoism is [said to be] self-apperception. It [even] defines Soul as an [empirical] ego, though not so definable ; [thus] this self-conceit, through non-perception of difference, seems to be also

¹ So Nārāyaṇa. Gauḍapāda reads, एकादशकगणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चलक्ष्योपेतः (Wilson). The final words, which make the verse unmetrical, are however, proved by the commentary to be the gloss for पञ्चकश्चैव inserted in the text by mistake. The ordinary lection is एकादशकगणस्तन्मात्रा (or तन्मात्रः) पञ्चकश्चैव.

in Soul; but this is not self-apperception; such is the sense.

Its products are described, **Thence**, &c.,: What is created is 'creation.' From self-apperception proceeds the sixteen-fold set, which, through internal difference, is divisible into two. The two kinds are specified, **the eleven-fold**, &c. From this self-apperception [springs] of sense a set or series of eleven, and also of rudiments a set of five. The word **only** (*eva*) excludes other sets.

ANNOTATIONS.

The second evolute of Nature is Egoism. Consciousness is followed by self-consciousness. It is by means of this principle that personality comes to be attached to our cognitions. What was hitherto cognised simply as matter for knowledge is now cognised as matter for *my* knowledge; and thus *I* comes to be set over against *not-I*.

The Sanskrit word by which Egoism is explained is the same here and in *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* (II. 16). It is अभिमानः. In ordinary parlance this means 'pride;' Ballantyne renders it as "conceit," and Garbe as "delusion."¹ When the word is used philosophically, however, it denotes perception of Self and not exaltation thereof. That is a derived and secondary sense.

We next proceed to investigate what are the modes of self-consciousness, how is it modified and what does it lead to.

¹ Garbe's *Aniruddha*, p. 97; Ballantyne's *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms* p. 199.

सात्त्विक^१ एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्त्वैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

25. From self-apperception, when modified [by goodness], proceeds the good eleven-fold set²; from it, as the source of the elements³ issue the rudimentary particles, [and] these are dark; [while] both [emanations] follow from it when affected by activity.

¹ Dr. Hall in citing this stanza in his preface to *Sāṅkhya Sāra*, p. 30 gives the word as सात्त्विकं, probably a misprint.

² Vijnāna understands this passage a little differently. He takes एकादशकः to signify 'the eleventh,' that is, mind. He would thus make mind the sole educt of pure Egoism, and derive the ten organs from the passionate and the rudiments from the dark Egoism. See his commentary on *Sāṅkhya Pravachana*, II. 18. Aniruddha, however, takes the other and more usual view (Garbe, p. 98). According to this, activity (रजः) is a condition precedent to all evolution; the co-ordination of the other two constituents serves only to determine the character of the evolutes. St. Hilaire gets woefully muddled over Vijnāna's interpretation in his *Premier Memoire*, pp. 100-102.

³ This verse, especially the passage beginning with भूतादेः, was not lucidly rendered by Colebrooke. He translated, "From consciousness, ... as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles." The expression "origin of being" is obscure, and Wilson, in his translation of the *Bhāshya*, puts "beings" for "being" (p. 93). But this does not mend matters, for "beings" can only mean "creatures" (see *Kārikā* 53), and these proceed

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] ‘What kind of creation proceeds from [Egoism] so defined?’ In reply it is said :

When within self-consciousness goodness triumphs over passion and darkness, the egoism is pure. This has been termed “the modified” by ancient teachers. **From this modified self-apperception the set of eleven organs is produced.** Thence the good set, that is, pure, adequate to its functions ; therefore is the eleven-fold set called **good**.

Moreover, **from it as the source, &c.** When within self-consciousness darkness preponderates over goodness and passion, the egoism is of the dark kind, and has been termed “the origin of elements” by ancient teachers. From this element-engendering egoism the five-fold set of rudiments springs. The originant of

but indirectly from self-consciousness ; their origin is the elemental rudiments. Wilson translates भूतार्दिः as ‘primitive element’ (p. 92), and is followed by St. Hilaire, who gives, “du moi considéré comme élément primitif viennent les éléments grossiers !” That this is an error has been conclusively demonstrated by Dr. F. Hall. See his preface to *Sāṅkhya Sāra*, pp. 30-34. Among parallel passages may be cited *Kurma Purāṇa*, prior section, IV.

वैकारिकादहंकारात् सर्गो वैकारिकोऽभवत् ।

तैजसान्दीन्द्रियाणि स्युर्देवा वैकारिका दश ॥

एकादशं मनसाव स्वगुणेनीभयात्मकम् ।

भूततन्मात्रसर्गोऽयं भूतादंरभवन् प्रजाः ॥

A version of this is quoted in the *Sāṅkhya Sāra* (Hall’s ed., p. 17). Dr. Hall also refers to *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, I. 1, 46-7, and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, III. 5. 29 seq., III. 26. 27 seq.

the elements is surcharged with darkness, thence it is called **dark**,¹; from that element-generator, therefore, the set of five rudiments proceeds.

Further, **both from the active**. When within self-consciousness passion prevails over goodness and darkness, the egoism is called **active**; from this both emanate, [*viz.*,] the eleven-fold set and five-fold rudiments. When the pure apperception as the modified produces the eleven organs, it takes the assistance of the active, [for] the pure egoism is non-active and becomes competent to produce the organs [only] in union with the active form. Again, the dark apperception, termed the origin of elements, is inert, and combined with the active form produces the rudiments. Therefore it is said, "from the active [issue] both," by its means are the eleven organs and the five rudiments thus created.

¹ भूतानामादिभूतसमीवहुलस्तेनीक्तः स तामस इति, This is translated by Wilson as, "the first element of the elements is darkness; therefore it is usually called *the dark*," and in his comment the learned professor proceeds to expatiate how this "presents a notion familiar to all ancient cosmogonies," and how it "harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to elementary or visible creation, when "chaos was, and night," " &c. (p. 94). The whole, however, proceeds upon a misapprehension. भूतानामादिभूतः is an adjective (referring to the preceding भूतादिः) and in the masculine gender. So it could not be translated as "the first element." The proposition in neither the text nor the commentary is that the elements originate from one amongst them. See the drastic criticism of Wilson's interpretation in Hall's preface to *Sāṅkhya Sāra*, p. 31.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] But self-apperception is unitary; how does then a dual creation proceed from it? In answer it is said, **From self-apperception, &c.**

The **eleven-fold set** of sense is **good** because light and illuminating: proceeding **from modified egoism**, which is the term the Sāṅkhya teachers use for that in which the constitutive of goodness predominates.

The **rudimental set** proceeds from the **origin of elements**, that is, egoism in which darkness is dominant. Why? Because it is **dark**, imbued with darkness, which, it is proper, should spring from a cause of like nature.

But if evolution be owing [only] to the good and dark constituents, what is the use of passion? To this it is replied, **both, &c.**: Both the sets proceed from preponderant passion. Goodness and darkness being naturally non-active, the work of both, [inasmuch as it proceeds] from the urging of passion, is really the work of the latter constituent. Therefore this factor also has its utility; such is the sense.

The term "modified" applied to the source of the senses implies power to produce small¹ work; the term "element-originant" applied to the source of the rudiments implies darkness and capability for great work; the term "active" applied to [egoism when] affected by passion implies competency for creation. This is to be understood.

¹ 'Small' and 'great' are contrasted in this passage not on considerations of importance, but because the faculties which pervade the organs of sense are subtle, whereas the objects that proceed from the rudiments are gross.

ANNOTATIONS.

Here we may stop for a moment and consider what the first two evolutes of Nature signify and what the exact functions are which they discharge. Human knowledge as we find it is a very complex process. It is the business of the philosopher, or rather now that the principle of division of labour has been carried even into the sphere of thought) the epistemologist, to analyse this complex process. Kapila's series of evolutes is also intended to portray the successive stages of this movement. But this series may be viewed in two different ways. When it is said that consciousness is the *first* evolute of Nature, *first* may mean either that it is prior to all others in the order of time or that it is superior to the rest in the order of importance. That the second order may not be lost sight of we are reminded that this evolute is also the mode *nearest* to Soul. We shall consequently have to study the chain of manifest categories from both stand-points. We shall show hereafter that in what may be called the epistemological order the function of Intellect is to present to the subject the object in a condition perfect for full and distinct cognition. Here we shall deal with the two categories in the genetic order. From this standpoint, Intellect is the first glow in the mental sky of Soul, the earliest ray of light that breaks upon it when it becomes aware of the proximity of the not-self. When the not-self approaches the self, the not-self undergoes a rapid modification and casts a reflection upon the mirror of Self. The ego is confronted with the non-ego and cognises that *there is something*. This is the first coruscation of intelligence,

and is nothing more than pure and simple consciousness. The next step is when the simplicity of this consciousness is diversified by the intrusion of the *I*. The knowledge that 'I know,' 'I perceive' comes in, and so the cognition *there is something* is developed into the cognition *I see something*. When we have learnt to recognise the *I* as contradistinguished from the *something*, we have taken an important step indeed. We have reached the stage of self-consciousness. The next step will be to perceive that this *something* is an aggregate. When we begin to break up this confused perception into the various sensations of which it is a compound, and to apprehend these sensations distinctly, we reach the subtle categories of Kapila. And lastly, when we learn to ear-mark these sensations and assign them to definite portions of the not-*I*, and become aware of the intimate relation in which they stand to our feelings and will, we arrive at the sense-organs and the gross elements. Thus is the evolution of the non-ego brought about and the phenomenal world created.

The synonyms that Gauḍapáda gives for self-consciousness are all dealt with in these two verses. They describe the different conditions due to preponderance at different times of one or other of the constituents of which Nature and all its products are composed. It is with reference to these that ancient teachers have described Egoism as of three kinds. When it appertains to the factor of goodness, it is pure and creates mind and the spiritual part of the other senses; when it pertains to the factor of passion, it imparts to the others the virtue of activity; and when it appertains to the factor of darkness, it produces the triple world. No

reader who has followed us so far is likely to feel surprised when he hears it said that Egoism is the cause of the world. For a little consideration will show that there can be no perception without apperception.

बुद्धोन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ¹ ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थात्यक्रमेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ² ॥२६॥

26. The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin have been called the organs of intellection; the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ and the generative, the organs of action.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The “good eleven” which proceed from modified self-apperception have been spoken of. They are [now] particularised.

The organs from the eye to the skin are called intellectual. Touched by it, the organ of touch, which is the skin; thus is formed the word *sparsana* used in the text. Sound, feel, colour, flavour and smell, these five objects are perceived or apprehended by the five organs of intellect.

¹ Gauḍapāda reads चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनस्पर्शनानि. Wilson's MS. had स्पर्शनकानि. The word is unusual, and the commentator explains it.

² The more ordinary lection is वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि. Some copies of *Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī* even give पायूपस्थाः. Wilson has पायूपस्थान्.

The voice, hands, feet, &c. The organs of action are operative. Thus the voice articulates, the hands variously manipulate, the feet effect motion, the excretory organs evacuation, and the reproductive organs pleasure by generation of offspring.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Out of the eleven senses, the ten external organs are next described, **The eye, &c.**

The intellectual organs are those by means of which sound, feel, form, flavour and smell are perceived; they are eye and the rest, supersensibles, placed in their orbits and demonstrated by reason of apprehension of form and the like.¹ Thus, sight, literally, 'that by which [anything] is seen,' that is, the eye perceives colour among that group; hearing, literally, 'that by which [anything] is heard,' that is, the ear perceives sound; smell, literally, 'that by which [anything] is smelt,' that is, the nose perceives odour; taste, literally, 'that by which [anything] is tasted,' that is, the tongue perceives flavour; touch, literally, 'that by which [anything] is touched,' that is, the skin, extending over the whole frame, perceives feel. Of these, touch and sight apprehend objects also; the rest perceive only the attribute [or sensation].² This is to be understood.

¹ The senses are carefully distinguished from the organs in which they are supposed to abide. When we touch anything with the hand, it is not the hand which feels but something else, the hand being nothing more than a medium. So the Aphorist says, "the sense is supersensuous; [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the sense exists] in [identity with] its site" (II. 23).

² A similar idea may be found in the writings of some members of the Scottish School.

Speech and the rest are organs of action because they do work. They are [next] described. If it be asked, 'how can all these be termed *indriya* (sense)?' this etymology is to be accepted: '*ing* means objects, that which runs (*dravanṭi*) thereafter.'¹ Of eye and the rest, since they apprehend their particular percepts, these are not to be inferred to be their originators, such an inference being needless [and therefore to be looked upon with suspicion]. This is plainly implied.

समयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषाद्बानात्वं बाह्यभेदाच्च ॥ २७ ॥

27. In this set² the mind partakes of the nature of both. It combines,³ and is a

¹ The usual derivation is from इन्द्रः, powerful—इन्द्रि परमेश्वर्ये. Thus इन्द्रियं literally would be a power. It here means a cognitive faculty. (Cf. Ballantyne, *op. cit.*, p. 207.)

² Davies translates, "in this respect."

³ The word संकल्पकं has, not unnaturally, caused difficulty. In later Sanskrit it signifies 'resolve, purpose, expectation.' So Colebrooke renders, "it ponders," and Wilson says the notion conveyed is "conclusion from foregone premises." Ballantyne translates संकल्पः by "decision" (p. 209) and Garbe by "volition" (p. 103) The substantive, however, is formed from संकृप् which also signifies 'to arrange or connect together.' (Cf. कल्पना, imagination.) A more exact equivalent therefore, I think, would be 'synthesis.' While the sensibility only 'senses' a "manifold," Mind combines the data thus received and forms groups of

sense-organ because cognate with the rest. Their multifariousness, as also the diversity of external objects,¹ is due to specific modifications of constituents.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Thus the ten⁹ organs of intellection and action have been described; the constitution and character of the mind, which is the eleventh, are next explained.

Here, in the set of organs, the mind combines attributes of both. Among the organs of intellection, it seems one of intellection, among those of action, it seems one of action. Why? [Because] it performs (or determines) the functions of the organs of intellection as well as those of action, therefore mind partakes of the character of both.

It is determinative. What else? It is a **sense-organ because cognate**, having a common nature. The organs of sense and intellect, having sprung from pure apperception together with mind, have this [that is, origin] in common with mind. Therefore owing to cognate functions, mind is also an organ. Thus from

them. The function of Kapila's Mind is thus analogous to that of Kant's Imagination. Lassen translates, "et imaginans est;" St. Hilaire, "sa fonction est de reunir;" Davies suggests, "formative" or "plastic."

¹ This is according to the received text and commentary. Some MS., however, read बाह्यभेदाच्च, which Lassen adopts. According to this reading there are two reasons assigned for the multifariousness. As Davies (who follows Lassen) puts it, "It is multifarious from the specific modifications of the modes and the diversity of external things."

self-consciousness modified by goodness eleven organs are produced.

What, then, is the function of mind? Its function is reflection. The functions of the organs of intellection are sound and the rest, those of the organs of sense, speech and the rest. Now, are these organs, various and with different functions, so created by God or by self-differentiation? For Nature, intellect and self-apperception are unconscious, while soul is non-active. According to the Sāṅkhya doctrine there is a cause, spontaneity. Therefore it is said, **Multifariousness as well as external diversity is due to specific modifications of the constituents.**¹ That is, the several objects of the eleven organs, [*viz.*] sound, touch, colour, flavour and smell of five, speech, manipulation, motion, excretion and generation of [another] five, and determination, of mind, these different objects are owing to the particularity of the modifications of the constituents. Thence the multifariousness of the organs as also the external diversities. Now, this numerousness was not created by God or egoism or intellect or Nature or Soul, but by modification of the constituents acting spontaneously. This does not proceed designedly,² because the constituents are insentient. How then? As will be explained here-

¹ Wilson states that his MS. of Gauḍapāda gave the other lection. But he (apparently followed by Paṇḍit Bechanarāma) printed बाह्यभेदाच्च, and that reading seems to accord better with the general tenour of the commentary.

² As if directed by a conscious will. This is a doubtful passage. The construction may possibly be: '[If you say], the constituents being insentient, the modification cannot proceed intelligently, [the answer is], it does so proceed.'

after,¹ like the secretion of milk, which is unintelligent,² for the nourishment of a calf is the action of Nature for the liberation of 'Soul. Thus the insentient constitutive powers are changed into the eleven organs, and their peculiarities are also thus derived. Whence the eye is placed in its elevated orbit for the purpose of vision ; similarly the nose, the ear, the tongue are conveniently situated for the apprehension of their respective objects. In like manner, the organs of action [are] also placed in the proper positions for the discharge of the special functions they are competent to, by the modification of the constituents acting spontaneously, but not so their objects.³ For it is said elsewhere, "constituents abide in constituents," the functions of the constituents have the constituents themselves for their objects.⁴ The sense is that external objects are to be considered as produced by the constituents, the cause whereof is Nature.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Mind is the eleventh organ, the marks whereof are now specified, **In this set**, &c. :

The organ called Mind is reflective, it combines (fashions) the objects roughly apprehended by the senses,

¹ See *Kārikā* 57.

² Wilson connects, अज्ञस्य with पुरुषस्य "without soul's being cognizant of them " (nature's proceedings).

³ The meaning seems to be that the objects are not, like the organs, due to the modification, for they owe their existence to the constituents direct and not to any modification thereof. The passage is obscure.

⁴ This quotation from *Bhagavad Gītā*, III. 28, has been explained in note 1, p. 83 *ante*.

contemplates them in the relation of substantive and attribute, and is thus productive of distinguishing cognition. This it has for its essence, because of the identity of cause and effect. Thus it partakes of the nature of both, of organs of intellection and of action, because it is a colleague to both, inasmuch as they perform their functions with mind for support.

‘But mind, like intellect and self-apperception, is [only] a helper of the senses and not a sense-organ itself; if that fact alone were to make it a sense, there would be an unwarranted extension of terms.’ To this it is replied, **a sense-organ also.** Why? **Because cognate.** The community consists in having together with the other senses pure egoism for its immediate cause; intellect and self-apperception, [on the other hand], are not senses, because not so occasioned; such is the sense. This [also] shows that the opinion of some that Mind is not a sense, because sense-organs are perceptible and it is not, is incorrect, for, according to our definition of a sense the attribute of non-sensibility [of a product of Nature] is not intended when similitude to Nature is spoken of.¹ It is needless to expatiate.

But how are eleven organs produced from the one pure egoism? In reply it is said, **by modification of constituents**, the specific modifications, in the form of diversity in the invisible [power of merit and demerit],² &c., of goodness and the other factors; diversity of pro-

¹ That is, according to our theory, the ascription of similarity to Nature does not predicate either sensibility or supersensibility of the object.

² This invisible power is commonly spoken of as fate.

duct being due to difference in the co-operant,¹ this is the meaning. **External diversities also** [are mentioned] by way of illustration, the sense being as external differences so also these. The reading *grāhyabhedāchcha*² is to be understood to mean that difference among sense-organs is also due to that among the objects thereof.

ANNOTATIONS.

There are eleven senses. Of these ten have been specified in Distich 26. Now Iśvara'Kṛishṇa proceeds to deal with the eleventh, which is Mind. This Mind is not to be confounded with Intellect or consciousness. It is more properly a sense. The particular senses furnish us with multifarious data of sense. But this "manifold," these multitudinous pricks do not yet constitute an object. For instance, sitting in this room I may have a multitude of sensations pouring in upon me from all sides—sensations of form, colour, cold, light, hardness and so forth—but until these sensations are arranged and synthesised, combined into definite groups, I cannot perceive either chair, table, paper, or ink. It is the function of Mind to do this work of combination, to form groups for perception. All impressions received,

¹ The production of the material world is due to अदृष्ट', the 'unseen' power of merit and demerit. With this *cause efficiens* a secondary cause, *vis.*, preponderance of one or other of the constituents, co-operates, and the variety of senses results. Of course, this inequality of factors is itself dependent upon अदृष्ट'.

² Query, बाह्यभेदाच्च.

by the external senses must be transmitted to mind before there can be any perception. If mind be not attending, no matter how strong be the air-vibrations that strike upon our ear-drum, we cannot hear any sound.¹ Again, the eye cannot perceive any but objects of vision, the ear any but objects of hearing, and so with the rest of the particular senses. But all objects are conglomerates of sensations of various sorts. Consequently there must be a sense which can perceive this conglomerate as a whole, which can 'sense' all the diverse sensations together and recognise the difference among them. This is the Mind of Kapila, and the common or central sense of Aristotle.²

It will now be understood what is meant by saying that Mind is at once a sense of intellection and a sense of action.³ Mind is cognate to both because it is identical in origin and function.

Iśvara Kṛishṇa next tries to explain to what the diversity of senses is due. Mr. Davies argues with much ingenuity that the distich purports to investigate the nature of Mind and should not be extended so as to include all senses. According to him, therefore, the second line explains the multifarious operation of Mind, and he relies upon Vijnāna's explanation of *Sūtra* II. 27: "as the same individual assumes different characters according to the influence of his associations, becoming a lover with his beloved, a sage with sages, and a differ-

¹ Cf. Locke, *Essay*, Book I, ch. ix. 3-4.

² Aristotle's *Psychology*, Book III, ch. ii (Wallace's ed.); also the editor's Introduction, pp. lxxv—lxxxv.

³ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 26.

ent person with others; so mind (*manas*) becomes various from its connection with the eye or any other organ, being identified with it, and being diversified by the modification of the function of sight and the rest of the organs."¹ Aniruddha, however, takes the other view.²

रूपादिषु³ पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।

वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

28. The function of five [organs] in the matter of colour and the rest, is only observation; that of [the other] five is speech, handling, walking, excretion and generation [respectively].

[GAUDAPÁDA.] Next are specified the several functions of the [different] organs :

The word **only** signifies specialty, and excludes the not-particularised; as, 'only alms are received,' that is, nothing else. So the eye [observes] only colour and not flavour, &c.; similarly of the rest, that is, colour is

¹ Wilson's translation (*Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, p. 99), as quoted by Davies (p. 64).

² Garbe, p. 101. Mahádeva tries to combine the two views, Garbe, p. 102.

³ Váchaspati reads शब्दादिषु.

the object¹ of the eye, taste of the tongue, smell of the nose, sound of the ear, and touch of the skin. Thus the functions of the intellectual organs have been specified.

The, [respective] functions of the organs of action are next detailed: **Speech, &c. of the five**, that is, of the organs of action. The construction is, the function of the voice is articulation, of the hands manipulation, of the feet locomotion, of the rectum excretion of fæces-converted food, and of the sexual organs delight from generation of offspring.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The function of the intellectual among the outward sense-organs is described, **The function, &c.** Of the five organs of perception, *viz.*, the eye, the tongue, the nose, the ear and the skin, the function in the matter of colour, flavour, smell, sound and feel is **observation** and that alone.² The word **only** excludes taking and other action. The sense is that the capability of the eye is for form, of the tongue for flavour, of the nose for odour, of the ear for sound, and of the skin for touch.

The functions of the active organs are [next] enumerated, **Speech, &c.** The work or function of the five organs of action is speech, &c. : Speech, whereby is articulation, the work of the throat, palate, &c., is the function of the voice; seizure or manipulation of the

¹ Gauḍapāda paraphrases वृत्तिः by विषयः. As Wilson points out, "the function and object of a sense is the same thing, sight being both the function and the object of the eye" (p. 102).

² निर्विकल्पकं, undeliberative, recognising no difference between subject and object, opposed to सविकल्पकं.

hand ; walking or locomotion of the feet ; evacuation of fæces, &c. of the rectum ; and delight, that which delights, that is, sexual pleasure, of the reproductive organs. This is to be understood.

स्वालक्षणं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २६ ॥

29. The function of the three [internal faculties] is characteristic of each and not common to all. The common function of the organs is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The functions of intellect, apperception and mind¹ are now defined :

That is **characteristic** which partakes of its peculiar nature. *Ascertainment* has been spoken of as the characteristic of intellect ; that is its function also. So *egoism is self-apperception*, [here] egoism is both the characteristic and the function. *Mind is determinative*, this is the definition ; hence reflection is the function of mind. Of the three, intellect, egoism and mind, the functions are the characteristics, and are peculiar. The functions of the organs of intellection, as before described, are also specific¹.

¹ And so also are those of the organs of action.

The common function is next described. The common function of the organs are the five vital airs, [viz.,] *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna*, *vyāna*. These are common to all the organs. *PRĀṆA*, for instance, is the air perceptible within the mouth and nostrils; and the circulation¹ of this is the common function of the thirteen organs; because it is owing to the existence of this breath that the organs become connected with Soul²; it is *prāṇa* too which like a bird in a cage moves³ everything. It is called breath (*prāṇa*) from breathing. So *apāna* is named after removing, and its circulation is also the common function of the organs. Similarly, *samāna* is so called because it is central and distributes food evenly [to all parts of the body], and the circulation of this is also a function common to all the organs. The name *udāna* is from either ascending or lifting or guiding up; [this air] is perceptible in the space between the head and the navel, and the circulation it has is a common function of all the organs. What else? The air which contributes to internal diffusion and division, and pervades the frame like the ethereal element, is *vyāna*, and the circulation thereof is a common function of the organic assemblage. Thus the five vital airs, as the common function of the organs, has been explained, the common function, that is, even of the thirteen kinds.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The function of intellect, egoism and mind is next specified, **The function, &c. :**

The function of these is peculiar, possessing charac-

¹ स्रन्दनं (Wilson's MS.); the Benares edition has स्रन्दनं, throbbing, pulsation.

² That is, acquire life.

That is, gives vitality to.

teristics that are individual and uncommon; thus, that of intellect is ascertainment, that of egoism self-apperception, that of mind differentiating or formative power, it separates, this is the sense. Functions are two-fold, common and uncommon. These are the uncommon or specific. The common are now described, **The common**, &c.: The functions of the organs that are common [are] the five vital airs, breath and the rest, because by [conducting to] life, &c., they form the ultimate cause of all organic action, [and] since their conjunction and disjunction¹ have been authoritatively laid down, the operations of sense having been said to be concomitant with the action of the said airs. In books the difference among the several airs is assigned to difference in their seats, thus, "PRĀṆA [dwells] in the heart, *apāna* in the anus, *samāna* goes down to the navel, *udāna* resides in the throat, and *vyāna* circulates throughout the frame." Enough.

ANNOTATIONS.

We now proceed to a more detailed examination of the faculties and senses we have been discussing. Of the various instruments or organs by means of which Soul *perceives* the world, three may be described as internal and the rest as external. Of course, this characterisation is with strict reference to the body (in which the Soul finds itself located). Consciousness, Self-

¹ The inference is by *अन्वयव्यतिरेक*, what Prof. Cowell calls 'affirmative and negative induction' (Colebrooke's *Essays*, Vol. I. P. 315, note 3).

apperception, and Mind are within the frame; we cannot fix them to different parts of it as we can the sense-organs. We shall here designate them as *faculties*.

Now these faculties have special characteristics which differentiate them from one another.¹ As we have seen, the proper function of Intellect is determination by judgment, of Self-consciousness preception as *mine*, and of mind discrimination and synthesis. But besides these peculiar functions—functions that may be called intellectual—there is one which these faculties have in common. This is a physiological function, being nothing short of keeping the man alive. The faculties support the life-winds.

These so called ‘winds’² should not be confounded with elemental air. As Vijnāna expands Aphorism II, 31, “the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as ‘airs,’ because of their circulating as the air does, these are the joint or common ‘*modification*,’ or kinds of altered form, of the triad of internal instruments.” Ballantyne calls them ‘animal spirits.’³ They are nothing more or less than vital forces. What the old Hindu physiologist had in mind was apparently a notion of some kind of pulsation within, a very subtle movement, which was independent of sensation, but which was indispensable to the maintenance of life. The idea of ‘air’ may possibly have been suggested by an observation, necessarily inadequate in those days of

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 30. Ballantyne in the commentary translates अध्यवसाय as “attention” (p. 209).

² A popular account of them will be found in *Anugītā*, Telang’s translation, pp. 258, 271, &c.

³ *Sāṅkhya Aphorisms*, p. 209.

pre-historic science, of the phenomena of breathing, flatulence and arterial pulsation. Any way, the 'five life-winds' denote the vital functions of respiration, excretion, digestion, the circulation of the blood and the sensibility of the skin.¹

Gauḍapāda makes these 'life-winds' the common function of all the organs. The other commentators are for restricting it to the faculties. That this is more accurate is shown by the fact that vitality does not necessarily cease with the mutilation or destruction of a limb or sense-organ.

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य हि² वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।

दृष्टे तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

30. The functions of the four with regard to sensible objects are described to be simultaneous as well as consecutive; with regard to the insensible, the functions

¹ The whole subject will be found dealt with in a true scholar's spirit by Mr. Davies (*Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 65-7). He points out that the 'airs' "indicate a dim perception of what we call "nerve-force," something more subtle than the elements of inanimate matter; for it is caused by the action of the internal organs, which are due to the agency of the mode called "goodness," i. e., matter of an etherealised and animate kind."

² Wilson's text has तु.

of the three [internal faculties] are preceded by the action of the fourth [sense-organ].

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] [The functions] of the four are simultaneous; the four are formed by intellect, egoism, and mind in connection with a sense-organ. The functions of the four in the matter of sensible objects, that is, in the ascertainment thereof, are simultaneous; intellect, self-apperception, mind and the eye apprehend form simultaneously and in one instant, [recognising, for instance, that] 'that is a post.' The three internal organs with the tongue perceive flavour instantly. The same three with the nose at once appreciate odour. Similarly in connection with the skin and the ear.

What else? They have been also defined to be consecutive; **they**, that is, the functions of the four. As a way-farer seeing an object from distance doubts [at first] whether it is a post or a man. He then perceives some mark¹ upon it or a bird. Thereupon intellect, which dissipates the doubt suggested by the mind, discriminates 'that is a post,'² and self-apperception assures, 'Verily [I am certain] it is a post.' This illustrates the

¹ That the correct word here is वस्ति¹ and not लिङ्ग² is shown by the commentary on verse 46 below.

² ततस्तस्य मनसा सङ्कल्पिते संशये व्यवच्छेदभूता बुद्धिर्भवति. Wilson translates, "and doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding discriminates." This is not quite correct. Mr. Davies also objects to the word 'reflection' being used of Mind. We have already adverted to the difficulty of rendering संकल्पः. 'Reflect' in the modern sense Kapila's Mind certainly does not; the word may, however, be used to show that its function is not purely 'sensitive.'

consecutive action of intellect, self-apperception, mind and the eye. As in the case of form, so it is as to sound and other perceptible objects.

What else? **In the case of the imperceptible, the function of the three is subsequent to that of the fourth.** In the imperceptible, that is, in time past and future, in the case of form the action of the three internal faculties is preceded by that of the eye, in the case of touch by that of the skin, in the case of smell by that of the nose, in the case of flavour by that of the tongue, and in the case of sound by that of the ear. The functions of Intellect, Egoism and Mind in respect of time past and future are preceded in order by those of the senses; in respect of the present [they may be] instantaneous or gradual.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The peculiar functions are now shown to be simultaneous and consecutive, **The functions, &c. :**

With reference to sensible or perceptible objects the function of the four, [*viz.*,] an external sense, mind, egoism and intellect, is both **instantaneous and gradual**; as, when it thunders, or when a tiger or the like is [suddenly] met, the observing, discriminative, apperceptive, and ascertaining functions all at once come into action, and the man immediately takes to flight. Also consecutive, as, when in dim light one perceives something, then makes sure it is such and such, then realises 'it is coming towards me,' and then determines 'I should move away from this place,' in this order do the [several] functions succeed.

Again, **in the unseen**, objects imperceptible, of the **three**, the external organ being excluded, the functions are instantaneous as well as gradual. Three are spoken

of, because in the matter of inference and testimony, there is no application of an [external] sense-organ. With regard to their objects, since there is an absence of the indeterminate,¹ the first function is that of mind; and this function is preceded by that, that is, the perceptive. In short, in cases of inference, perception is required for a knowledge of concomitance, [and] in those of testimony, perception cannot be dispensed with because of the necessity of the inference of power.

ANNOTATIONS.

How do the various instruments of cognition come into action? Do they operate consentaneously or one after another? The order of their action is the subject-matter of the verse under discussion.

The Aphorist tells us, "the functions of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously."² So generally we may take it that the action in question may be either way. The faculties and the senses may be stimulated to action all at once, as when we perceive a flash of lightning. Or they may find a leisurely application and come into operation one after another. For instance, I am walking in a forest. I hear a sudden whizz, and look up. My mind gathers up the sense-

¹ निर्दिक्त्वक, what does not arise from the relation of the qualifier and the qualified. This is a technical term of philosophy applied to knowledge not derived from the senses. What Nārāyaṇa is driving at here is that perception must precede inference and testimony,—unless the senses have operated before the application of the higher faculties, all reasoning must be mere jargon, all argumentation only wrangle about words.

impressions and cognises that an arrow has been shot. Then the empirical ego wakes up; I perceive the arrow and perceive that it is coming towards me. My intellect ascertains that it is so, that there is no doubt about it, and I move off.¹

It will be noticed that this applies only to the case of objects that are not beyond the senses. When the object is one that is imperceptible, the occupation of the senses is in a way gone. Such objects, we have been already told,² are to be cognised by means of inference and testimony. The internal faculties operate as usual; and their action may be consecutive or successive. But the faculties cannot make bricks without straw, they must be furnished with data by the senses. We can only reason about things that at sometime or other has been in some way an object of our senses; we can intelligently apprehend things we are told about only when we have had experience of similar things before. Thus, it will be seen that there can be no functioning of our internal faculties about matters upon which the

¹ It will be noticed that Gauḍapāda seems to place egoism last and attribute conviction to it. The possibility of such a transposition makes it all the more clear that the internal faculties are not to be divided off from one another by any very hard and fast lines. The names only mark 'moments' or stages in a process which is strictly continuous; the abstractions indicate nothing more than a temporal succession.

It may be here noted that according to the Vais'eśhikas the organs operate only successively. Aniruddha suggests that where we speak of simultaneity there is a succession but it is imperceptible (Garbe, p. 103).

² Distich 6 *ante*.

senses have never operated.¹ We build upon our prior perceptions.

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्म्यराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

31. The organs perform their respective functions, being incited thereto by a mutual impulse. The cause is the benefit of Soul. No organ is moved to action by anyone.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] *Svām* (proper, respective) is repeated. Intellect, self-apperception and mind perform their respective functions, the incitement whereto is a mutual impulse. *Akūta* implies respectful eagerness. Intellect and the others [do this] for the advantage of Soul. Consciousness being influenced by the activity² of self-apperception, sets about its peculiar work. If [it be asked], 'with what object?' [the answer is,] the purpose of the Soul is the motive. The purpose of Soul is to be effected; the constitutive powers operate for this end, and hence do these organs make manifest the object of Self.

If [it be asked], 'how they, being unconscious, [effect

¹ Wilson translates तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः by "their prior function." This is obviously inaccurate and not in consonance with the Professor's own comments (p. 107).

² Literally, becoming conscious of the influence. Wilson has, 'knowing the wishes of egotism and the rest.'

this]?' [the reply is,] they act of their own accord.¹ **No one does move an organ.** The benefit of Soul alone moves them to action. This is the meaning of the sentence. An organ is not caused or incited to act by anybody, divine or² human.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] 'But the alternative *simultaneous* is not probable, because the action of mind is dependent upon the operations of sense, similarly egoism is dependent upon the action of intellect, and mind upon that of egoism.' To this is replied, **The organs**, &c.

Ākūta means intention; that [sense] being inapplicable in the case of the irrational, the meaning here is readiness for activity.³ The time of the origination of activity of one [organ], there being nothing to hinder, is also the time for that of another; thus simultaneity becomes possible; in the case of gradual [action] doubt and the like obstruct; this is to be understood.

Energise towards their respective ends; this shows that though the activity is simultaneous, yet the objects being distinct, as in the case of a clubbist and a spearman, there is no commingling of functions.

Yet, who moves an organ? the reply is, **The cause**, &c.: The object of Soul, which has for its marks experience and liberation, being moved by a desire for

¹ यद्यचेतनानीति कथं स्वयं प्रवर्तन्ते, which may mean, 'If [it be asked], how do they, who are devoid of intelligence, act of their own motion?' Prof. Wilson reads simply, कथं स्वयं प्रवर्तन्ते, and translates, 'How is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act?'

² In Wilson's text दा is wanting, he renders accordingly 'any human superior' or 'sovereign man'.

³ प्रवृत्तुम् स्वयं, Wilson translates, 'incitement to activity'.

self-realisation, becomes the incentive to the activity of an organ; this is the sense. **Moves**, incites; for this a desiring agent is necessary; God, [however], is not such, for to [support] the assumption of Him there is want of proof.

ANNOTATIONS.

Iśvara Kṛishṇa next proceeds to consider what moves the organs to action. Now when we ask 'what moves the organs to action?' two answers are possible, for two different causes may be assigned. One is the direct incitement to activity, this is the efficient cause; the other is the reason why there is such an incitement at all, this may be called the final cause. Our author is careful to state both causes here.

1. The organs are set in action by a mutual impulse; they act in concert being induced thereto by sympathy. The word in the text **आकूतं** generally signifies 'intention' or 'purpose'. But we are to lay aside all ideas of conscious volition, for the organs with which we are now dealing are admittedly unintelligent. The influence then that one organ exerts upon another is one of unconscious sympathy; when one moves, the other is also induced to move provided there is nothing to obstruct or hinder. (Be it here noted that there is nothing to restrict the "organs" here to the internal faculties. Gaudapāda takes that view and is followed by Mr. Davies. The organs are, however, spoken of quite generally, and that they must be so understood is apparent from the consideration that for purposes of cognition the co-operation of all the organs, senses as well as faculties, is necessary.)

2. The organs are set in action in order that the object of the Soul may be fulfilled. What is this object? It is liberation, dissolution of worldly bonds. How is it to be effected? By experience. Soul is the principle of intelligence. When it comes in contact with the non-manifest principle, the latter undergoes modifications and becomes manifest unto the former. Soul views these modes, reflections of the non-ego upon the glass of its consciousness, and makes itself acquainted with them¹. When it has exhausted all phases of Nature and its experience is complete, there is a severance between the two. Now, the organs are nothing but (to speak in chemical language) the solutions formed from the union of the ego and the non-ego. And when our faculties and senses present matter for experience to Soul it is in order that the latter may attain fruition. It will be shown later on that it is not so very strange that unconscious action should betoken design.

There is a remark in Náráyana's commentary which deserves notice. The organs are moved to action not by God says Náráyana. for तदपेक्षायां मानाभावात्, we should

¹ In his notes upon Distich 4 Mr. Davies remarks that Kapila "rejects all innate ideas, and all knowledge derived from pure consciousness. He adopts the axiom, '*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*'" (p. 24) But when later on he finds that there is such a thing as memory, that "the Soul has a distinct faculty," that "it sees and understands the forms of external things presented by its ministers, the internal organs," that it "alone is the seat of all real cognition, it alone knows and decides," he is constrained to say that Kapila "also would add '*Nisi intellectus ipse*'" (p. 68). A comparison of the two passages is not without its moral.

not assume the Deity because we cannot prove Him. This well shows the rationalistic mind of the Sāṅkhya philosopher : when we are dealing with positive facts we should avoid introducing things that are not susceptible of strict demonstration. The 'average mind, whenever in a difficulty, falls back upon God ; if there is anything that he cannot explain, lo ! there is God. But that is hardly the philosophic way. In his commentary on verse 27, when Gauḍapāda has to explain why there is a diversity of objects and functions here, he finds the cause in spontaneity, in the nature of things (स्वभावात्). The idea seems to be that there is a subtle force which underlies and inspires all things ; it is this force which sets the organs in motion, it is this force again which impels the pure, active and dark constituents to combine together for the production of diversity in formal being. When the objects can help themselves, why should we drag in the Deity ?¹ Whenever the question of God is pressed forward, the Sāṅkhya takes up an agnostic standpoint. He will not deny His existence, however.

ईश्वरासिद्धे : I. 92.

All that he will commit himself to is that there is no proof. If you ask him to define more clearly his ultimate cause, he will say it is unseen (अदृष्ट').

¹ Cf. the conclusion of Nārāyaṇa's commentary on verse 15 *ante*.

करणं त्रयोदशविधं तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशधाहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥३२॥

32. Organ is thirteen-fold, seizing, retaining and manifesting;¹ the effect thereof is ten-fold, that which is to be seized, to be retained, and to be manifested.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] It is next specified how many Intellect and the other [instruments] are.

Instrument. *Mahat* and the rest are thirteen. Intellect and the rest [make] three, the organs of perception, eye &c., five, the organs of action, voice &c., five; [thus], instrument is of thirteen kinds. What does this perform? In answer it is said, **seizing, holding and manifesting**. The organs of action seize and retain, those of perception manifest.

How many are its operations? In reply it is said, **the effect is ten-fold**. The work of the instrument, what it has to do, is of ten kinds, sound, touch, form, flavour and smell, also voice, handling, motion, excretion and generation, these are the ten effects manifested by means of the organs of perception. Grasp and retention are effected by the organs of action.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The organs are next enumerated, **Organ, &c.; Thirteen-fold**, intellect, self-apperception, and eleven senses. Their functions are specified, **seizing, &c.** Of these seizing is the function of the organs of action; retention of mind, egoism and intellect, inasmuch as body is held together, by their functions [pro-

¹ Colebrooke renders, "it compasses, maintains, and manifests."

ductive of] the five vital airs ; [and] manifestation of the organs of perception.

How many are the objects ? In reply it is said, **the effects, &c.** Among the thirteen, of the organs of action the object, [that is], the seizable, is ten-fold, according to the distinction of human and divine, [similarly] of mind, egoism and intellect the object, [that is], the maintainable (*e. g.*, body and the like), is ten-fold, according to the distinction of gross elements, human and divine ; and of the organs of perception the object, [that is], the to-be-manifested, (*viz.*, sound, touch, form, flavour and smell) is also ten-fold, because human and divine.

ANNOTATIONS.

The various instruments by means of which there is cognition for Soul are generically denominated as "organs". These organs are thirteen, three internal and ten external.¹ The work that these organs have to perform is either seizure, retention or manifestation.² We seize or grasp an object by means of an organ of action ; we make it manifest, that is, convert it into a percept, with the aid of an organ of intellection. Retention may

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 38.

² Mr. Davies understands the three kinds of work to belong to all the organs. *E. g.*, he says, "the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an internal object and manifests it to the *manas* ; this organ does the same to consciousness, and the latter to the intellect (*buddhi*), which, as a mirror, receives, retains, and reflects the impression, which has now become a definite ideal form, that the soul may see it" (p. 70). The explanation we have given is supported by the consensus of Hindu commentators.

be physical or intellectual ; for example, we may hold an object by our hand or we may keep it in mind. When we have a sensation, a trace of it may be left in the internal sense, and on future occasions it may be called up or revived.¹ Thus retention would seem to belong to the faculties.²

The action of the organs is necessarily ten-fold, there being five organs of action and five of intellection. The further division of this action as human and divine seems to be a later addition.

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।

साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥३३॥

33. Internal organs are three, external ten, making known objects to the three. The external are confined to time present, the internal embrace past and future as well.³

[GAUḌAPÁDA.] What else? **Internal**, [viz.] Intellect, Self-apperception, and Mind are three-fold, through difference between the Great One and the others. **Ex-**

¹ So in *Sútra* II. 42 the internal sense मनः is called "the receptacle of all impressions." (*Vijnána* understands this of intellect). In the next Aphorism memory is referred to, but it is not located.

² Váchaspati and Náráyana assign retention to the internal organs as they support the vital airs. Since Gauḍapáda considers this a common function of the instruments he ascribes retention as well as seizure to the organs of action.

³ Literally, 'the three times.'

ternal [organs] are ten, five being organs of perception and five of action : they **make known things** to the three internal [organs], [thus] causing fruition unto them.

In time present. , The ear hears a present sound, not a past or a future, the eye sees a present form, not one that is gone by or not yet come, the skin touches a present object, the tongue a present flavour, the nose a present odour, not what is past or what is future. Similarly [with regard to] the organs of action : [for instance], the voice articulates a present sound, not past or future ; the hand takes hold of a present jar, not one that was or is to be ; the feet move upon a present, and not a past or future, walk ; and the organs of excretion and of generation perform present, and not past or future, offices. Thus the external organs are said to be active in time present.

The internal organs serve at all times : Intellect, Self-apperception, and Mind have to do with objects in all the three times. [For instance], Intellect apprehends a present water-jar as well as one that has been or is yet to be ; Self-apperception identifies [an object], whether present, past or future ; Mind defines in the present as well as in the past and the future. Thus the internal organs relate to all the three times.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The divisions of the thirteen organs are next specified, **Internal**, &c. :

The internal are three-fold, through the distinction of Intellect, Egoism, and Mind ; the external organism is ten-fold, through the distinction of the five organs of perception and the five of action. **Objectifying**, furnishing objects to the three-fold internal set ; to the

functioning of Mind, Egoism, and Intellect the operations of the intellectual organs are suited ; so also are those of the active organs through the former organs ; in objects produced by the operation of the organs of action the activity of the organs of perception is antecedent to that of the internal [instruments].

What like are the external organs ? In reply it is said, **confined to the present**, having their objects only in the present. The external, *sc.*, organs ; the organs of action are to be understood indirectly [through those of perception]. **The three times**, having objects in time present, past and future ; the internal organs, named mind, self-apperception, and consciousness objectify time past and future by means of inference and testimony, and time present by means of perception.

ANNOTATIONS.

Three of the organs we have seen are called *internal* because they are placed within the body and operate there. The other organs are *external* and can directly apply to objects. The function of these latter organs is to receive the impressions at the outset and to forward them within in order that the internal organs may perceive. All percepts must come through the channel of the senses. These senses necessarily are confined to objects that are *now* before them ; so sense-knowledge pure cannot transcend the present. But the internal faculties know no restrictions of time.

An interesting inquiry here arises as to how far, if at all, memory, imagination and volition are to be attributed to the internal organs. Since Self is the sole seat of all real knowledge it may with some plausibility

be argued that these all belong to it and to it alone. It seems to us, however, that the authority of the *kārikā* under discussion is the other way. 'What is meant by saying that the internal organs are concerned with all times? Surely this that their objects are not limited to the present instant, but that the data which they manipulate may be furnished partly by present sensations, partly by reminiscences of impressions received some time ago, and partly by imaginings of sensations which may be received hereafter. Such manipulation will evidently involve not only memory and imagination but volition. Kapila, it is true, has left this part of his psychology rather hazy, but there can scarcely be much doubt as to what lines we have got to work upon.

बुद्धेन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥३४॥

34. Among these, the five organs of perception concern objects, both specific and non-specific.¹ The voice has for its object sound. The rest concern all the five objects [of sense].

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Next is explained which of the organs apprehends specific objects and which non-specific.

Among these the intellectual organs appre-

¹ Lassen translates, "are the province of distinct and indistinct objects," and Davies, following him, "are the domain of specific and non-specific objects." I substantially adopt Colebrooke's version.

hend specific objects. The said organs in the case of men make known, sound, touch, form, flavour and smell, as well as objects connected with pleasure, pain or indifference. The organs of the divinities perceive things which have no specific characteristics.

Next, among the organs of action, the voice is concerned with sound; in gods as well as men the voice speaks, recites verses, &c. Therefore the organ of speech is alike in beings divine and human.

The rest, [that is], all except speech, [*viz.*,] the hand, the foot, the organs of excretion and of generation, **concern all the five objects**, [*viz.*,] sound and the rest. [For example], sound, feel, form, flavour and odour are [all] to be found in the hand; the foot walks over the earth characterised by the same five marks; the excretory organ evacuates matter containing all of them; and the generative organ secretes a liquid which is marked by the five objects of sense as well.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] [The author] now discusses the objects of external organs, **Among these**, &c. :

Among the ten sense-organs, those of perception have for their objects **specific**, apprehensible, and **non-specific**, non-sensible, things; of these, the organs of ascetics apprehend both kinds of object, ours only the specific.

Similarly among the organs of action, voice has sound for its object, since it produces that, [but articulated] sound is not rudimental, for this comes from egoism. **The rest**, hands, feet and the organs of excretion and generation, **have five objects**, because pot and the like, which may be seized by hand, &c., have for their essence sound and the rest of the five.

ANNOTATIONS.

In the previous verse we have been told that the external organs operate only in a particular time. In this verse the character of the objects they deal with are investigated.

Now, objects are of two kinds: some of them are subtle and unparticularised, others are distinct and diversified. The intellectual organs are capable of apprehending both kinds of objects. It may be that you or I fail to perceive objects that are subtle and without specifications. But there are men who possess occult powers and who can perceive them.¹

The organs of action generally deal with objects that may be characterised by potentiality to cause all the five

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 91. The mystic powers of adepts and holy men have always been recognised in India. As to whether they do exist, this is not the place to discuss. It would, however, be unfair if I were to pass by Mr. Davies's ingenious explanation of this passage without notice. He thinks the reference is to the composition of the "intellect organs," which is two-fold: (1) a subtle organisation in which the *faculty* dwells—ethereal forms of matter; (2) an instrument which is formed of grosser elements. In the absence of the faculty, the instrument would be useless; the eye of a dead man, *e. g.*, cannot see. By keeping both factors in view, we shall be able to see that sensation proper implies some mental activity in addition to a purely passive state. Kapila's theory is thus brought in accord with the conclusions of modern science. (*Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 133-5.) All this is very good, and, we believe, is true as far as it goes. But is the subtle organisation confined to the "intellect organs"? *Sūtra* II. 23 ascribes super-sensibility to all sense. Nor does it appear why upon Mr. Davies's theory वाक् should have only शब्द; for its विषय.

kinds of sensation. But there is an exception. The object of the voice is sound and that alone. Speech must be articulated and so must proceed from a gross material organ. It cannot consequently be subtle and unspecific. It does not, like taste, smell and the rest, originate with any thing, gross or subtle, exterior to the speaker.

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।

तस्मात् त्रिविधं 'करण' द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥३५॥

35. Since Intellect with the [other] internal organs dives into¹ all objects, therefore those three organs are the gate-keepers, and the rest are gates.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] Because Intellect with the other internal organs, that is, with Self-apperception and Mind, **dives into**,^{*} apprehends, all objects, sound and the rest, at all times, therefore the [said] three-fold instrument is the warder, and the rest of the organs are [only] doors.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] To indicate the subordinate character of external organs it is said, **Since Intellect**, &c. :

Since Intellect with the internals, Mind and Egoism, **dives into** or ascertains all objects brought by the senses

¹ This is the literal significance. Colebrooke prefers to render 'advert to,' Lassen 'perlustrat,' St. Hilaire 'embrasse,' and Davies 'allies itself with.' The reference seems to be to verse 28 ante.

[and] beneficial to soul, therefore the internal three are the gate-keepers, and the remaining ten sense-organs are the gates. The reason is that it is by the gate-way of the senses that directly or indirectly the internal instruments ascertain objects. To be a door is to be a source of benefit, which is [accomplished] by observation in the manner indicated above.

ANNOTATIONS.

It is by the door-way of the senses that objects of perception enter into the reception room of soul. The internal organs keep ward at the gate, they not only open or shut it at their pleasure, but they have to take note of all that come in.

एते प्रदीपकत्वाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

‘कृत्स्न’ पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्यं बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥३६॥

36. These [organs], different from one another in characteristics, and variously modified by the constituent powers, present to Intellect the whole object of Soul,¹ making it manifest, like a lamp.

¹ So the Hindu scholiasts. Colebrooke accordingly has ‘the soul’s whole purpose’, and St. Hilaire gives ‘l’objet entier de l’ame’. Lassen, however, renders, ‘universitatem genii causam menti tradunt,’ and Davies follows him with ‘present the whole (of being) in the ‘intellect’ for the sake of the soul.’ The difference in interpretation is, however, more apparent than real. In both cases it is matter of experience that is presented to Soul in order that it may discriminate itself therefrom and be free.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] What else? **These**, the aforesaid organs, **variously affected by the constituents**; how particularised? **'Like a lamp**, illuminating objects like a lamp; **characteristically differing from each other**, dissimilar, that is, having different objects; **diversely modified by the constitutives**, [that is], produced from them.

The whole object of Soul. The organs of perception and of action, self-apperception and mind, after representing [the object] of self according to the capability of each, **present it to Intellect**, that is, place it therein; whereupon soul attains to pleasure and the other objects to be found in consciousness.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] In order to indicate the superiority of Intellect among the internal instruments, it is said, **These, &c.**

These, that is, the ten sense-organs, mind and egoism, which are **modifications of the constituents**, [inasmuch as] in them inhere goodness and the other varieties thereof, having made manifest the whole object of self, present it to consciousness, that is, exhibit it there, as a lamp shows a jar to a person by illuminating it.

ANNOTATIONS.

The various organs are gate-keepers to soul and as such they present unto it all objects that crave entrance. The Sāṅkhya system of categories is to be conceived as a hierarchy. Soul stands apart as the king; it is he, therefore, that is the ultimate source of all real power. The several organs are his ministers; they are all alike workers for the sake of the king, but relatively one is higher or

lower than another. The pre-eminence, however, belongs to Intellect, who occupies the place, if we may say so, of the prime minister.¹ These organs are only accessories and subordinates, and the work done (in the case of soul, cognition) is to be attributed to the fountain-head. As cleaving and other action of an axe is for the sake of the man who purchased it, so the energising of this or that intellect is for the sake of this or that soul who has acquired it by the force of merit or demerit earned in a previous existence.²

The organs are here characterised by three epithets :—

(i) they possess specific characteristics which differentiate one from another ;

(ii) they are constituted of the three factors, pure, active, and dark, and are only different modifications of them ;

(iii) they resemble lamps, for it is by their aid that objects become manifest unto soul. Of course, soul alone is the true principle of light, but these constitute the favourable conditions which are necessary to its action. Just as nothing can be seen unless there be the eye to see it, but the eye cannot see without light. (The illustration of the lamp also suggests co-operation of opposites for a common purpose. See Distich 13 *ante*.)

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 47.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, II. 46.

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात् पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।

सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥३७॥

37. As it is Intellect which accomplishes for Self fruition of all that is to be experienced, so it is that, again, which discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and Soul.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] Moreover :

All, what may be apprehended by any of the senses in all the three times.

Fruition: respective enjoyment by means of the organs of perception and of action, in gods, men, or animals; Intellect with the [other] internal organs **accomplishes**, effects. Therefore **it is that again which distinguishes**, demarcates the objects of Nature and Soul, [establishes], that is, their diversity. **Subtle**, unattainable without practice of religious austerities. This is Nature, the equipoised condition of goodness, passion and darkness, this is intellect, that is egoism, these are the five rudiments, these the eleven organs, these the five gross elements, and that is different, [it is] soul and dissimilar to all. He whose intellect discriminates all this obtains liberation.¹

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Intellect has for its object the end of Soul and not its own, this is next explained, **As it is**, &c. :

¹ Wilson suggests अवायात् 'after departure or death,' for अवापात्.

Since it accomplishes for self experience of all objects, sound and the rest,¹ though supreme, it works for another's purpose and not its own, this is the sense.

To show that it is so also because it produces the knowledge which brings liberation, it is said² that it again, in a state of discriminative knowledge, **discriminates**, objectifies, **the otherness**, subtle or cognisable with difficulty, between Nature and Soul. Intellect is so³ because it ascertains ; such is the meaning.

ANNOTATIONS.

Intellect is the chief organ (महत्) and it has a two-fold function to discharge. (1) It has to supply to soul matter in order that the latter may experience. But as soul gathers experience, it begins to realise that it is other than Nature, and as soon as this perception is

¹ 'सर्वं शब्दादियोग्यं' प्रति य चपभोगः. This Wilson translates, 'All, sound and the rest, with which the preposition *prati* (implying severalty) is to be connected.'

² 'मीलहेतुज्ञानजनकत्वादपि सा तथैवमिष्टेत्याह सैव &c. Wilson, who reads सु for सा, renders, 'and as hence arises the purpose of liberation, this sense is accordingly intended to be expressed in the phrase, *It is that*,' &c. The Oxford Professor puts Nārāyaṇa's idea thus, "this discrimination is the necessary consequence of its [Intellect's] relative function ; for as it conveys ideas of pleasure or pain to soul, and is in this way the cause of its fruition, it is subservient to another, to something of a different nature from its own ; and the knowledge of this is discrimination between nature and soul." Nārāyaṇa's proposition, however, seems to be that Intellect subserves the purpose of Soul, and it does this in two ways (which ultimately come to one), *vis.*, by supplying it with experience and by bringing saving knowledge.

³ Papdit Bechanarāma's gloss is, प्राधान्यवती, 'supreme.'

distinct and complete, mundane ties dissolve and Self stands free. (2) Intellect, therefore, by furnishing it with experience enables it to obtain absolution. Thus the same organ which causes experience leads to a cessation thereof. It should not be supposed that Intellect can discriminate between Nature and Soul. The difference is very difficult to apprehend,¹ and Intellect is *ex hypothesi* only a non-sentient mode of the non-ego. No amount of "immediate contiguity and communication with soul"² would enable the prime organ to discriminate. This statement can be true only in a figurative and secondary sense. Intellect is the *medium* and not the *agent* of discrimination.

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषास्तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।

एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥३८॥

38. The rudimentary principles are non-specific; from these five proceed the five gross elements, which are known as specific, [since they are] soothing, terrific and dulling.

¹ Gaudapáda's अनधिकृततत्पश्यरशौरप्राप्य is obviously what has been called a 'Bráhmaṇic gloss.' Liberation, according to Kapila, is to be attained by knowledge and not by the practice of religious austerities. Still it may be asked if this saving knowledge can be actually acquired without any the least practice of what are sometimes contemptuously denominated as 'religious austerities.'

As Willson seems to suggest, p. 118.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] It was said before, "objects specific and non-specific" [verse 34]. What they are is now explained.

The five subtle principles which spring from self-consciousness, [*viz.*,] the rudiments of sound, touch, form, flavour and smell are spoken of as **non-specific**. They are objects of perception for the divine beings, characterised by pleasure and devoid of pain or dullness. The five gross elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether by name, which spring from these five subtle rudiments, are said to be **specific**. From the rudiment of smell proceeds earth, from that of flavour water, from that of form fire, from that of touch air, and from that of sound ether. The gross elements have thus sprung, and they are "specific," objects of perception for human beings. They are **soothing**, marked by pleasure; **terrific**, marked by pain; and **dulling**, marked by stupefaction. As, for instance, the same sky which may be pleasing and soothing to a person coming forth from inside a narrow house,¹ may be a cause of pain and terror to one affected by cold, heat, wind or rain, and may be a source of bewilderment to a way-farer in a forest who has gone astray from his path and lost himself in the perplexity of space; even so the wind is agreeable to a person perspiring with heat, dreadful to one affected by cold, and stupefying when stormy and surcharged with dust and sand. Similarly of fire and the rest.

¹ अनवकाशादनं गृहादेर्निगंतस्य, which Wilson renders, 'coming forth at once from within a house.'

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Objects specific and non-specific have been spoken of. What they are is now specified, **The rudimentary, &c.:**

The subtle principles, rudimental sound, &c., are **unspecific**, because non-apprehensible [by ordinary sense]. From these rudiments the five gross elements, earth and the rest, [proceed]; these latter are **specific**, because apprehensible. Why? **Since soothing, &c.** One *cha* denotes cause, the other conjoins. Since some among ether and the rest are **soothing**, [that is], pleasant, tranquil and light on account of the predominance of goodness; others are **terrific**, [that is], painful on account of the predominance of passion; and others, again, are **dulling**, [that is], stupefying and heavy on account of the predominance of darkness; it has been demonstrated before that such variations occur in [the effects of] the constituents as one or another happens to prevail.

ANNOTATIONS.

Objects, we have been told, are either specific or non-specific. The author now proceeds to enquire more closely into these two kinds of objects.

Things that we see around us are gross forms of matter. Were it not for their grossness we could not apprehend them. They appear in various forms, they are continually undergoing changes. But as we apprehend these mutations, we cannot fail to cognise that there is an underlying substance which changes and yet changes not. There is a quality which strikes us as permanent amidst all diversity and which serves to mark off one genus from another. But thinkers have

not been satisfied with this genus, they have constantly tried to probe deeper, and to find the ultimate fact in atoms or monads or plastic natures or units of force. Kapila's *tanmātrās* are of a like nature. They are the five somethings, which are ever one with their essential nature, and which form the bases of the five gross elements that make up the diversified world of sense. The word is a compound of तद्, 'that,' and मात्र 'only,' and means something that possesses only one quality, ever one, and never anything else. It is not even capable of producing feelings of pleasure, pain or apathy in us.¹ Vijnāna Bhikshu's account is as follows; "subtle substances, the elements which are the holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; but in which as a genus, the three species of pleasurable, painful, and indifferent do not occur; they are not varieties of the gross elements, but in each respectively the elementary property exclusively resides; whence they are said to be *rudiments*. In those elements that elementary property resides alone (without being diversified, as agreeable, &c.); and as there is no distinction between a property and its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is called a rudiment, तन्मात्रा; the existence of which as a cause is inferred from that of the gross element as an effect."² Professor Wilson suggests a parallel between these subtle rudiments and the elements of the elements of which Empedocles supposed his elements to be compounded.

¹ तस्मिन्स्तस्मिन्स्तन्मात्रे तेन तन्मात्रता सूता ।

न शान्ता नापि घोरान्ते न मूढाश्चविशेषिणः ॥

² I quote Wilson's paraphrase, pp. 120-1.

अविशेषादिशेषारम्भः,¹ from the undiversified originate the diversified world of sense. Thus, the subtle principle of ether is sound, of air tangibility, of light visibility, of water flavour, and of earth odour. Empedocles (who seems to have recognised five elements like the Hindus) probably had a similar idea when he said, "By the earthy element we perceive earth ; by the watery, water, the air of heaven by the aerial element ; and devouring fire by the element of fire."²

The elemental rudiments do not come into contact with our body, and so they do not give rise to any sensations in ordinary mortals. It is only sages and holy men, whose senses have become adapted for the purpose that have perceptions of them and derive pleasure therefrom. Moreover these rudiments have each only one effect. But this effect, when manifested in the form of a gross element, is susceptible of multifarious modifications, and may, assume diverse aspects according to a difference in powers of the several constitutive factors.

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

39. Subtile [bodies] and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great [existences] form the three varieties of

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 1.

² Cf. Wilson, pp. 122-3.

specific objects.¹ Of these, the subtile are everlasting, [while] those born of parents perish.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] There are other specific varieties :

Subtile, the rudimentary principles, from an aggregation of which [springs] the rudimental subtile body, characterised by intellect and the rest, which subsists for ever and undergoes transmigration : these are the "subtile" (bodies).

¹ A question has been raised as to that विशिष्टाः means here. It has been suggested that it means 'sorts, species, specific differences', and the classification in the text is not of gross bodies only but of bodies in general. (See Wilson, p. 124.) Colebrooke apparently takes this view, though his translation is nearly the same as ours. Lassen, on the other hand, understands the word विशिष्टाः in the same sense as in the previous verse, and renders, "Distinctorum triplex est divisio in subtilia, a parentibus progenita, crassa." It seems to us that all the Hindu commentators are in favour of interpreting the disputed word as 'specific or diversified objects.' Surely the probabilities are strongly against the same word being used in two different senses in two consecutive verses. What Gauḍapāda says is अनेन विशिष्टाः ; Nārāyaṇa puts the same thing more elaborately, एतावन्त एव विशिष्टा इति न किन्तुनेऽपि सन्ति ; and Vāchaspati is even more explicit, विशिष्टाणामवानन्तरं विशिष्टमाह, 'the sub-species of the specific are enumerated.' All this makes it clear that we are here dealing with 'specific' objects as distinguished from 'non-specific.' It is perfectly true that the classification is of bodies in general, but all bodies, whether subtile or gross, are 'specific.' Aphorism III. 2 distinctly tells us that the Body originates from the diversified principles. The subtile body is made of seventeen principles, if not eighteen (Sūtra III. 9). It is called the rudimental body, and not incorrect-

Next, generated by father and mother, the nourishers¹ of gross bodies. At the season of the menses, by means of the mixture of blood and semen through sexual union, they form an envelopment for the subtle body within the womb ; this subtle body again is nourished through the umbilical cord by the black, yellow and various other fluids [into which food and drink have been converted] within the mother ;² and the [complete] body thus begun with the triple specific ingredients of the subtle rudiments, the parent-begotten envelopment, and the gross elements,³ is then furnished with back, belly, thighs, neck, head, &c., with the six-fold mem-

ly, with reference to its constitution. It is, however, admittedly an aggregate, and as such necessarily 'specific.' It forms the personality of each individual, and, though subtle, cannot, obviously be 'non-specific' in the same sense in which the rudiments are so. It will thus appear that the "inconsistency" that Wilson finds "in the *Kárikás* speaking of *subtle* bodies being a species of *gross* bodies," is more apparent than real. It will, however, be readily seen that the interpretation we adopt does not necessarily involve the hypothesis of three sorts of bodies (as suggested by Vijnána), *vis.*, 1. rudimental, 2. vehicular, and 3. gross or elemental. That is a later development of the theory, and, we believe, finds no place in either the *Káriká* or the *Pravachana Sūtras*.

¹ उपचायका, "cementers or means of the aggregation" (Wilson).

² मातुरक्षितपीतनानाविधरसेन. Wilson's version is rather free, "by the nutriment derived from the food and drink received by the mother."

³ Gauḍapāda finds in the complete human frame all the three varieties of specific objects that the verse deals with. It is doubtful, however, if प्रभूतैः mean only the gross elements.

branes, with blood, flesh, nerve, semen, bone and marrow, and with the five gross elements, ether being supplied for extension, air for growth, fire for digestion, water for aggregation, and earth for stability ; thus provided with all parts, it emerges from the mother's womb. In this way there are three kinds of specific objects.

It is next indicated which is eternal and which is non-eternal. Of these, the subtle are ever-lasting, the rudimental principles are eternal ; by them is body commenced and it migrates,—passing through the forms of beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, stocks and stones, if associated with impiety, or passing through the heaven of Indra and other divinities, if controlled by virtue,—thus the subtle body migrates till it attains to knowledge ; when knowledge has been acquired the knowing [Self] leaves the body and obtains salvation. Therefore the subtle specific [bodies]¹ are permanent.

The parent-begotten body perishes : having left the subtle body, the said frame even here perishes at the time this life departs ; the frame born of parents at the time of death perishes, and [the several constituents] are resolved into earth and the other [elements] respectively.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] These are not the only specific objects but there are others. So it is said, **Subtle, &c.:**


The **subtle**, the rudimental body ; the **parent-generated**, the gross body ; the **great existences**, rocks, trees, &c. ; these are specific, because being specific effects. Thus, the rudimental body originates

¹ Or, perhaps, "the subtle species [of bodies]".

from the subtle elements ; the parent-generated from the blood and semen produced by the food taken by the couple, and the great existences spring from causes of a different and diverse character. Among these, the rudimental body is **permanent**, and will stay till liberation, **the parent-generated perishes**, is dissolved at the time of death. The same [also] is the character of the great existences, they too perish, this is to be understood. The use of "specific" is to be taken to imply subordinate being.

ANNOTATIONS.

Objects have been divided into (1) non-specific, (2) specific. The latter class comprises all objects that are capable of affecting our senses and become manifest in various forms. Among such objects are the five gross elements. But these elements do not exhaust the class ; there are other objects also which are diverse and specific and not necessarily modes of these. Iśvara Kṛishṇa deals with them in the present verse. His classification of Objects may be thus set out :—



The third book of the so-called Aphorisms of Kapila begin, we have seen, with an affirmation of the origination of the diverse from that which is not diverse. The next

aphorism tells us that thence arises the body. This "thence" refers to the diverse, or (as Vijnāna suggests) to the twenty-three categories. Body, again, is two-fold, subtle and gross. Gross body is the corporeal frame we are all familiar with. But this body is a strictly temporary tabernacle. It is brought into being by a union of the sexes and comprises six sheaths, *viz.*, skin, blood, flesh, bone, tendon and marrow. The merit or demerit of a previous existence invests each soul with such a frame, but, as soon as the effects of former actions wear out, the soul works itself free, and the body resolves into the five gross elements of which it was made.

A soul, however, can not completely free itself from all material conditions or, more correctly, objective relations till it has attained to perfect knowledge. Until this consummation is achieved it must undergo transmigration. So upon the surcease of the gross body, the soul is not at once deprived of all corporeal covering ; it has still a subtle covering, which serves it for a vehicle in its passage from one body to another. The nature of this subtle frame we shall have occasion to study more fully presently.

While the gross body is generally engendered by father and mother, the subtle body is not so.¹ We say 'generally,' because there are some which are not so produced. For instance, the gross bodies of the vegetable kingdom. It is with reference to such bodies that the word प्रभूतैः seems to be used in the text. The meaning is not the gross elements,² but substances formed from them.

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 7.

² So Colebrooke, following Gauḍapāda.

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादि सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम्^१ ॥४०॥

40. The subtle body, [which is] primeval, unconfined, permanent [and composed of] intellect and the rest down to the elemental rudiments, migrates, enjoys not, and is invested with affections.²

[GAUDAPÁDA.] What the subtle body is and how it migrates are next described.

When the universe was not, in the first creation of Nature, was the subtle body produced.

What else? **Unconfined**, not tied down to the condition of an animal, man, or god; being subtle it is nowise restrained, and passes unobstructed through rocks, &c.; it migrates or goes.

Permanent, it undergoes transmigration until it acquires knowledge.

Next, [composed of] **Intellect and the rest down to the subtle rudiments**, that is, consciousness in the

¹ The double meaning of this word has been commented upon before. I translate it as "the subtle body." This is so called because it consists of the principles termed लिङ्ग either from being characteristic indications of the source they have their rise in, or from being ultimately resolvable into it. Colebrooke, as before, gives "mergent."

² The word भावाः is difficult to render, and, in fact, seems to bear different shades of meaning in different passages. Among other equivalents suggested are 'dispositions,' 'sentiments,' 'conditions,' and 'states of being.'

first place, with self-apperception and mind, down to the five subtle principles.

[It] **migrates**, [traverses] the three worlds, as an ant on a trident¹ [continually goes up and down].

Unenjoying, not experiencing ; the sense is that the subtle body becomes capable of experience when it acquires the property of action through conjunction² with the external generated body.

Invested with dispositions : affected by dispositions, which will be enumerated hereafter.³

Mergent. At the time of universal dissolution, the subtle body, furnished with intellect and the rest down to the rudiments, resolves into Nature, and exempted from further migration, remains there till the period of a new creation, bound in her (Nature's) bonds of insensibility, and incapable of revolution and the like action. When creation is renewed, it again migrates ; whence [it is] called *linga* or subtle.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The characteristics of a rudimental body are next specified, **The subtle**, &c. :

Before, that is, in the first creation,⁴ it **sprang** or was produced from Nature.

Unconfined, unobstructed, [it] enters even into a rock.

Fixed, distinct in different persons.

¹ मूलग्रहपिपीखिकावत्, which Wilson renders, "as an ant the body of Siva."

² उपचयेन, literally, 'through aggregation.'

³ Vide Distich 43 below.

⁴ "Annus magnus" (Ballantyne).

Intellect &c., formed of the aggregate of intellect, egoism, mind, the ten sense-organs and the subtle principles.

Migrates, assumes new and [ever] new gross bodies, and forsakes previous ones.

Unenjoying, incapable of experience [when] un-associated with a gross frame.

Invested with affections, endowed with internal dispositions [like faith and the like], or made the receptacle of impressions by sacrificial ceremonies, &c. The effect due to performance of ceremonies, &c., is the invisible [power of merit and demerit].

ANNOTATIONS.

We have heard about the subtle body. Now, what is this ?

It is a very subtle covering which invests the soul and serves to give it a certain material configuration. It is by means of this that the soul seems to become capable of corporeal feelings, however spiritualised and refined, and to retain traces of them even after separation from the gross body.

But why do you assume that there is any such thing ? Colebrooke suggests that it is "a compromise between an immaterial Soul and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter."¹ The

¹ *Essays* (Cowell), I. 258, not very happily expressed. Colebrooke's "animated atom" for the subtle body is even a less happy expression. A more apt comparison is with St. Paul's "spiritual body."

difficulty seems to have arisen in this way. Soul in itself was conceived as perfect and immobile. "It is incapable of being cut, burnt, drenched, 'or dried up," says the *Gītā*,¹ "it is unchangeable, all-pervading, stable, firm, and eternal." Now, what is all-pervading need not move and cannot move. In what sense can we then predicate action of Soul? What do we mean when we say that the soul migrates? The reply is given in Aphorism I. 51. It is not the soul which moves, but it is the *व्याधि*, investment or adjunct. The *Brahma-bindūpanishad*² puts it thus, "As, when a jar is carried, the space enclosed in the jar [*seems to move*], while [in reality only] the jar is carried, but not the space, just so is the Soul which may be compared with the ether [or space]." We have therefore to postulate a subtle frame, by means of which all migration takes place and which keeps Soul company till experience is ripe and the transcendental ego can do wholly without the non-ego.

It is, however, not Soul alone which requires an investment; Consciousness also wants a receptacle. There are various dispositions, or conditions if you like, which seem to affect Soul. Such are virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, dispassion and passion, strength and weakness, and sentiments of fear, shame and the like. These affect Soul in the same way as flowers kept with cloth—the fragrance seems to be transferred to the latter and the whole garment is perfumed. Now, these dispositions are only particular conditions of consciousness. Consciousness, again, is a thing which must

¹ II. 24.

² 13 (Garbe, p. 31).

have a site or receptacle. This site cannot be the corporeal frame, for that is gross matter ; nor is it pure Soul, for that is without any quality, attribute, or action. There must be some other site then, and this is the subtle body wherein consciousness finds its origin and location.

This subtle body has several important features. Unlike the gross body, which is a compound of the gross elements,¹ it is made of the more spiritual and more ethereal forms of Nature.² It is consequently not an object of ordinary perception in the same way as the gross body ; it has yet a specified or diversified existence, for it is a product of प्रकृति: and therefore cannot be independent of the factors which give rise to feelings of pleasure, pain, and apathy. What is more important is that it is the subtle body which is the real seat of all these feelings.³ Of course, unless there is a corporeal frame there can be no experience ; neither intelligence nor the senses can operate if there is no physical mechanism to receive and transmit impressions. But that it is not this physical mechanism which actually experiences will become patent from the consideration that there is no experience for the dead body. The subtle body, again, does not perish in the same way as the gross body does. This latter is a frame which soul has to take up its lodging in in order that it may experience the fruits of previous works. The association with the

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III .17.

² *Ibid.* III. 9. It is a compound of seventeen (Vijnāna) or eighteen (Aniruddha) principles.

³ *Ibid.* III. 8.

former is also ultimately to be traced to what is called 'the unseen,'¹ but it is of a far more permanent character, and so long as this force lasts it does not dissolve. It sprang with the earliest emanations of nature, it is not confined to any one body, and it has a vitality of its own. This vitality enables it to migrate with the soul and thereby give it an individual character, mark it, as it were, with the stamp of *personality*.

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
तद्वद्भिना विशेषैस्तिष्ठति न निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥४१॥

41. As a painting rests not without a frame,² nor a shadow without a stake, et cetera, so the rudimental substance subsists not unsupported, without specific³ [forms].

¹ *Ibid.* III. 10.

² Colebrooke has "ground."

³ The text may be read either as विशेषैः or अविशेषैः. Gauḍapāda adopts the latter view and explains the word by तन्मात्रैः. He, however, goes on to point out that the gross specific body is also meant. The other commentators understand विशेषैः to mean the subtle rudimental body. So though there is a difference in reading, there is none in interpretation. In either case the sense is taken to be that the लिङ्गं cannot subsist without the लिङ्गशरीरं, the 'rudiment' presupposes the subtle body. There is another interpretation which Nārāyaṇa mentions. According to this the purport of the verse is to establish the existence of the gross body. But the context seems to show that it is the subtle body principally, at any rate, which is in question.

[GAÚṢAPĀDA.] Being pressed [to explain] why the thirteen instruments revolve, [the author] replies :

As a picture does not stand without the support of a wall or the like, a shadow does not stand, does not exist, without a stake¹ or peg, &c. The word **et cetera** includes [other illustrations], for instance, water does not exist without coldness, nor *vice versa* ; fire cannot be without heat, air without touch, ether without extension, [or] earth without smell. On the analogy of these illustrations, [the rudimental substance] does not exist without [the support of] **non-specific elements**, the subtle principles.² The specific elements are also implied, a body composed of the five elements ; [for] without a frame with specific particles where can the place of the 'rudiment' be, which, when it leaves one body, takes refuge in another ?

Unsupported, devoid of support. The '**rudiment**' is an instrument composed of thirteen principles ; that is the sense.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] But experience may be by means of intellect accompanied by egoism and the sense-organs, [what then] is effected by the subtle body, undemonstrated as it is ? In reply it is said, **As a painting**, &c. :

As a painting does not rest without a support, but stands when supported, similarly **without the specific**, that is, the very subtle frame, the '**mark**,' that is, intellect and the rest (so called because they mark out or

¹ "The gnomon of a dial" (Wilson).

² To understand this it is necessary to bear in mind that the **सिद्धि** consists only of the faculties and the senses, and the **सिद्धिभूमी** adds a frame composed of the five elemental rudiments.

indicate), having for form the assemblage of the rudiments &c. with being, subsist not unsupported, but supported by the subtle body. Therefore this body, as their receptacle, is necessary. [This also follows] from the following authority, "Yama drew out with force from the body of some truthful person the thumb-like Soul, bound and subdued."¹

Some explain this [verse] as indicating the necessity of a gross body; in which case [construe], *liṅgam*, that is, the subtle body, embracing the essence of all, does not subsist unsupported without the specific or gross frame, but subsists with it for its support. Hence there is no incompatibility demonstrated in [the co-ordinate existences of] the subtle and the gross frames; this is the sense. The rest is [to be construed] as in the previous case.

ANNOTATIONS.

We have seen that the subtle body bears the soul and migrates. It is now explained why this must be so, why the subtle body is indispensable.

There are two things which must be distinguished from each other, not because they are actually found to exist as distinct objects, but because they are separable in thought. These are :

- (1) लिङ्गं, which is a rudimental substance composed of intellect, self-consciousness, and the eleven senses, and
- (2) लिङ्गशरीरं, which is the subtle body and adds to its constitution the *tan-mātrās*.

¹ *Mahābhārata*, III. 16763 Vāchaspati attributes the passage to the Veda (आगमः).

Now, the former cannot exist without a support; therefore it premises the latter. Of course, Soul cannot do without the former, since it is this which carries the impressions of experience (संस्कार) and thus guarantees for it an existence which is continuous and one.

As the 'rudiment' premises the rudimental body, so the latter again premises the gross body, for, we have already seen, without the gross body there can be no experience. It is because both kinds of bodies are meant that the word विशेष्टैः is used in the text (see verse 39 *ante*).

Vijnána gives a peculiar explanation of this *Káriká*. In his commentary on the corresponding Aphorism¹ (III. 12) he explains that the subtle rudimental body cannot exist independently without a subtle vehicular body, for on abandoning a gross body it must, in order to go to another world, take this to serve as its tabernacle. विशेष्टैः he defines as 'those which are called subtle amongst gross, a variety of gross elements,' and he points out that the definition of a subtle body which is given in verse 40 (सहृदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं) as compared with the expression of the present verse, proves that there is a distinction made between a subtle body proper and the specific variety of the gross elements, which is also called subtle. This hypothesis of three bodies² instead of two is obviously a later refinement upon the original theory as expounded by the earlier scholiasts.

¹ Aniruddha and Mahádeva explain this aphorism differently. They understand it to refer to the dependence of the idea of the ego upon the Self. Garbe, pp. 115-116.

² Cf. M. Williams, *Indian Wisdom*, p. 206.

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।

प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते' लिङ्गम् ॥४२॥

42. The 'rudiment,' formed for the sake of Soul, through relation of means and consequence, [and] by conjunction with the presiding influence of Nature, plays its part like a dramatic actor.¹

[GAUDAPĀDA.] It is next explained what for [the subtle principles are invested with a frame].

The purpose of Self is to be fulfilled, hence Nature proceeds to action. This (purpose) is two-fold, apprehension of sound and other [objects of sense], and appreciation of the difference between Soul and the constitutive powers. The former brings about enjoyment of fragrance and other sense-objects in the spheres of Brahmā &c., the latter liberation. Therefore it is said that the subtle body acts for the benefit of Soul.

Through relation of means and consequence. Means are virtue and the like. Consequences are ascending to heaven and so forth, as will be afterwards explained. **By their relation,** [that is], connection.

By union with the predominant power² of

¹ Professor Lassen misunderstands the verse and explains निमित्तनैमित्तिक° as "inclining now to these, now to those 'originals et derivatas conditiones.' "

² Vāchaspati explains विभुत्व° to mean universality, for all that we perceive is some modification or other of Nature. See next note.

the Prime Agent or Nature ; as a king in his dominions does what he likes of his own authority, so through the authority of Nature and by the connection of means and their results, the 'rudiment' plays its part ; at Nature's command it assumes ever diverse forms. The subtile body is formed by aggregation of subtile atomic rudiments and is furnished with thirteen organs ; and it assumes different forms by birth among animals, men or gods. How ? **Like an actor.** As a player, entering upon the scene as a god, goes out and [appears] again as a man, and again as a clown, so the subtile body, through relation of cause and consequence, may by entering [diverse] wombs become an elephant, a woman or a man.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Thus having established the existence of the subtile frame, its mode of migration and the cause thereof are next described, **The 'rudiment'** &c. :

Means, virtue and the rest ; **consequence**, the gross frame &c., which have virtue and the rest for their cause ; through the **relation** or connection of these two, the *liṅgam*, [that is], the subtile frame acts like a player ; as a player acts assuming various forms, so this also acts endowed with celestial and other frames.

What for ? The reply is, **for the sake of Soul** ; having for its cause or end the object of Self. It uses these [bodies] for its purposes of experience, because the invisible power [of merit and demerit] makes it so to enjoy.

To what does it owe this power (or greatness) ? It is replied, **through conjunction**, &c. So it is said

in the *Purāṇa*,¹ "since Nature has for its form the universe, these are the modifications thereof." *Mahat* and the rest are evolved in order that Nature may receive her satisfaction or quittance ;² such is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

It is next explained why there is an investiture with a gross body at all, why transmigration takes place.

The causes that work upon the subtle frame (the individuality, so to speak) and make it pass through various conditions, now assuming the external form of a man, again of a divinity, and next of a brute, may be classified as three. The *final* cause is the fulfilment of the purpose of Soul.³ This subtle body clothes itself in various forms in order that the soul within may have experience and thereby gain saving knowledge. This, however, is a remote cause ; there is another more *proximate*. This is the influence of Nature, and it enforces the purpose of Soul. The subtle body is only an evolute, and is subject to the modifications and agitations that may

¹ Vāchaspati cites the text with अद्भुतः; for इदम् at the end. Wilson translates, 'this wonderful vicissitude is from the universality of nature,' 'that is, from its invariable presence and consequent influence' (p. 138).

² The meaning is that the evolution of products takes place in order that the ultimate end of all activity on the part of Nature may be fulfilled. This ultimate end is that Soul may recognise that it is distinct and different from Nature. When Soul rises to this knowledge, the occupation of Nature is gone, and the latter slinks away 'like a guilty thing surprised.' Nor is Soul thereafter troubled again with mundane experiences.

³ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 16.

arise within the evolvent. But this also does not fully explain the phenomenon. We have yet to seek an *efficient* cause, through whose instrumentality the subtile body undergoes metempsychosis. And this is to be found in the immanent conditions of Intellect, *e. g.*, virtue and vice. These operate as causes and have for consequence reward in heaven or punishment in hell. The subtile body is, if we may say so, born again and assumes nobler or baser forms through what is shortly defined as कर्मफलं.

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥४३॥

43. Conditions are either transcendental or natural or modified.¹ [They² are] virtue and the like. [These are] considered to be appurtenant to³ the cause, while the uterine

¹ It is doubtful whether only two kinds of conditions are here meant or three. Vāchaspati and Nārāyaṇa construe प्राकृतिकाः as appositional with सांसिद्धिकाः. Colebrooke accordingly translates, "Essential dispositions are innate." Gauḍapāda thinks that three different kinds are specified.

² The European translators favour the view that धर्माद्याः is to be construed with वैकृतिकाः. But it may be doubted if only "these (last) are virtue and the rest" (Davies). The different classes that are here enumerated seem to be different states of the same conditions.

³ Davies translates, "including," that is, having the nature of. This is not strictly literal, though perhaps ultimately there does not come to be much difference in signification.

germ and the rest are appurtenant to the effect.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] The subtle body was spoken of as migrating "invested with affections" [verse 40]. The affections (or conditions) are next specified.

Affections are considered to be of three kinds, transcendental, natural and modified. Of these **transcendental** are the four dispositions which in the first creation came into existence simultaneously with the divine sage Kapila, *viz.*, virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power. The **natural** are [thus] described: Brahma had four sons, Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra; with them, in consequence of [meritorious] work [done in a former existence], were these four dispositions produced, invested with youthful forms;¹ therefore are they [called] *natural*. Next **modified**, as, from the form of the teacher as a cause arises knowledge within us, from knowledge dispassion, from dispassion virtue, from virtue power; [now] this form of the teacher is itself a product [of Nature,] whence these dispositions are termed *modified*, "invested with which the rudiment migrates" [verse 40]. These four dispositions partake of the quality of goodness; those partaking of darkness are the contraries. This explains "when affected by goodness the modes are these; when affected by darkness they are the reverse" [verse 23 *ante*]. Thus there are eight dispositions, [*viz.*,] virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion and weakness.

¹ Literally, 'bodies of sixteen years of age.'

Where do they abide? **They are considered appurtenant to the cause.** Intellect is a cause, they attach themselves to it. It has been [already] said, "Intellect is determination ; virtue, knowledge" &c. [are its modes].¹

Effect, body ; supported by that are the uterine germ etc., [that is,] those which are said to be born of the mother. *The uterine germ etc.* are the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, and the rest, which through union of blood and semen [are generated] for the development [of the foetus]. Thus the states of boyhood, youth and old age are brought about by the instrumentality of food and drink. [They are] therefore termed **attributive of the effect**, having for their instrumental cause repletion and the like sensual gratification.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] It not being well known what natural and modified [conditions] are, these are next explained, **Conditions, &c. :**

Conditions, virtue and the rest ; those which are **innate are natural**, and will last till objects remain, as intellect, egoism, &c. The **modified** are temporary, and among these virtue and the rest have been considered by the Sāṅkhya teachers to be dependent upon the cause, [*viz.*,] intellect.

Appurtenant to the effect, [that is,] dependent upon the body are the uterine germ &c., [which], in the case of a foetus [are] the embryo, the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, the liver, and limbs major and minor ; in the case of the born [are] childhood, boyhood, youth and old age ; this is the gist.

¹ See verse 23 *ante*.

ANNOTATIONS.

Transmigration has for its instrumental cause the conditions or dispositions. What these conditions are and how they may be classified are next to be investigated.

It is not easy to define these conditions. Roughly speaking, they are states which affect a man. They may be either inward or outward, that is, they may become manifest either as dispositions of the mind or as conditions of the body. So the first classification would be as intellectual and corporeal.

But besides the seat of manifestation there is another basis upon which we might proceed. This is origin. Some dispositions may be innate, that is, we may be born with them ; others may be the result of education and other external influences. Among dispositions that are innate it is possible to make a further division. Some may be characterised as *transcendental*, these will be such as are peculiar to saints and sages ; others as *natural*, these will be those states which are connate to us in this existence because of virtue or vice in a previous existence.¹ The conditions that are induced by education and other means have been described as incidental or constructive or modified.

The intellectual conditions are virtue, dispassion, knowledge and power. These have been described before as modes of consciousness, and it has been shown

¹ Gauḍapāda's explanation of these two classes is not at all clear. In fact, the whole subject of conditions will require further consideration.

how a leaven of darkness converts them into the contraries. The corporeal conditions are the various stages through which a being must pass as the embryo develops into the foetus and the foetus into a child, which must then grow into a youth, an adult and an old man. These conditions stand to one another in the relation of cause and effect, though, of course, the several states of the organism are immediately dependent upon generation and nutrition. It is therefore that Váchaspati explains the object of the stanza to be to distinguish incidental cause from consequence (निमित्तं नैमित्तिकं च विभजते).

धर्मेण गमतमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद् भवत्यधर्मेण ।

ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः¹ ॥४४॥

44. By virtue is ascent upwards, by vice descent below; by knowledge is liberation, and by the reverse bondage.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] It was said, "through the relation of means and consequence" [verse 42], this is [now] explained.

By virtue ascent: having virtue for the efficient cause it ascends upwards. **Upwards** refers to the eight regions, *viz.*, those of Brahmá, Prajápati, Soma, Indra, Gandharva, Yaksha, Rákshasa, and Piśácha. The subtles body goes thither. If **vice** be the efficient cause, it enter into an animal, wild or domestic, a reptile, stock or stone.

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 27-24.

What else? **By knowledge liberation**: knowledge of the twenty-five principles, this being the efficient cause, salvation [is attained], the subtle body ceases [to migrate], and [soul] is termed 'the supreme spirit'.

By the reverse comes bondage: ignorance being the efficient cause ; and "this effect, bondage, is natural, modified or personal, as will be explained hereafter.¹ For it is said, "He who is bound by natural, modified or personal bondage cannot be released by any other [means save knowledge]".

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The necessity of virtue &c., which reside in intellect, is now explained, **By virtue, &c.**:

By means of virtue that is pure or untainted by harmfulness [for instance, prayer], and virtue that is mixed or so tainted [for instance, sacrifices], one ascends to the region of Brahmá, Prajapati, Indra, the Gandharvas, the Yakshas and the Pitris. **By means of vice**, conduct forbidden by holy texts, [for instance], injury to others and the like, one descends to the hells [called] Raurava, Maháurava, Vahni, Vaitaraṇí, Kumbhíṣṭaka, Tāmisa, Andhatāmisa, &c. **By knowledge** or intimate apprehension of Soul, there comes **liberation** or salvation. **By the reverse**, [*viz.*] ignorance, there comes **bondage**, which is three-fold according to the distinction of natural, modified, or personal. Of these, *natural* bondage is caused by a worship of Nature in the belief that it is soul, so [it is said], "the meditators on the unmanifested principle remain (or migrate) for ten

¹ See on verse 62 below. The following quotation is also to be found in *Sāṅkhya-krama-dīpikā* (sometimes though erroneously attributed to Panchasikha).

thousand years." *Modified* bondage springs from a worship of the sense-organs as Soul ; for "the meditators on the organs stay for ten æons."¹ *Personal* bondage arises from the performance, out of desire, of the scriptural rites by one who knows not the soul ; so, [we hear] "these are works instituted by those who know not the soul and desire heaven, &c.; their bondage is personal." The name is to be understood as due to the connection with presents [given to Bráhmaṇs at the conclusion of the rites]; this is the substance.

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः² संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात् तद्विपर्ययः ॥४५॥

45. From dispassion [follows] absorption into Nature ; from foul passion birth into the world ; from power removal of obstruction ; from the contrary, the reverse.

¹ The original has सन्वत्तराणि. One of these periods comprises 4,320,000 years, *Manu*, I. 79.

² This is usually understood to mean 'absorption or resolution into Nature.' Davies, following Lassen, translates "a dissolution of Nature", and explains, "by the destruction of passion the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." He further refers to distich 67 below. "An absolute loosening of the bonds by which the soul is bound" which does not yet amount to liberation is, however, an anomalous position. And if the loosening be *absolute*, what more can be left for knowledge to effect ?

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Further there are other efficient causes :

If one has dispassion but no knowledge of principles then from such dispassion (having for its antecedent ignorance) [follows] absorption into Nature ; on death it¹ merges into the eight forms of Nature, [*viz.*] the Prime Cause, intellect, self-apperception, and the five rudiments ; [but there is] no liberation.

Similarly again **from foul passion** : [for instance], 'I sacrifice, I give alms, so that I may obtain divine or human bliss in this world ;' from such passion worldly re-birth proceeds.

Next, **from power non-obstruction** : from eight-fold power (consisting of minuteness, &c.) as efficient cause follows the result absence of hindrance ; such power is not impeded [even] in the spheres of Brahmá and the rest.

What else? **From the contrary, the reverse** : the reverse of non-obstruction, [that is], hindrance ensues ; weakness is impeded everywhere.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Since the *Śruti*, "from knowing thee alone one transcends death, there is no other path to liberation", assigns salvation only to a knower of Soul and ascribes it not to one devoid of such knowledge, in the latter case there is no liberation even when there is dispassion. This is now explained, **From dispassion, &c.**

From dispassion alone, which consists in a disinclination from objects seen and heard, there follows absorption

¹ That is, the subtle body ; there is a resolution of this, unaccompanied, however, by the emancipation of soul.

into Nature, which is being worshipped as Soul ; the term "Nature" includes intellect, egoism, &c. ; such is the meaning.

From **passion** (lust, anger, &c.,) which is the product of [the constituent of] foulness, proceeds migration ; when it is connected with sacrifices &c., there is heaven and the like ; when it is associated with women &c., there is worldly enjoyment ; it is thus to be understood.

From **power**, characterised by minuteness &c., comes non-obstruction, absence of impediment to motion ; from **the contrary**, weakness, **the reverse**, stoppage of motion everywhere,—as a weak person is repulsed from the house of another.

ANNOTATIONS.

There are eight intellectual conditions. What are their effects? In what way do they operate upon the subtle body? These two verses furnish the answer. This we may summarise thus :—

<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Effect.</i>
1. Virtue	Elevation in the scale of being.
2. Vice	Degradation in the scale of being.
3. Knowledge	Liberation from existence.
4. Ignorance	Bondage or transmigration.
5. Dispassion	Dissolution of the subtle body.
6. Passion	Migration.
7. Power	Unimpediment.
8. Weakness	Obstruction. ¹

¹ Wilson, p. 144.

The first condition *virtue* includes piety. This leads to elevation, that is, goodness is a step to godliness, the virtuous man may look for reward in heavenly bliss, he will be born as something nobler and happier than he was.

The opposite disposition produces the contrary effect. Vice is sure to drag you down. You are bound to fall from your state, and be born as a lower being. It is quite possible that, previous to your re-birth, you may have to undergo a preliminary course of tortures in hell.

As has been said more than once before, error and misconception (some sort of materialism generally) are at the root of bondage, and as soon as the truth is cognised liberation must result unto the soul.

So much for moral and intellectual merit. But suppose we see into the hollowness of things, and our mind turns away from the vanity around us. The truth, the whole truth, has not yet been cognised, consequently there cannot be liberation. But we *have* a partial glimpse of the truth, for the objective has lost its hold upon us. The result is that there is a temporary emancipation of Soul. Asceticism is not without its effect, and the subtle body, through force of accumulated merit, dissolves.¹ But without fulness of knowledge there is no complete absolution. Habits, impressions ingrained in the past, cannot be wholly destroyed, and "as a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls which have been absorbed into Nature reappear,

¹ Davies says the Sāṅkhya philosophy "does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature until the soul is entirely free" (p. 81), but adduces no proofs.

at the commencement of a new annus magnus."¹ Dispassion has put a period to only one series of migrations; reinvested in a subtle body, the soul starts on a new career of migratory existence to be pursued till knowledge is attained.

By worship and meditation it is possible for man to acquire supernatural power;² this will render the spiritualised body comparatively free of material conditions. On the other hand, there is the contrary state of weakness, which may be absolute.

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्धाख्यः ।

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्³ तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥४६॥

46. This forms an intellectual creation, described as obstruction, disability, contentment and perfection; by the hostile influence of inequalities among constituents, the varieties thereof are fifty.

¹ Vijnána on Aphorism III. 54 (Ballantyne, p. 257).

² cf. *Sánkhya Sūtras*, III. 29.

³ Colebrooke translates, "by disparity of influence of qualities," Davies, "by the hostile influence of modal inequalities (or specific differences)." विमर्दः means pounding, pressing, or destruction. As one triumphs, another succumbs; this is what is referred to.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The sixteen-fold causes and effects have been explained; what they comprehend is next described.

The sixteen-fold set of causes and effects [just] described is called an **intellectual creation**. *Pratyaya*¹ (trust) is intellect; as has been said, "intellect is determination" &c. [verse 23].

This intellectual creation is divided into four kinds, *viz.*, **obstruction, disability, contentment and perception**. Of these, doubt or ignorance is *obstruction*, as, one on beholding a post is in doubt whether it is a post or a man. *Disability*, for instance, when though the post is plainly seen, yet there is an incapability of resolving the doubt. The third is termed *contentment*, as, when one does not care to doubt or determine whether it is a post [saying], 'how does it concern us?' This is contentment (or acquiescence). The fourth is called *perfection* (or certainty), as, when the delighted observer perceives a creeper round or a bird upon the stake and knows for certain that it is a post.

Of this four-fold intellectual creation, **the varieties on account of the influence of constitutive differences are fifty**: there are fifty modifications of it due to the hostile influence of inequalities in the constituent powers of goodness, passion and darkness. In some goodness prevails, passion, and darkness are subordi-

¹ Wilson suggests that this may mean 'notion'; प्रत्ययसर्गः then would be "the creation or existence of which we have a notion or belief, in contradistinction to bodily or organic existence, of which we have an idea or sensible perception; the भूतसर्गः or elemental creation" (p. 147).

nate, in others passion, in others again darkness ; hence the varieties.¹

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] We hear of obstruction &c. from the Sāṅkhists ; are they different principles, and how many are there of them ? It is replied, **This forms**, &c. :

The set, [consisting of] obstruction, disability, contentment and perfection by name, is the creation or product of Intellect ; these are [to be understood as] included in Intellect, and not being different principles because of the identity of cause and effect. The varieties thereof are said to be fifty.

But how can so many effects proceed from [the same] one cause ? It is replied, **by the hostile influence** &c. : from the hostile influence of the constituents, defeat of one or more [by others or other], due to inequalities among them, that is, greater or less strength, disparity from defect, evenness or excess ; this is the sense.

Thus, since cause and effect are not different, obstruction is to be understood as ignorance, weakness as impiety, contentment as virtue, and perfection as knowledge. Ignorance and the rest spring from Intellect, hence obstruction, &c., are not [to be considered] different principles. Enough.

ANNOTATIONS.

“The 46th and following distichs,” says Mr. John Davies, “form the outline of a Hindu system for the conduct of the human understanding.” What Iśvara

¹ I have here again split up the sentence that Wilson prints as concluding the commentary on the present verse and Paṇḍit Bechanarāma as introducing that on the next.

Kṛishṇa seeks to point out in these verses is the different ways in which the conditions we have been just discussing are modified by changes in the Intellectual substance itself, changes that are due to inequalities among the constituents. It will be remembered that these conditions are only diverse modes of intellect. Any modifications of them will then be modifications of Intellect itself. All products of Nature we know are constituted of three factors, one good and pure, another foul and urgent, and a third dark and dulling. As one or more of these triumphs over the remaining, the character of the understanding is modified accordingly. The sum-total of these modifications is termed an *intellectual creation*, and when Professor Wilson describes it as "the various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect, or the exercise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries," he is substantially right.

This 'creation' may be divided into four broad classes. Viewing from the standpoint of knowledge (and that is the proper standpoint according to Kapila), we may distinguish four states. The first is when through misconception or error we fail in cognition; the second when through some infirmity or disability we are incapacitated; the third is when through self-sufficiency or mental indolence or some cause of a like nature, we take up our lodgings in a half-way house and care not to enquire further; the fourth when knowledge is perfected and true cognition results.¹ The various

¹ Mr. Davies, by saying "Perfection means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue" (p. 85), suggests a distinction

subdivisions of these four classes are next to be discussed.

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिसु^१ कारणवैकल्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

47. Five are the varieties of obstruction ; twenty-eight of disability, through organic imperfection ; nine varieties there are of contentment, and eight of perfection.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] [The modifications] are now detailed.

There are five varieties of obstruction : these are as follows, obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom and utter darkness ; the distinctions between these will be explained presently. **There are twenty-eight varieties of disability**, owing to defects in organs, which also we shall explain. Next, **contentment is nine-fold**, [being] the [several] kinds of passion-befouled knowledge possessed by an ascetic. Lastly, **perfection is eight-fold**, [comprising] the [several] kinds of goodness-purified knowledge which a holy man possesses.

that is futile. According to the Hindu there can be no perfect knowledge without completeness in moral virtue. The doctrine of *karma* negatives the possibility of any such consummation. चित्तविशुद्धिः or purity of heart is a necessary condition to the acquisition of saving knowledge.

¹ Most editions give शक्तिश्च ; Gaudapāda has the genitive अशक्तेः ; the sense remains practically unaffected.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The varieties were collectively spoken of as fifty; the number of the kinds of each is now specified, **Five are the varieties, &c.:**

Obstruction, the source of migration, has five kinds, by name obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom and utter darkness, according to the five afflictions, ignorance, egotism, desire, hatred and dread.¹

Since **disability** proceeds from disease, the variations of the former should be as numerous as those of the latter; how can they then be twenty-eight? The answer is, **through organic imperfection.** The disability that arises from imperfection or defect in the instruments (intellect and the eleven sense-organs) is twenty-eight-fold.

The rest is easy.

ANNOTATIONS.

With this verse begins the specification of sub-divisions. It is interesting to compare the corresponding Aphorisms, III. 39-44. They content themselves with specifying the numbers and declaring that the sub-divisions are to be understood in the same sense in which previous teachers have explained them. This enumeration by its bareness suggests the *Tatva-samāsa*, where these topics are dealt with in *sūtras* 12-15.

In the next verse the varieties of Obstruction are more particularly detailed by exhibition of their sub-species.

¹ See *Yoga Aphorisms*, II. 3.

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा¹ तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥४८॥

48. The sub-divisions of obscurity are eight, so also of illusion ; extreme illusion is of ten kinds, gloom of eighteen, as also utter darkness.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The sub-divisions are to be particularised in order ; first of those of obstruction.

There are eight distinctions of obscurity, final dissolution being so divided by ignorance ; as when a person thinks the soul merges into the eight modes of Nature known as Prime Stuff, consciousness, self-apperception, and the five rudiments, and thence concludes, 'I am liberated' ; this is eight-fold obscurity.

The distinctions of **illusion** are also of eight kinds, whence Indra and the other gods, through association with the eight-fold powers, minuteness &c., do not attain salvation, but on the destruction thereof have to migrate again ; this is eight-fold illusion.

Extreme illusion is of ten kinds : the five sense-objects of sound, touch, colour, flavour and smell, are sources of happiness both to gods and men ; extreme illusion consists in these ten.

Gloom ; the eight kinds of power and the ten objects of sense, perceived and heard (that is, human and divine), make up eighteen ; the feeling that rejoices in the season

¹ Wilson prints चष्टदशधा.

of fruition and the feeling that grieves in that of want, constitute the eighteen-fold gloom.

Like gloom, **utter darkness** has eighteen varieties, [owing to] the eight superhuman powers and the ten objects of sense; but it refers to that profound grief which results when a man dies in the midst of rich sensual enjoyments, or falls from the command of the eight-fold powers.

Thus the five varieties of obstruction, [*viz.*,] obscurity and the rest, being each divided, make up sixty-two subdivisions.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The sub-divisions of the five obstructions are next enumerated, **The sub-divisions**, &c. :

Ignorance is the taking of the eight—Nature, intellect, egoism and the five elemental rudiments—for soul; this is also called **obscurity**; it is eight-fold from its eight objects.

Egoism is a self-conceit founded upon the idea that 'I am perfect,' consequent upon the attainment of the eight-fold powers; the powers of atomicity, &c., being eight, it has also eight varieties; this is also called **illusion**. The *cha* (also, connects "illusion" with "of eight kinds."

Greed is an appreciation of the five objects of sense, sound &c.,—which become ten because human and divine, —as fit to be taken by me. This is **extreme illusion**, ten-fold through ten objects.

Envy at seeing others enjoying the ten objects of sense, sound &c., and the eight kinds of powers, atomicity &c., is called **gloom**, [which is] eighteen-fold because of eighteen objects.

Fear is termed **extreme gloom**; the apprehension is

that somebody else will get the ten sense-objects and attain the eight powers ; this [also] is eighteen-fold through eighteen objects. '

Thus the sub-divisions of obstruction are sixty-two [in number].

ANNOTATIONS.

Obstruction may be defined as any thing that stands in the way of Soul's attaining liberation and renders all its efforts directed to that end abortive. Now, since there is only one way to salvation, and that narrow path is knowledge, bondage is to be ascribed to an absence of it. This absence may be either a negative or a positive state ; we may be simply wanting in discriminative knowledge, or we may go further and, mistaking the nature of real bliss, place it in sensual gratification or supernatural might.

According to this disjunction, obstruction has been divided into five classes. These correspond to the five 'afflictions' of Patanjali. The classes are as follows :—

(1) Ignorance, अविद्या, technically called 'obscurity.' This comprises the different forms of materialism. Error may lead us to fix Soul in Nature or any of her first seven (and subtler) modes. Thus such error may be eight-fold.

(2) Egotism, अस्मिता, technically called 'illusion.' Desire for self-aggrandisement, as vulgarly understood, may lead us to seek for the supernatural powers. As eight kinds of these are enumerated, illusion will also be eight-fold.

(3) Desire, राग, technically called 'extreme illusion.' This consists in an addiction to the pleasures of sense. Now, the objects of sense are generally said to be five,

yet the text says that this form of obstruction may be ten-fold. How is this? The explanation probably is, as suggested by St. Hilaire, that the sense-organs have been enumerated as ten, and the objects of all are intended. The scholiasts, who perhaps felt that the objects of the several organs of action are only special forms of the object of touch, believe that the gods (glorified humanity) were intended to be included in the classification.

(4) Hatred, द्वेष, technically called 'gloom.' This may mean aversion to the pleasures and powers just described, or envy at others' possession of them, or perhaps, as Wilson suggests, "the mental conditions of fierceness or impatience with which sensual enjoyments are pursued, or superhuman powers are exercised."

(5) Dread, अभिनिवेश, technically called 'utter darkness.' This results from a passionate attachment to these pleasures and powers. Death is looked upon with much terror as it means the loss of all these *loved* possessions.

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।

सप्तदशधा च' बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥४८॥

49. Defects in the eleven organs together with aberrations of the intellect have been termed disability. Intellectual aberrations

tions are seventeen, by inversion of contentment and perfection.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The distinctions of disability are next specified.

It has already been declared 'that of disability' through organic defects there are twenty-eight varieties [verse 47]. These comprise destructive injuries to the eleven sense-organs, [as,] deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste and of smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, constipation, impotence and insanity.

Together with injuries to the intellect, there are twenty-eight sub-divisions of disability; [thus] there are seventeen defects of the intellect.

There are seventeen defects **from the inversion of contentment and perfection**. There are nine varieties of the former and eight of the latter. The opposites of these together with the eleven defects [in senses] make up the twenty-eight forms of disability.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The sub-divisions of disability are next enumerated, **Defects**, &c.

Injuries or defects of the eleven organs, *viz.*, ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, voice, hands, feet, the excretory and the reproductive, and mind. They are as follows : deafness, leprosy, blindness, loss of taste and smell, dumbness, distortion, lameness, impotence, iliac passion, and intoxication.

With aberrations of the intellect, incompetence thereof to its work. How many forms there are of intellectual defects, this is now stated, **are seventeen**, &c. : contentment is said to be of nine kinds, similarly perfection of eight; from the **inversion** or opposites thereof.

ANNOTATIONS.

Disability may be defined as any thing which incapacitates intellect for the proper discharge of its functions. Now, if there be any defect in any of the senses, if any of the organs, whether of intellection or of action, be injured or destroyed, the action of the understanding is bound to be seriously affected. But this is not all. The inversed forms of contentment and perfection will also have an undesirable effect upon its action. What these forms are we next proceed to investigate.

आध्यात्मिक्यसप्तसुः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ¹ ॥५०॥

50. Nine sorts of contentment are enumerated : four internal, named from nature, means, time and luck ; and five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The variations arising from the opposites of contentment and perfection are to be noticed, therefore the nine-fold contentment is next specified.

Four sorts of contentment are internal ; *internal* being such as are in the individual (or spirit).

They are **named from nature, means, time and luck.** *Named from Nature :* as, when a person knows

¹ Gauḍapāda's text, according to Wilson, has आध्यात्मिका, विषयोपरमाश्च, and अभिहितः.

the world-stuff, knows it with the constituents as well as without, and, conceiving a principle [of existence] to be its product, rests contented; for him there is no liberation; this is *Nature-contentment*. *Named from means*: as, when a person, ignorant of the [twenty-five] principles, adopts external means, [relying upon] the triple staff, the water-pot and general curiosity¹ for salvation; for him too there is no liberation; this is *means-contentment*. *Named from time*: 'salvation will follow in course of time, what is the use of studying principles?' this is *time-contentment*, and in this case too there is no liberation. Similarly, *named from luck*: salvation will be attained by good luck; this is *luck-contentment*. These are the four sorts of [internal] contentment.

And the external are five, resulting from abstinence from sense-objects. The external forms of contentment are five, which result when a man, observing [the evils attendant upon] acquisition, preservation, destruction, attachment and harmfulness, abstains from [the pleasures² of] sound, touch, form, flavour and smell. With a view to increase, one has to take to rearing of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and service;² acquisition in this way is painful. There is pain, [again], in the preservation of what has been acquired; waste also is painful, and enjoyment leads to waste. Where there is attachment to sensual pleasures there is no repose for the

¹ विविदिषा, enquiry after knowledge. Text perhaps doubtful. Wilson's MS. had विविदिक्षा, which makes no sense.

² This sentence is interesting inasmuch as it indicates the approved modes of acquisition in olden times—the professions that were most largely followed.

organs;¹ this¹ is the fault of such attachment. Again, there is no enjoyment without injury to created things; this is the evil of harmfulness. Thus, an observation of the evils of acquisition and the rest¹ leads to abstention from the five objects (of sense), whence the five kinds of contentment result.

Hence taking the internal and the external varieties together, there are nine forms of acquiescence, the names of which are [differently] given in other works, thus, *ambhas*, *salilam*, *ōgha*, *vṛishti*, *sutamas*, *pāram*, *sunetram*, *nārīkam*, *anuttamāmbhasikam*.² From the contraries of

¹ So Manu says, "Desire is by no means appeased by satisfying the desires, as fire [which] increases only the more by butter [being poured into it]," II. 94.

² Literally, 'water, wave, flood, rain, great darkness, crossing, happy crossing, feminine, unsurpassed water.' It is very difficult to explain what these terms mean. While almost all the commentators (whether on the *Kārikā* or the *Sūtras*) give them, none attempts an explanation. They seem to be technical terms, which still survive from some mystic tradition of the past, but the original significance of which has been lost. It is noticeable that the terms given by Gauḍapāda differ from those given by later scholiasts. Those given by Nārāyaṇa are supported by most of the others, except that Vāchaspati has अपरं for पारापरं. Dr. Garbe, with great ingenuity and probability, suggests, "these denominations are based on the same metaphor which is current in Buddhism, *vis.*, on that of passing over the ocean of mundane existence into the harbour of liberation. The 'acquiescences' of the Sāṃkhya-system are, as preliminary stages of liberation, compared with smooth waters which facilitate the passage of those who have reached them" (P. xv). He further suggests that Gauḍapāda's नारीकं may be a deformed derivative of नदी and सुतमः a corruption of सुतारं.

these forms, which constitute varieties of disability, arise defects in intellect, *viz.*, *anambha*, *asalilam*, *anóbha*, &c. Thus from the opposites follow intellectual aberrations.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] The nine divisions of contentment are next described, **Nine sorts**, &c. :

‘Knowledge of Soul as distinguished from Nature and the rest is the means to salvation ; but this knowledge is a product of Nature and will be attained by its means ;’ he who thinks thus and withdraws from action, his is the contentment **named from Nature**, [also] termed *ambha*.

Others reason thus : ‘this knowledge comes not from Nature alone, otherwise the house-holders would also acquire it, but it is obtained by leading a hermit’s life ;’ thus through indolence and the like [causes] they remain content ; this is contentment **named from means**, termed *salilam*, also styled *paribrajya*.

‘This *paribrajya* also will bring it [only] in due course of time ; therefore time being supreme, knowledge will come at its proper moment ; consequently do not exert.’ This contentment is **named from time**, and is termed *megha*.

‘Even in the due season it will come only by force of luck, therefore luck alone is the cause thereof and no other ; consequently exert not.’ This is the contentment **named from luck**, and is termed *vrishṭi*. These are the four internal.

The **external** [forms of] contentment, proceeding from abstinence from sense-objects, are five, [so called] because of the absence of a knowledge of Soul as distinct from Nature and the rest. From an observation of the evils attending acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoy-

ment and injury, follows five-fold abstinence; from the same cause contentment is also five-fold. 'Acquisition is attended by the troubles of begging, wandering, &c.; therefore exert not'; this [form of] contentment is called *pāram*.

Acquiescence, which is based upon the idea that it is a trouble to have to guard against thieves and the like the little that has been acquired, is named *supāram*.

'Even the little thus protected will be lost by enjoyment'; contentment based upon this reflection is *pārāpāram*.

'The continued enjoyment of sense-objects, sound, &c., gives rise to lust, this brings pain upon the subject by [successive] gain and loss of objects'; contentment founded on this consideration is styled *anuttamāmbhas*.

From such enjoyment results harm to animals; abstention from sense-objects on the observation of this evil is contentment known as *uttamāmbhas*.

Thus the four external and the five internal make up the nine forms of contentment, [which are], *ambhas*, *salilam*, *megha*, *vrishṭi*, *pāram*, *supāram*, *pārāpāram*, *anuttamāmbhas*, and *uttamāmbhas*.¹

ANNOTATIONS.

We now come to the third 'intellectual creation'. This is *Contentment*. It may be described as the stage reached by many pious men, who have led pretty correct lives and are satisfied with their lot. These people know

¹ The last four, literally translated, mean, 'happy crossing, perfect crossing, unsurpassed water, and excellent water'.

that liberation is the goal of Soul, but they do not know exactly how this is to be attained. They arrive at a certain point, and, in their self-complacency, think that they are close to salvation and need strive no more.

Contentment is either internal or external. Those forms, which refer to the self and distinctly recognise that it is to be discriminated from the not-self, are called internal or subjective. These again are susceptible of a further division. All forms of contentment are expectant states, you know there is salvation and you hope to gain it, but you have got upon a wrong trail, and cannot find the right way to compass it. There are four different trails which may lead you astray, and upon them is the four-fold classification of subjective contentment based.

(1) A person, for instance, may learn in a general way, either from books or from a teacher, that the soul is other than Nature. He further learns that all that can be known is one mode of Nature or another, that knowledge itself is a product that follows from the union of the ego and the non-ego, and is dependent for its very existence upon the activity of the latter. He may now rest content with this knowledge and desist from further pursuit of it (by means of devotional practices and good deeds), believing that the non-ego is the more important pole of the antithesis and will bring about for him the cognition of the distinction that is sought.

(2) Another person, more intelligent in his way, may perceive that the non-ego alone cannot be responsible for this knowledge—else it should occur to every body and always. There is the personal equation which makes it operative as regards A but not as regards B. Therefore if you desire to attain salvation you must do some-

thing, adopt some means, engage in some form of asceticism preferably.

(3) A third person may here object that salvation does not follow upon a renouncement of the world, but it takes its own time. So you must wait; when your time is full, you will be able to achieve success without any difficulty.

(4) A fourth person, more indolently inclined than the rest, will here interpose that time alone will not effect salvation unless you are destined to achieve it. Common experience proves how large a part luck plays in the world. Good luck alone is the cause of liberation.

These are the four forms of internal content. External or objective content is the state of acquiescence which induces a man to withdraw from the objects of the five senses, not because he has attained to a philosophic cognition of their real nature, but because he is afraid of the pain that attends upon them and has come to see that the trouble and anxiety that sensual gratification entails far outweighs the pleasure that it brings. Objective contentment, as the scholiasts show, may be of five kinds.

जहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।

दानं च सिद्ध्योऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्गुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

51. The eight [means to] perfection are reasoning, hearing,¹ study, suppression of

¹ That is, oral instruction.

three-fold pain, intercourse with friends,¹ and purity. The three foregoing [dispositions] are checks to perfection.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] Perfection is next described.

Reasoning : as one continually meditates, 'what is truth? What is the future? What is ultimate felicity? What should I do in order to attain the end (of my existence)? From such reflections the knowledge arises that Nature is one and Soul another, and intellect, self-apperception, the subtle rudiments, the sense-organs and the five gross elements are all distinct. In this way a knowledge of principles is reached, which leads to salvation. This is the first kind of perfection, named *reasoning*.

Again, from oral instruction comes a knowledge of Nature, Soul, intellect, self-apperception, the rudimentary principles, the sense-organs and the five gross elements; from which knowledge liberation follows. This is the perfection styled **hearing**.

From **study**, study of the *Vedas* and other sacred works, a knowledge of the twenty-five principles is obtained; this is the third kind of perfection.

The three-fold suppression of pain : when, with a view to the removal of the three kinds of pain, intrinsic, extrinsic and superhuman, one approaches a teacher and following his advice, attains to salvation; this is the fourth kind of perfection. This, conceived as three-fold on account of the three sorts of pain, makes up six varieties of perfection.

¹ "Acquisition of friends" (Davies).

Next, **intercourse with friends** : as, when obtaining knowledge from a friend [one] attains to liberation ; this is the seventh kind of perfection.*

Liberality : as, when one by offering abode, medicine, staff, water-pot, food and clothes to holy men, obtains knowledge from them and is thereby emancipated ; this is the eighth kind of perfection.

These eight forms have different names in other works, as *tāram*, *sutāram*, *tāratāram*, *pramōdam*, *pramuditam*, *pramōdamānam*, *ramyakam*, and *sadāpramuditam*.¹ The opposites of these are defects of intellect and are classified as disabilities, viz., *atāram*, *asutāram*, &c. The varieties of disability have been spoken of as twenty-eight, eleven organic defects together with the intellectual aberrations [verse 49]. Now, the contraries of contentment are nine, those of perfection eight, thus there are seventeen defects of intellect ; these together with those of the organs make up the twenty-eight varieties of disability already referred to.

Thus obstruction, disability, contentment and perfection have been particularised and determined.²

What else ? **The foregoing are three kinds of checks to perfection** ; [that is], obstruction, disability, and contentment are from their severalty three-fold curbs upon [the attainment of] perfection. As an elephant is brought under control by an iron hook, so the world sinks into ignorance through obstruction, disability and contentment. Therefore we should abandon these

¹ Literally, 'passing, nappy passing, perfect passing, joyance, joy, joyousness, delight, and perpetual joy.'

* उद्देशो निर्देशश्च कृत इति, which Wilson renders, "have been affirmatively and negatively described."

and apply ourselves to [the acquiring of] perfection. Perfection gives rise to a knowledge of principles, which leads to liberation.

[NARÁYAṆA.] The eight varieties of perfection are now enumerated, **The eight, &c.:**

Reasoning, discursive power, special perception, in fact. **Hearing**, conversancy with collocations of words, connected by subject and predicate. **Study**, learning the *Śāstras* from the instructions of teachers. **Suppression of pain**, the means for the removal thereof, which are three-fold because pain is of three kinds. **Intercourse with friends**, association with men spiritually-minded. **Purity**,¹ from the root *daip*, to purify; internal and external cleanliness. **Perfection** is that which perfects. That perfection which consists in the removal of pain is primary inasmuch as it is the result; the other five helping to effect this result, are subsidiary; this is to be understood.

Reasoning and the rest are thus designated in the gloss: *lāratāra, sūtāra, promoda, mudita, mōdamāna, ramyaka, and sadāmudita.*

¹ This explanation is supported by Aniruddha and Mahādeva and is preferred by Vāchaspati. The two latter refer to Patanjali, *Yoga Sūtras*, II. (26). St. Hilaire also adopts this view. Davies, however, scouts, it, going even so far as to suggest that the proposed root has been coined for the occasion, because he could not find it "in any dictionary, Indian or European." And this is called "sound philology." All that we can say is that the learned critic has been unfortunate in his selection of dictionaries. The root दैप or दै is recognised by Pāṇini, and is not quite so unknown in Sanskrit literature. It is a transitive verb of the first class which is conjugated in the परस्मैपद voice.

To indicate the excellence of perfection and the inferiority of obstruction, disability and contentment, it is said, **the three foregoing, &c.:** The three **foregoing**, aforementioned, obstruction, disability, [and] contentment, are **curbs to perfection**, preventive thereof by displacement of causes, &c. They are like *iron hooks* because inimical to perfection. Hence obstruction, disability, and contentment are to be abandoned; this is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

Finally we come to *सिद्धि* or *Perfection*. By this is meant the means whereby perfect knowledge may be attained and the ultimate end of Soul gained. These are the conditions productive of knowledge, and fall readily into two classes, (1) primary and (2) secondary. The first class comprises those which are conducive to the suppression of the three-fold pain: these are among the means to the attainment of perfect knowledge, inasmuch as by such suppression there is the removal of a grave distraction and the acquisition of knowledge is thereby facilitated; but the removal of pain, as we have seen, is the prime end of existence. So these properly are the objects which the other means seek to effect. So they are called *primary*, while the others, being subsidiary to them, are termed *secondary*.

'Well, what are these other, these secondary, means? They are as follows:—

(1) Reasoning. This means a cultivation of the logical faculty. There is a power within us, call it

Reason or whatever you please, which enables us to arrange and marshal our knowledge and test the validity of all that is presented to us. It is a faculty that we have been furnished with not for the purpose of solving intellectual conundrums, but that with this we may reflect and build up the fabric of our knowledge.

(2) Hearing. But over and above personal reflection we must receive instruction from somebody, from some one who knows.

(3) Study. This instruction must further be supplemented by a careful perusal of texts and other writings of authority.

(4) Friendly discussion. If you want your ideas to become clear and distinct and your knowledge to be something more than a dead thing, you should mix with people who take an intelligent interest in the subject and converse with them. Such discussions will open up your mind wonderfully, and you will gain new light.

(5) Purity, internal and external. The better life you lead, the more virtuous your conduct is, the greater are your chances of acquiring perfect knowledge. It is only by a course of good life that you become qualified for such acquisition. Moral and devotional practices, therefore, are not to be discounted; it is they which wean us from the dangerous allurements of sense, it is by them that we are enabled to lay the foundations of the prospect of a higher existence for us. When Patanjali says that undistracted discriminative knowledge is not obtained without devoted practice, long continued and uninterrupted,¹ he says nothing that is not in accord with

¹ *Yoga Sūtras*, II. 26; also *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 30, 36, &c.

the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and (allowing for the expression) he lays down no principle that Kapila would not endorse.¹

Gauḍapāda and Vijnāna, however, think दानं in the text signifies gift. Even if this be so, we opine that the word is used in a figurative sense. The meaning then would be not the *naïve* one that a person must pay for learning anything but that he must impart his knowledge if he wants it to grow from more to more.²

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।

लिङ्गाख्योभावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥५२॥

52. If there were no conditions there would be no subtle person, [and] if there was no subtle person there would be no evolution³ of the conditions. Thence a two-fold creation proceeds, by name personal and objective.

¹ Mr. Davies advocates the opposite view, but he is careful to indicate the limits of the basis of his strictures—"all we know of Kapila's views of morality" (p. 88).

² Vedāntin Mahādeva thinks that the order above given is not according to the *real* order of things and that 'study' and 'oral instruction' logically precede 'reasoning.' (See Garbe, pp. 135-6.)

³ Colebrooke and Wilson translate 'pause;' Davies, following Lassen, 'development or manifestation.' The latter interpretation is the correct one. निर्वृत्तिः signifies development or accomplishment.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] In the statement, "the rudiment invested with dispositions" [verse 40], the dispositions are the affections of intellect, virtue and the rest, as modified by obstruction, disability, contentment and perfection. These form the intellectual creation, [also] called dispositional. The *liṅga* is described¹ as a rudimental creation, extending throughout the fourteen sorts of created things [verse 53]. It is now explained whether Soul's purpose is fulfilled by either (then by which) or by both of the creations.

Without dispositions, the intellectual creation, **there would be no subtle person**, rudimental creation; because the investiture with successive frames is due to the necessary influence of ever-preceding conditions.

Nor without a subtle person, the rudimental creation, **would there be any evolution of the dispositions**, because the origination of virtue and the rest is effected by bodies subtle and gross, and because creation is eternal.¹ This mutual dependence, like that of the

¹ स्थूलसूक्ष्मदेहसाध्यत्वाच्चर्मादेः अनादित्वाच्च सर्गस्य. Wilson translated, "from the indispensability of virtue or vice for the attainment of either subtle or gross body, and from the non-priority of either creation." Mr. Davies takes exception to this and as an improved rendering gives, "without the *liṅga*, which is formed of the finer elements, there is no development of dispositions, and there would be no beginning of virtue and the rest without a complete formation of subtle and gross body." We have already said that Wilson was not quite right when he spoke of "pause of dispositions," but the way in which his critic connects अनादित्वाच्च with the preceding clause is hardly an inspiration of either profound scholarship or (what Mr. Davies seems more solicitous about) 'sound philology.'

seed and the sprout, is no defect, for the reciprocity is one between species and not between individuals.

Wherefore a double creation proceeds, one named dispositional, the other personal.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] ‘ But since there is no experience apart from sense-objects there has been the creation of ether and the other [gross elements] ; what, however, is effected by the supersensible creation? ’¹ In reply it is said, **If there were, &c. :**

Without conditions, perceptible objects, **the subtle mark,** that is, the supersensible set of intellect, &c., will not have experience ; this is the meaning.

[Again], **without the subtle mark,** Intellect and the rest, **there will be no evolution of conditions** or objects, no experience of them will be brought about. Such is the sense. An object by itself does not cause experience, or there would be universal experience,² [it is a cause of it] only when known ; knowledge, again, cannot be without the senses and the internal organs ; thus either presupposes the other. Therefore, since both is necessary, [there is a two-fold creation], [one] personal, *lingam* being that which indicates the supersensible set of intellect &c., but produces no intuition of it ; [the other] objective, [a condition] being that which is reached or apprehended by means of the senses, that is, the assemblage of objects known by perception.

¹ That is, of intellect, &c.

² i.e., of everything by everybody.

ANNOTATIONS.

We read in Distich 40 that the subtle body migrates invested with conditions. And then these conditions were explained, and we were told about the intellectual creation, which embraced them all. This intellectual creation, it will now be shown, is further divisible into two, and that each presupposes each and that neither can exist without the other.

We have seen that conditions are affections of intellect, and comprise virtue, vice, *et cætera*. Now, it is these conditions that control our existence, that influence the return of the individual, the Soul, to the world of sense. The irresistible, inexorable force of *karma* is whirling us along through a succession of mundane existences, and these will not cease so long as our dispositions continue to operate. But the dispositions cannot operate unless the soul is invested with a frame and thereby rendered amenable to their influence. The consequences of virtue and the rest require a seat of manifestation, a personal investiture, so to speak, and thus the so-called rudimentary or personal creation cannot subsist without the creation that may be termed dispositional or conditional or objective.

On the contrary, this personal creation, the rudimentary body, is equally necessary to these dispositions. As virtue, vice and the rest, on the one hand, imply and occasion bodily condition, so bodily condition, on the other hand, is necessary to the performance of acts of virtue and vice. Thus there is a continual action and reaction going on between the states of intellect and the states of body. Each conditions the other, and if the

dispositions cause the personal investure, it is this investure which furnishes them with means of operation, and by manifesting controls them.

It is futile in this connection to inquire which is causally prior to the other. Readers will be reminded of the old puzzle, 'which was first, the acorn or the oak?' It is an eternal process, in which each is dependent upon and generative of the other. The oak bears the acorn and from the acorn springs the oak. To neither belongs the character of being solely the initiative or solely the consequent.

Vijñāna, however, explains the verse in a more specialised sense. He styles the two sorts of creation 'a collective emanation,' and supposes that the verse deals with the intimate relation that subsists between intellect and its conditions. According to him भावः signifies knowledge and the other properties of intelligence in the form of affective influences,¹ and लिङ्गः the intellectual principle or consciousness.

The explanation suggested by Nārāyaṇa is again to some extent different from either of the above. He proceeds upon the supreme importance of experience. Without experience there can be no liberation, but experience cannot be had unless there be a person to experience and there be objects to be experienced. According to this scholiast then भावः or states of being signify present objects of sense, while लिङ्गः is the aggregate of internal faculties which are indispensable to experience.

¹ वासना, which Benfey defines as 'an impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions etc. and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain' (*Sanskrit English Dictionary*, s. v.).

A little consideration will, however, show that there is not so much difference between the several explanations as one may at first be led to suppose. The real point is that the several parts of the not-soul which environ the soul hang closely together, and that our personal states are in intimate correlation with the circumstances which condition them and which they condition.

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च^१ पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुष्यैकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः^२ ॥५३॥

53. The divine race is of eight sorts, the non-human of five, and man is alone in his class. Such briefly is the world of created beings.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] What else?

Divine, of eight kinds, [*viz.*], Bráhma, Prájápatya, Saumya, Aindra, Gándharva, Yáksha, Rákshasa and Paisácha.

¹ Some editions give यौनश्च. The word properly means an animal which goes horizontally, as distinguished from man who walks erect. Colebrooke translates 'grovelling,' Lassen 'in-humana', St. Hilaire 'nés de la matrice', and Davies 'arimal.' The last term would strictly include mankind.

² Gauḍapáda's text is

अष्टविकल्पं दैवं तैर्यग्योनं पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुष्यं त्वेकविधं समासतोऽयं विधा सर्गः ॥

Animals wild and domestic, birds, reptiles and immovable substances form the five kinds of **horizontal-movers**.

The human kind is one. These are the fourteen sorts of creatures.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The divisions of the existential creation are next enumerated, **The divine race**, &c. :

Celestial eight-fold, according to the division of Bráhma, Prájápatya, Aindra, Pitrya, Gándharva, Yákshya, Rákshasa, [and] Paśácha. Such is the meaning.

Horizontal-movers are five-fold, through the division of animals, birds, reptiles, insects and immovables.

Human is of one kind. **Briefly**, that is, neglecting racial inter-differences, as Bráhmaṇa, &c.

Elemental, corporeal, thus excluding jar and the like. [But] some speak of jar, &c., as included in the class of immovables.¹

ANNOTATIONS.

The creation having been generally dealt with is now considered in its parts, in its gross and specific forms.

There are two things which deserve notice here. *First*, fixed things—vegetables and minerals—are classed among *living* objects as forming the crudest stage in organic evolution. In spite of Dr. Garbe's superior note of admiration,² we submit this betokens wonderful insight in the thinkers of ancient India. *Secondly*, mankind is spoken of as *single* in its class, thus sinking altogether distinctions of race or caste.

¹ Standing generally for inanimate objects.

² Garbe, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।

मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

54. The creation extends from Brahmá and the rest to a stock.¹ Above goodness prevails, below the creation is full of darkness ; passion predominates in the middle.

[GAUḌAPÁDA.] The three constitutive powers are to be found in all the three worlds ; it is next stated which predominates in each.

Above, in the eight celestial spheres, **prevalence of goodness**, extensiveness or predominance of goodness ; [that is], goodness is triumphant, passion and darkness exist, [however]. **Full of darkness below**, in animals and immovable substances the whole creation is pervaded by an excess of darkness, [though] there also goodness and passion are not [wholly] absent.

In the middle, in man, passion predominates ; here, too, goodness and darkness are present, therefore man is often in pain.

Thus **from Brahma' to a stock**, Brahmá at one extremity and immovable things at the other, [creation extends].

In this way creations non-elemental—[comprising] rudimental and dispositional,—and elemental (of beings

¹ Wilson prints (? misprints) पर्यन्तः.

² Colebrooke translates, " in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from Brahmá to a stock." But this is obviously erroneous, for Brahmá does not belong to the 'middle region,' whether this means the earth or the abode of men.

of celestial, human and brutal origin) constitute the sixteen sorts which proceed [mediately] from Nature.¹

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] The specialities of the [elemental] creation are next described, **The creation, &c. :**

Above the terrestrial globe **goodness predominates**; for, though passion and darkness are to be found there, yet we are told there is an excess of goodness.

Below, among the horizontal-movers who tend down-wards, **darkness predominates**; the other two constituents are not absent, but this is found in excess.

In the middle, in the terrestrial globe passion predominates; though goodness and darkness are there, yet, from an observation of [man's] addiction to virtue and vice, passion is considered to have greater strength.

From Brahma', &c. This creation extending from Brahmā to a stock is thus situated (or constituted) according to difference of spheres. **Stock**, that is, a fixed thing.

¹ एवमभौतिकः सर्गो लिङ्गसर्गो भावसर्गो भूतसर्गो देवमानुषतैर्यग्यीमय इति, एषः प्रधानकृतः षोडशविधः सर्गः. Wilson, who translates, "thus non-elemental creation, rudimental creation, conditional and elemental creation, in beings of divine, mortal, brutal, and (immovable) origin, are the sixteen sorts of creation effected by nature," naturally gets into difficulties in accounting for the sixteen sorts. But, as Dr. Hall (*Sāṅkhya Sāra*, Pref., p. 32) has pointed out, his version is based upon a misapprehension. There are primarily two kinds of creation, non-elemental and elemental. The former is again subdivided into two forms, and the latter into fourteen. Thus there are altogether sixteen sorts.

ANNOTATIONS.

Elemental creation extends from Brahmá to a grass-blade, that is, it embraces the celestial regions as well as the sub-terrene. But these regions and the several orders of being that inhabit them are differentiated from one another by constitutional diversity. In the higher world, extending from the aërial to that of Truth, goodness is abundant and the beings are happy ; in the middle region where man resides, passion is abundant, people are thereby led to engage in good and bad actions and suffer pain ; in the inferior creation, that is, from the tame beasts down to the vegetables, darkness is abundant and all life is either stupid or insensate.¹

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥५५॥

55. * In them the sentient Soul experiences pain, owing to decay and death, till the subtle person returns ;² hence pain is of the essence [of bodily existence].

[GAUḌAPÁDA.] In them, in beings of divine, human and brutal origin, the **sentient**, intelligent, soul experiences pain due to decay and death,—not Nature, or consciousness, or self-apperception, or the elemental rudiments, or the sense-organs or the gross elements.

¹ The corresponding Aphorisms are III. 47-50.

² That is, is re-absorbed in Nature. Colebrooke renders, "until it be released from its person."

How long does the soul suffer pain? This is discussed. Till the 'rudiment' ceases to be, as long as it entering into the subtle person, composed of intellect and the rest, remains manifest there, [that is], as long as the migratory body does not cease to revolve, so long, in short, the soul suffers pain, arising from disease and death, in the three worlds. Till the cessation of the 'rudiment,' till its release. With the discontinuance of the subtle body comes liberation, with liberation emancipation from pain.

How then can liberation be effected? When a knowledge of the twenty-five principles, which has for its well-known characteristic the differentiation of Soul from Nature, has been attained. This is Nature, this is intellect, this is egoism, these are the five subtle principles, these the eleven sense-organs, these the five gross elements, and that is soul, which is distinct and dissimilar; from a discriminating knowledge like this results the cessation of the subtle person, and thence salvation.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Having portrayed the creation, [the author] now proceeds to describe the pain that attends upon it and serves to stimulate the dispassion by which emancipation from it is to be obtained, **In them**, &c. :

Since **in them**, the three orders of creation, Soul, though sentient, yet undergoes pain due to disease and death, therefore **pain is by nature**;¹ the creation, sc., of intelligent beings, is by its very nature afflicted with pain. So the holy sage Patanjali has said, "Through functional, ideal and congenital troubles, and because of

¹ Rāma Kṛishṇa explains स्वभाव by प्राक्तनकर्म्म, 'the acts of a former life.'

the conflict between the functions of the several modes, all intelligent beings suffer pain." Here 'functional trouble' is pain due to disease, &c.; 'ideal trouble' means the pain due to fear of death, [as when a man says], 'I have not been [born] and shall not be;' [and] 'congenital trouble' implies the pain due to re-birth.

How long does Soul suffer pain? It is replied, **till the**, &c.: until the *lingam*, intellect and the rest, do not return; the subtle mark having ceased with [the attainment of] knowledge, final beatitude is gained; this is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

The twenty-five categories of Sāṅkhya philosophy have been now described. We return to the grand end of existence, the purpose of Soul that is to be achieved. Pain is to be extirpated, the bondage of the not-soul is to be dissolved. So long as the connection between Soul and Body subsists, this consummation cannot be accomplished, for pain is of the very essence of this connection. We should not suppose that pain belongs to Soul. That is not subject to decay or death, and consequently is in truth independent of pain. It is the non-ego which creates this gaunt spectre and throws a dark shadow upon the blissful soul. So long as the two, the subject and the object, do not come in contact, there is no experience, and there is no pain. But when the great heart of the Formless Objective is agitated by the reflection of the light of intelligence upon it, it gathers shape and becomes manifest in discrete forms. So there is experience for the subject, and as it perceives it seems to feel and suffer. But the suffering really belongs to

the not-self. We need not object that the not-self is *a hypothesis* insentient, how can it then suffer pain? There is no such suffering, no such feeling for the not-self apart from the self. The empirical soul resides in the subtle body,¹ and by its means become connected with sense. So long as this investure or vehicle remains the connection with sense stands. Wherever the soul may be, whether in the regions above or below or on this earth,² there is sensible experience and consequently there is pain. Even what is known as heavenly bliss is transitory. From Brahmā to a blade, common to all alike is sorrow produced by decay and death.³ Even when higher and higher states of glorious existence have been attained to there is regeneration, and immunity from pain is not possible till mundane life as a whole be avoided and abandoned.⁴

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ ५ महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥५६॥

56. This evolution of Nature from intellect to the special elements is for the deliverance

¹ पुरुषः is thus derived, पुरि लिङ्गे श्रुते.

² Davies unnecessarily restricts तत्र to 'the world of men.'

³ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 53.

⁴ Cf. *Ibid* , III. 52.

⁵ Gauḍapāda reads प्रकृतिकृतौ and uses the locative case in his commentary.

of each [individual] Soul ; the activity, as if for itself, is for the benefit of another.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] The purpose of the evolution of Nature is next explained.

*Ityesha*¹ is used at the conclusion and for definition. **In Nature**, [that is], in its instrumentality or activity, the evolution, **extending from intellect to the elements**, from Nature intellect, from intellect egoism, thence the rudiments and the eleven organs, and from the rudiments the five gross elements,—thus for the liberation of each individual soul, whether in god, man or animal, is the development (of Nature).

How [is this]? **The activity, as if for self, is for another's sake**, as, one forsaking his own purpose accomplishes that of his friend, so [also] Nature ; Soul in this case doing nothing for Nature. **As if for self**: not for itself, but for another's purpose. **Purpose** : the apprehension of sound and other objects [of sense], and discrimination between the constituents and Soul. In the three worlds, the function of Nature is to bring Soul into connection with sound and other sense-objects, and [thereby] ultimately to secure [for it] liberation. So it has been said, "Nature, like a jar, ceases after accomplishing the object of Soul."

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] [The author] concludes by pointing out the reason of activity in the Prime Cause alone, **This evolution, &c. ;**

Iti is used to conclude. **This from Intellect &c. to the special elements** is an evolute of Nature, creat-

¹ Literally, ' thus this '

ed, according to the mode already indicated, by Nature alone, and not by God or Fate.¹ **Special element,** the earth, such is the purport.

God is not the cause because His existence is affected by the dilemma of its being at once dependent as well as independent upon virtue, and because of want of proof. Nor Fate either, since [upon this hypothesis], there is a disjunction of causality with the effect,—it being inapplicable to the action of uncreated [and uncombined] atoms at the time of general dissolution,²—and therefore it cannot be the cause of every [possible] product. This will indicate [the line of reasoning].

Since [Nature] is insentient, it has no purpose of its own and its activity is for the sake of another. But for whom is the evolution? The answer is, **for the deliverance**, &c. : of each individual soul, this is meant. Here experience is discarded, and the purpose of liberation [alone] spoken of, in order to indicate that created existence being common to all, it will not be put an end to by the emancipation of one; therefore **each soul** is mentioned. As the sage Patanjali has observed in his corresponding (or cognate) work, “Soul has that alone for its object; [and] for one that has attained its end Nature both is and is not, because it is common to others.”

Since there is no dispute about [the possibility of] activity for the sake of another, it is said, **the activity**,

¹ Literally, the unseen [power of merit and demerit].

² We should not argue that Desert determines Nature to energise with reference to particular Souls, for Desert is inferrible only from, and, therefore, not cognizable antecedently to, its *fruits*. Ballantyne, p. 270.

&c. : In the same way as a person energises for himself, the evolution of Nature is for the benefit of another, all activity having for its cause some necessity (or purpose). There is no need to expatiate.

ANNOTATIONS.

If liberation be the object of soul, if all that we seek here is relief of misery, why is there experience at all ? You say, that the non-ego acts upon the ego and binds it. If no such action took place, if the various sensible forms that absorb and delude the soul did not come into existence at all, the self would never be bound and there would be no suffering.

But this is not so. And the reason is plain. The soul can never rise to a perfect cognition of itself unless it is placed in contrast with the not-self and knows itself as distinct therefrom. This is why if the soul is to fulfil its nature and attain to the knowledge which saves, it must have experience. Now, it is the function of the not-self to produce this experience and thereby minister to the need of the soul. If the not-self did not come under the influence of the self, it would undergo no modifications and remain as it was. Thus, though it is Nature that undergoes modifications and produces ever diverse forms, all this activity is due to the proximity of the ego and has its end for its final cause.

वत्सविवृद्धि निमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥५७॥

57. As the secretion of the unintelligent milk is for the purpose of the nourishment of the calf, so the activity of Nature is for the purpose of the liberation of Soul.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] Here [an opponent] objects, 'Nature is irrational, Soul is rational ; then how can the former act rationally, [reflecting] that she must supply the latter with sound and other objects of sense and ultimately effect his salvation ?' True, but action and cessation therefrom are both observed in irrational objects ; whence it is said, [**As the secretion** &c.]

As the grass and water taken by a cow are converted into milk in order that the calf may be nourished, and cease, when it has become [sufficiently] strong, so Nature [acts spontaneously] for the liberation of Soul. Such is the activity of unintelligent beings.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] But how can there be activity in insentient Nature ? It is answered, **As the secretion**, &c. :

From observing the secretion of milk, &c., to be connected with the needs of nutrition and the like of a calf by affirmative and disjunctive concomitance, [we infer that] activity is not restricted to the sentient but may be accomplished by any [entity brought into being by] active destiny.¹ Therefore there is nothing to hinder the activity of insentient Nature for the emancipation of Soul ; this is the purport.

¹ Literally, ' the roused unseen,' that is, operative desert.

It should not be thought that the production of milk is due to the influence of God, and thus activity is confined to the sentient. Why so? Because God cannot be proved, and even if proved, in the absence of need there is nothing to urge the desire-fulfilled One [to action]. It is not to be supposed that [He does this] through compassion, for since pain is not possible for creatures before creation [itself], compassion in the form of desire for the suppression of pain is also not possible in Him. Therefore though insentient itself, it develops for a purpose, like milk and similar [unconscious objects].

ANNOTATIONS.

All activity is directed towards an end, there must be something that it is intended to effect. This reason or purpose of the action need not be a personal one. I may do a thing in order to effect some purpose either of my own or of a friend of mine. Similarly when Nature energises or evolves, it is not because she has some purpose of her own to serve, but because the end of Soul is to be effected.¹

It may be here asked, how can an unintelligent object act purposively? Kapila replies that this is nothing strange. The milk in the udder, for instance, comes of itself in order that the calf may have nutrition, and it ceases of itself when the calf has grown older

¹ Aphorism II. 1 tells us that the agency of Nature is for the sake either of emancipating the seemingly-bound Soul or removing the actually real pain which consists of itself.

and stands no longer in need of it.¹ Now, the milk is wholly unintelligent, and even the cow, though animate, does not bring an intelligent agency to bear upon its production when she supplies it. Thus there may be action exactly adapted to the accomplishment of a very definite end, but which is at the same time wholly spontaneous and almost mechanical.

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्तार्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।

पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तदद्वयकृतम् ॥ ५८ ॥

58. As people engage in works for the purpose of relieving desires,² so does the Unmanifested principle for the purpose of liberating Soul.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] What else ?

As men here being excited by desire engage in **works**, actions of various kinds, for its gratification, and desist when satisfied, so the Prime Cause desists, after accomplishing the two objects necessary for Soul's deliverance, *viz.*, [first], apprehension or experience of sound and other sense-objects, and [second], appreciation of the difference between Soul and the constituents.

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, II. 37 and III. 59.

² Davies has, "As people engage in acts that they make desires to cease," which is not very intelligible.

[NARĀYAṆA.] But activity is always seen to aim at some end, and Nature seems to have none, **As people,** &c. :

Eagerness, desire that this is fit to be enjoyed by me. To relieve this people engage in sexual and other pleasures, for the non-gratification of desire brings pain. And the desire ceases with the attainment of the object, so that is the end.

Similarly Nature, the unmanifested principle, being also led by the desire that the object of Soul should be effected by me, sets about to realise that end, [*viz.,*] the liberation of Soul. That desire does not cease till the object is gained and so long as it is unsatisfied there may be evil. Therefore the evolution is for the sake of another, as if for some purpose of its own. Enough.

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते¹ प्रकृतिः ॥५८॥

59. As a dancer, having exhibited herself on the stage, desists from the dance, so does Nature cease, when she has manifested herself to Soul.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] And what else ?

As a dancer, having acted her part by representing on the stage plays, founded on history and tradition, and giving expression to love and other passions, and accom-

¹ The usual reading is निवर्तते.

panied by songs, music and dances, desists from her dance, so too does Nature desist, after she has exhibited herself to Soul in the various forms of intellect, egoism the rudiments, the organs, and the gross elements.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Let the activity of Nature be thus ; when does it cease ? and when is the emancipation of Soul accomplished ? In reply it is said, **As a dancer,** &c.

The word **stage** here means the stagers. As a dancer, self-satisfied, full of dalliance and of wanton and playful gestures, and decked with various ornaments, having exhibited herself with songs and dances to the spectators on the stage, ceases,---she has then accomplished her end and received largesses, and thinks "I have been seen by them" ; so Nature also ceases, after having shown herself to Soul in the modes of Intellect &c., ending in joy and sorrow, and having produced the knowledge discriminating between 'you' and 'I.' Nature [then] moves away, and Soul, from which she has thus receded, attains salvation.

ANNOTATIONS.

In these and the following two verses Kapila proceeds to illustrate further his thesis of the disinterested energising of Nature for the sake of Soul. Nature's activity is mechanical, but is purposive all the same. You may be led to suppose that action on the part of an unintelligent object must be aimless and uncertain. But in this case it is not so. Whence is this accurate adaptability of means to end Kapila does not stop to enquire. The very method in Nature's activity, the rationality that pervades it all, proves that Reason is at the helm, that

there is an intelligent designer who directs. Patanjali, not without reason, thought there was a hiatus in the original doctrine at this point, and he added the supreme category of God. Kapila, however, thought fit to follow out the law of parcimony more strictly. He saw arrangements around him, seemingly rational, but in which no intelligence apparently supervened. He found there was such a thing as instinctive action. When matters could be otherwise explained he considered—and considered rightly—that it was fallacious and imprudent to invoke the aid of *Deus ex machina*.

Since Nature evolves for a certain end, there would naturally be a period to her activity when that end is accomplished. When the cooking is completed, the labour of the cook ceases ;¹ when a dancer has exhibited her performance to the spectators, she desists.² Similarly the non-ego undergoes no further modifications after the ego has attained to discriminative knowledge.

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।

गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति³ ॥६०॥

60. Nature, generous and endowed with the 'qualities,' accomplishes by manifold means, and without benefit [to herself], the

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 63.

² *Ibid.*, III. 69.

³ Gauḍapāda, according to Wilson, reads कुरुते.

purpose of Soul, [which is] thankless and uncomposed of the constituents.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] It is next explained why and for what cause is such cessation.

By manifold means. Nature is the **benefactress** of soul, **ungrateful** Soul. How? In the characters of gods, men, and animals, by conditions involving pain, pleasure and insensibility, and by the properties of sound and other sense-objects. Having in this way by manifold means exhibited herself to Soul [and made it manifest] that 'I am one, thou art another,' [Nature] desists.

Thus she **accomplishes the object** of the eternal Soul, **without benefit** [to herself]. As a benevolent person works for the good of every body and seeks no return for himself, so Nature effects the object of Soul without [thereby securing] any advantage [for herself].¹

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] 'But activity for the sake of another is seen to take place with a view to recompense; Nature, however, obtains no benefit in return from Soul.' To this it is replied, **Nature, generous, &c. :**

Nature, **endowed with the 'qualities,'** therefore **generous,** benefiting Soul, the spectator, which is **not composed of the constituents,** inasmuch as existent and having intelligence for its nature; and so is **thankless,** incapable of conferring benefits.

And having no purpose of its own, does [she],

¹ I have again split up what Paṇḍit Bechanarāma prints as the last sentence of the commentary, and transferred a portion of it to the introduction to the next verse.

by manifold means, [*viz.*,] intellect, egoism, the senses, mind, &c., 'accomplish or effect the object of [Soul].

This is the character of the virtuous that they confer favours without having received any themselves. 'Consequently it is not the rule that activity for the sake of another is with a view to profit,¹ for there is an exception. No need to expatiate.

ANNOTATIONS.

This verse disposes of a second objection that may be brought against the theory of Nature's energising for the sake of Soul. It is not shown that Nature receives any recompense for effecting the purpose of Soul. Why should then she do it?

True, Nature receives no recompense. In fact, it is not in the power of Soul to offer any. The constitution of Soul is essentially different from that of Nature, the three factors of goodness, passion and darkness are absent there. Consequently Soul is devoid of action and can confer no benefits. But this fact alone does not negative Nature's activity as suggested. Kapila again appeals to experience. In the world you will find many men who do good work out of native benevolence, and expect no return. Why should not Nature belong to that category?

¹ 'परार्थ' प्रत्युपकारसंबन्धेनैव प्रवृत्तिरिति न नियमः, which Wilson strangely translates, "it is not true generosity to do good to another with the expectation of requital." (p. 171.)

प्रकृतेः^१ सुकमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टास्तीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपेति पुरुषस्य ॥६१॥

61. My opinion is that nothing exists more bashful² than Nature, who knowing that 'I have been seen' does not appear again before Soul.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] It was said before that "having exhibited herself Nature ceases" [verse 60]; it is now explained what she does on desisting.

There is nothing in the world more **modest** than Nature, this is my opinion; since her mind thus consults another's advantage. Wherefore Nature [saying] 'I have been seen by that Soul,' does not again expose herself to his gaze, disappears from his presence, in fact. This explains "modest."

Some assign God as the [universal] cause: "The ignorant brute, having no control over its own pleasure or pain, goes to Heaven or Hell, as directed by God." Others speak of spontaneity as the cause: "Who made the swan white, the peacock many-hued? They are by nature³ so." On this point the Sāṅkhya teachers say, "How can a creation, characterised by the presence of the [three] constituents, proceed from God, in

¹ Lassen misprints प्रकृति; and translates accordingly.

² Literally, more soft or tender, hence modest. Colebrooke renders "gentle." Gauḍapāda paraphrases सुभीक्यतरं, 'better fitted for experience' ('more plastic' as Wilson suggests), and launches into a rather out-of-the-way discussion about the first cause.

³ That is, spontaneously.

whom they are absent? How again from Soul, which is also not made of the constitutives? These [considerations] render [the causality] of Nature probable. As from white threads, white cloth is made, from black black, so from Nature, compounded of the three factors, the three worlds, similarly constituted, proceed; this is the inference. God is not made of the constituents, the origination therefrom of worlds so constituted is therefore a [logical] inconsistency. This applies [also] to Soul. Some, again, [make] Time the [first] cause,¹ [for] it has been said, "Time matures the elements, time destroys the world, time watches when [all] things sleep; indeed Time it is difficult to overcome." There are [but] three categories, the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and Soul; time is included in one of these. It is a manifested principle, and has for its origin Nature, since that is the universal cause; spontaneity also merges thereinto; wherefore neither time nor spontaneity is the cause,² but Nature alone, [and] of Nature there is no other cause.³

She does not appear before soul again. Therefore my opinion is that there is no cause more gentle, more plastic than Nature, like God and the rest. This is apparent from the verse.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] 'Let this be so. [But] an actress, who, after having shown her dance to the stage-goers and received reward, ceases, may [be seen to] engage

¹ See, among others *Mahābhārata*, *S'ānti Parva*, XXV, XXXIV.

² Cf. commentary on verse 27 *ante*.

³ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, VI. 32-5.

again [in it] through curiosity. Similarly the Prime Agent too, having exhibited herself to Soul and ceased from knowledge, may evolve again.' To meet this it is said, **My opinion** &c. :

More bashful or modest. 'I have been seen,' thinking this she does not appear again before Soul, does not become an object of sight. As a youthful and virtuous lady of family, having been seen secretly or while going by a man at the door, blushes with modest shame and quickly moves away,—she disappears from the gaze of the stranger feeling 'I have been seen by him'; so Nature, when seen with the eye of knowledge by the stranger Soul, feels abashed like the matron and does not expose herself again to his view. It is only when discriminative knowledge [has been attained by Soul] that there is an obstruction to [further] evolution on the part of [Nature]; such is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

With the effectuation of Soul's liberation Nature desists, and there is no further evolution of the Object so far as that particular Soul is concerned. When once experience is complete and the character of the non-ego is fully understood by the Subject, Nature's occupation is gone and it appears not again to disturb the equanimity of Soul. Nature thus disappearing is compared with a lady of good family. A virtuous matron will naturally feel abashed in the presence of a stranger, and if she has ever been surprised by him in *dishabille* she will take all the more care to keep out of his sight. A feeling of shame again may produce the same result as one of modesty. As the Aphorist suggests, if a

woman of family has some faults, a consciousness that those faults have been discovered will also serve to keep her away.¹ Nature is a great offender with respect to Soul, for it is to her that the distress of migration, &c., is due.

It has been observed that these verses are not "in strict harmony with other parts of the Sāṅkhya philosophy" inasmuch as they seem to endow Nature "with all the qualities that belong to thinking and self-conscious mind."² Íśvara Kṛishṇa, of course, does not profess to do anything more than illustrating popularly the relations between Nature and Soul. The line that has to be drawn, however, between the genuine consciousness of Soul and the fictitious reflection thereof on modes of Nature is rather fine, and the personification here may possibly have gone a risky length.

तस्मान्न बध्यते नापि^३ मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥६२॥

62. Wherefore not any [Soul] is bound, or is liberated, or migrates; it is Nature, which, in connection with various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 70.

² Davies, *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 95.

³ Some copies of Vāchaspati's text have बध्यतेऽसौ न, others बध्यतेऽहं न.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] On being pressed that the Soul is liberated, that it migrates, [the author] says :

The reason why the soul is neither bound, nor liberated, nor does it migrate is because **Nature alone, with various receptacles**, [that is], in connection with divine, human and animal forms, and in the character of intellect, egoism, the rudiments, the organs, and the elements, is bound, liberated, and migrates. Soul is by its very nature unbound and ubiquitous ; why [then] should it migrate? [For] migration is for the purpose of attaining what has not been [previously] obtained. 'The soul is bound,' 'the soul is liberated,' 'the soul migrates' are mistaken descriptions due to connection with mundane existence.¹ The true nature of Soul is revealed when a knowledge of its otherness from Nature² is attained ; on such revelation it is seen to be single, uncontaminated, free from bonds, and resting firmly in its own nature. Now, if there is no bondage for soul, nor is there any liberation. Hence it is said, "Nature alone binds and liberates herself" [verse 63], for where the subtle body, composed of the rudiments and possessing a triple constitution, exists, it is bound by three-fold bonds ; as is said, "He, who is bound by natural, modified or personal bondage, can be

¹ तेन पुरुषो बध्यते इति व्यपदिश्यते येन संसारित्वं विद्यते. Wilson translates, "the phrases originate in ignorance of the nature of migration." (He also prints न विद्यते.)

² Wilson's MS. had सत्त्वपुरुषान्नज्ञानात् for सत्त्वपुरुषान्नज्ञानात्. He accordingly translates, "from knowledge, the end of soul and existence, the real nature of soul is attained." सत्त्व = creation.

released by no other means.”¹ This subtle body is affected by virtue and vice.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Let this be so ; but if soul be without modes and modifications, how can there be bondage for it in the shape of pleasure and pain ? nor can there be liberation for it, since bondage and emancipation must have a common subject. Thus “with the purpose of soul’s liberation” is a meaningless phrase. On the pretence of concluding [the author] removes this doubt, **Wherefore, &c. :**

In reality Soul, being without union, is free of bondage and liberation ; so it is said in the *Śruti* : “ There is no destruction [for it] and no origin ; [it] is neither bound nor active, nor desirous of salvation, nor liberated ; this is the truth.”* Such is the sense.

How then does it seem bound and so forth ? The reply is, **It is Nature, &c.** It is Nature which, as the resting-place of various souls, seems so on account of intellect and the other modes. Thus bondage and the rest are attributed to Soul owing to connection with consciousness in which it resides, and not because they are there too. This is the meaning.

ANNOTATIONS.

It was said that Nature acts to effect the purpose of Soul. But it has been authoritatively laid down that nothing adheres to Soul,² that it is wholly void of quali-

¹ See Commentary on verse 44 *ante*.

* *Amṛitabindu Upanishad*, 5, 10.

² *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, 4. 3. 16.

ties. How can then there be any purpose of Soul to effect? how can it get bound at all?

There is great force in this objection, that Kapila has to admit. Soul essentially is free. It acts not; how can it then undergo change? Bondage is the consequence of past misdeeds, it belongs not therefore to what is devoid of action altogether. And what is not bound cannot be set free. Therefore it is quite clear that neither bondage nor liberation really belongs to Soul, that in truth the transcendental Ego is ever clear of both conditions.¹

What do we then mean when we speak of the soul being bound or liberated? The explanation is to be found in the fact that an *essential* absence of the conditions will not necessarily exclude a reflectional attribution of them. A crystal, for instance, is white, but when it is placed near a China rose and the flower is seen athwart it, the hue of the crystal seems also changed. The flower lends its colour to the vase, but there is no actual alteration,—remove the rose and the original colour is restored. The redness that was induced by the proximity of the flower was only a reflected tinge.² The case of the soul is similar to this. Bondage and liberation belong to Nature alone, because to it, in truth, belongs misery.³ The various conditions that cause pain are, as we have seen, conditions of intellect. But this intellect itself is an evolute of Nature and so formed of the three factors which constitute the latter. It is to

¹ *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, I. 160.

² *Ibid.*, VI. 28. Cf. also I. 19, with Vijnána's exegesis.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 71-2

our personality, therefore, as existent in this world of sense, that either bondage or liberation can with any truth be attributed. It is the subtle sheath that invests the soul and makes it 'Me,' which is subject to the bond of work and which migrates. And if people are led to ascribe bondage or action or liberation to the essence of soul, it is because they fail to discriminate between the transcendental and the empirical Ego. Such expressions are to be understood in a strictly relative sense.

But if Soul be really free, what purpose of it is to be effected by experience? There is a purpose, Soul must recognise itself as free. Any obstacle that impedes such recognition must be removed.¹ Until the obscuring mist of non-discrimination has been dissipated and the soul has attained to a luminous insight into its own nature there is no beatitude for it, no blissful state of eternal calm. And, as has been explained, Soul cannot fully know what it is until and unless it clearly understands what it is not.

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रल्लतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

63. By seven modes does Nature bind herself by herself, and by one mode does she free herself² for the benefit of Soul.

¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, VI. 20, "Liberation is nothing other than the removal of the impediments."

² Davies prefers to translate, "she causes deliverance."

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] How is the Prime Cause bound and liberated, and how does it migrate are [next] explained.

By seven modes : the [following] are said to be the seven, virtue, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion and weakness ; these are the seven forms of Nature by means of which she binds herself ; **by herself**, of her own accord. The same Primal Agent, [recognising the performance of] Soul's object to be obligatory, by the **one mode** of knowledge, liberates herself.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Well, it has been said that the bondage of pleasure or pain is attributed to soul through connection with Nature. [But] how does the latter bind or liberate ? [The author] replies, **By seven modes**, &c. :

With reference to [one] object of Soul, [*viz.*,] experience, it binds Soul¹ **by herself**, [that is], in the form of consciousness, **by seven modes**, [*viz.*,] virtue, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion and weakness ; with reference to the [other] object, [*viz.*,] liberation, characterised by repose in itself, it frees by one mode, [*viz.*,] knowledge, [it] releases [Soul] from migration. This shows that [even] in the absence of asceticism and dispassion, knowledge can bring about salvation. So it is said in the *Vedānta*, "On the acquisition of perfect knowledge and on the restriction (or cessation) of the two [asceticism and dispassion], liberation is surely attained ; but obvious pain ceases not." *The two*, that is, asceticism and dispassion ; *obvious pain*, *viz.*, that attendant upon obvious actions. Of dispassion in the shape of rejection of objects of sense, the result is not salvation but only absence of han-

¹ Wilson states, "*ātman* is here uniformly explained by *swa*, 'own self'." But Nārāyaṇa gives पुरुष as the synonym.

After those objects, the associated evils having been seen; similarly of asceticism in the form of control of intellect, which may be effected by restraint, &c., the result is non-perception of duality and not emancipation. For the *Śrutis* lay down that that is attainable by knowledge alone. Enough.

ANNOTATIONS.

Nature binds and liberates herself. But how does she do it? She binds herself by herself, that is, she undergoes modifications and thereby forges bonds for her own self. The Aphorist¹ adds an illustration: "like the silk-worm." As the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs, so Nature, through consociation, gets herself enmeshed in the seven habits of virtue and vice, dispassion and passion, power and weakness, and ignorance, which are the several affections of an evolute of her own self.

There is, however, only one way of escape. Since the ultimate cause of bondage in every case is delusion, non-discrimination, the precise and effective cause of liberation is knowledge and knowledge alone. It has no associate and no alternative.²

¹ III. 73, Ballantyne, p. 275.

² *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 25. Cf. *S'vetās'vatara Upanishad*, 3. 8: "I know that mighty being of sun-like lustre beyond darkness. Only by knowing him does one transcend death; there is no other path to go."

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि^१ न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययादिशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥६४॥

64. So by a study of the principles is the final, incontrovertible and only one^२ knowledge attained that I am not, naught is mine, and the ego exists not.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] How does that knowledge originate ?

So, in the order specified, **by a study of the** twenty-five **principles**, a knowledge of Soul, [that is, discriminative knowledge] that this is Nature, that Soul, and these are the rudiments, sense-organs, and elements, is attained. **I am not**, [that is,] I do not exist ; **nor is mine**, [*scilicet*] my body, because I am one and the body another ; **nor is there an ego**.

[Thus], **complete, incontrovertible**, [that is], pure of (or free from) doubt ; **single**, unique, there being no other [true knowledge] ; liberation-causing [knowledge] is produced or made manifest. **Knowledge** is of the twenty-five principles and is possessed by Soul.^३

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] Let isolation (or beatitude) be by knowledge, but whence is it, and of what form ? Hence it is said, **So by a study, &c.** :

By means of the study already described which brings about a cognition of Soul, by continued meditation

^१ Wilson misprints नास्मि.

^२ Davies renders 'absolute or 'abstract.'

^३ पदसंज्ञेति, "or of Soul" (Wilson).

and reflection, arises the **one** knowledge [or] intuition which makes [us], acquainted only with self ; such is the import. It is by the mind aided by meditation that the knowledge of self without an alternative is gained, [and] not by testimony or inference, for, it is implied, that these are not competent thereto. As is said by the sage Patanjali in his cognate (philosophical) work, "Knowledge that embraces the (supreme) Truth is different from knowledge derived from testimony and inference, because it has a distinct object."

The form is next described, **I am not**, &c. : that is, I am not the agent, this shows that I am distinct from Intellect ; **nor is mine**, *scilicet* pain, this implies that pain and the like are not to be attributed [to Soul] ; **the ego is not**, this indicates the contrary of egotism.

Complete, which has no other end. So it is said in the *Yoga Sûtras*, "knowledge thereof is finally seven-fold." **Pure** from negating doubt, authoritative. capable of exterminating the impression of untrue knowledge. Such cognition, productive of an intuition of self is described as a knowledge of principles. This is the sense.

ANNOTATIONS.

Liberation, we have seen, is to be attained by means of knowledge. This knowledge is now described under three heads.

1. How is this knowledge acquired ? By a study of the principles. Nature in all its forms is to be continually observed and meditated upon, and so is Soul ; when by repeated consideration we have thoroughly mas-

tered the difference between the two, we shall have risen to the knowledge required, the knowledge of truth.

2. What is the character of this knowledge? It is

(a) *final* or *ultimate*, there is nothing beyond it, and it embraces all that has gone before :

(b) *conclusive*, its authority is beyond controversy, there is nothing that is doubtful or uncertain or questionable about it ;

(c) *unique* or *absolute*, there is nothing else like it, it is the one thing needful, as it were.

3. What is the form of this knowledge? It consists in an emphatic assertion that Soul is not what it seems, that the ego is distinct from the non-ego, that all personal states lack ultimate truth. I speak of *my* action, *my* property, *my* states. This is a mistake, an illusion. To the transcendental ego, which is the true Soul, belongs no agency or property or egotistic affections. This is generally expressed by saying " Not so ", " Not so,"¹ that is, Soul is other than Nature ; and the Aphorist adopts this form². Iśvara Kṛishṇa, however, uses other terms to explain the form of the saving knowledge. They are नास्ति, न मे, नाहं. In the first, the emphasis is on the verb—'there is no activity ;' in the second, the emphasis is on *mine*—'there is no mastership, no individual property :' in the third, the emphasis is on *ego*,—'there is no individuality.' Vijnāna³ puts the point thus, "*I am not* denies the agency of Soul ; *naught is mine* denies its attachment [to any object] ; *the ego*

¹ Cf., e. g., *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, 2. 3. 6.

² *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 76.

³ *Ibid.*, *Bhāshya*.

exists not denies its appropriation [of faculties]." It is obvious that the personality which is here denied is the personality of the empirical ego. M. Cousin was wholly wrong when he supposed that this verse declared for "an absolute nihilism, the last fruit of scepticism." If there was one thing which Kapila was more solicitous to enforce than another it was the reality of Soul, self-existent from all time and for all time. The old Hindu was too clear-headed a thinker to preach anything so suicidal as what the French philosopher suggests.

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सत्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।

प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वस्थः^२ ॥६५॥

65. With this [knowledge] Soul, unmoved and self-collected,³ as a spectator, contemplates Nature, who has ceased from production [and] consequently reverted from the seven forms [to her original state].

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] What does Soul after having acquired knowledge?

With this pure and unique knowledge Soul beholds Nature like a spectator, **unmoved** and **calm**; just as

¹ Davies renders, "because the capacity (or desire) of producing has now ceased," and explains *vas'a* (?) as capacity.

² Wilson reads सुस्थः.

³ "At leisure and at ease" (Colebrooke).

seated in a theatre a spectator beholds an actress, **composed**, collected in self [and] abiding in his own place.¹

Nature of what description? Who has **ceased from production**, desisted from evolution [in the forms] of intellect, egoism, and the rest. **Consequently reverted from the seven forms**: sees Nature who, owing to the accomplishment of both the objects of Soul, has reverted from the seven forms, [*viz.*] virtue and the rest, by means of which she binds herself

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] What does Soul after attaining a knowledge of principles? It is replied, **with this**, &c. :

Possessed of the knowledge before mentioned² Soul looks at Nature, **self-collected like a spectator**, when the Primal Agent, having produced effects which cause experience and perception of difference, has ceased therefrom. As a spectator on the stage beholds, unmoved and unaffected, a dancer who is singing and dancing, so Soul too contemplates Nature in those productive stages. This Primal Evolvent by its own attributes binds Soul and [then] releases it.

ANNOTATIONS.

When Soul has attained to discriminative knowledge, it has gained its end, and any unrest that may previously have been fancied to be there has departed from it. The

¹ That is, unmoved or unagitated.

² It is doubtful if Nārāyaṇa does not rather connect तेन with the next word. The sense then would be, 'which has ceased from production because of this knowledge [having been attained by Soul]'

end of Nature has also been gained, because this end was Soul's fruition. There is no inducement then left to set Nature evolving again, there is no occasion for it. In presence of this particular Soul Nature undergoes no further modifications, and, what is more, the existent modifications are re-absorbed into the world-stuff. Both the principles continue to exist, but apart from one another, isolated and independent. This is further illustrated in the following verse.

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमत्यन्या¹ ।

सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥६६॥

66. The one disregards because 'I have seen;' the other desists because 'I have been seen;' [and] notwithstanding their conjunction² there is no occasion for [further] evolution.

[GAUDAPĀDA.] What else?

One, [viz.,] Soul, which is single and pure, [is] regardless,³ like a spectator at a play. 'I have

¹ Gaudapāda reads रंगस्य इत्युपेक्षक एको दृष्टाहमित्युपरमैका ।

² St. Hilaire translates, "And though a union between the two may subsist again." This is rather loose, as it may suggest that even after Soul and Nature have separated a union between them like what subsisted before may take place again. That cannot be.

³ Unobservant, devoid of interest.

been seen by him,' knowing this [Nature] ceases to act. Nature is the **one**, the principal cause of even the three worlds, there is no second; since destruction of the [one] form will lead to specific differences. Thus though Nature and Soul have desisted, yet through their pervasiveness there is conjunction; but from [this mere] conjunction proceeds no creation.¹

There being conjunction of the two: juxtaposition of Nature and Soul, on account of their universal diffusion, **there is no motive² for creation** or production, because of fruition [of objects]. The necessity for Nature is two-fold: perception of sound and other sense-objects, and appreciation of difference between Soul and the constitutive powers; both having been accomplished, there is no occasion for evolution, for further production. As after a settlement of accounts between a debtor and a creditor due to acceptance of payment, their coming together does not [again] bring about any pecuniary relation;³ so there is no further occasion [for creation] in the case of Nature and Soul.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] 'But since there is a constant conjunction of Nature and Soul, why does the former cease

¹ मूर्तिवधे जातिभेदात्, एव प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्निवृत्तावपि व्यापकत्वात् संयोगोऽस्ति न तु संयोगात्, कृतः सर्गो भवति. The passage is rather obscure. Wilson, who omits the comma and reads कृतः for कृतः, translates, "Although form have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in the cessation of (the co-operation of) nature and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence is creation?"

² That is, nothing to occasion or stimulate Nature's activity; no intelligence is implied.

³ अर्थसंबन्धः, which Wilson renders, "connection of object."

[from production]? To [meet] this [objection] it is said, **The one**, &c.:

Notwithstanding their conjunction, there is nothing that urges to creation, no **occasion** or concomitant cause thereof; therefore among them **the other**, [*viz.*,] Nature, **desists**, [that is], leaves off creating; this is the construction. And why is there no [creation]? It is replied, **the one disregards**, &c. Among them **one**, [*viz.*,] soul, **disregards**, beholds without interest, knowing "I have seen Nature, which is different from me and [yet] by contact binds me;" any prompting towards further experience becomes extinct [in it], as in a spectator who has seen the dancer. This is because of Nature's evolution the concomitant cause is the non-apprehension by Soul of the different character of the world-stuff; when this is seen that [cause] ceases to operate; such is the meaning.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमाद्धर्मादोनामकारणप्राप्ते ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशाच्चक्रभ्रमिवद्भुतशरीरः^१ ॥ ६७ ॥

67. The attainment of adequate knowledge renders virtue and the rest inoperative;² [Soul, however,] like a wheel revolving from the effect of [previously-received] impulse, remains [for a while] invested with a frame.

¹ Gauḍapáda reads चक्रभ्रमवत्^०:

² Mr. Davies says, "The lit. translation is, 'By the attainment of complete knowledge, virtue and the rest have become a name-

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] 'If upon attainment of knowledge a soul's liberation follows, why does not mine [at once] take place?' The answer is [now given].

Though a knowledge of the twenty-five principles has been attained, yet from the effect of previous impulse, the holy man, clothed with flesh, stays. How? **Like the whirling of a wheel**, similar to it; as a potter, having set his wheel whirling, places a lump of clay upon it and makes a pot and thereafter takes it off, leaving the wheel to revolve, **from the force of previous impulse**.

In this way **from the attainment of perfect knowledge**, upon one possessing such knowledge, **virtue and the rest cease to operate as causes**. The seven forms of fetters are consumed by adequate knowledge; as seeds scorched by fire are incapable of germinating, so these, virtue, &c., are incompetent to bind [Soul].

Virtue and the rest having become defunct as causes, body continues through the force of previous impulse. Why does not the destruction of present virtue and vice follow from knowledge? Because [they are] present; [but] they shall perish in a moment. Knowledge, moreover, destroys future acts as also what is done in the present body by observing established rites.¹ With the

cause (nāmakāraṇa),' i. e., a cause only in name " One should have thought this was only a (? philological) joke, but the learned critic goes on quite seriously to add, "cf. *nāmayajna* (name-sacrifice), a false or hypocritical sacrifice." (!) The euphonic coalition is, of course, to be resolved thus: धर्मादीनाम् अकारणप्राप्तौ.

¹ Gauḍapāda seems to be referring to pious observances instituted by emancipated sages.

cessation of the impulse and [consequent] destruction of the body, liberation takes place.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] ‘But the text in the *Śruti*,¹ “Of him who has beheld the all-pervasive [Spirit] the heart-strings crack, all doubts are resolved, and [the effects of] works fail,” indicates that on liberation consequent upon the attainment of a knowledge of principles, [there is] a destruction of the body with the failure of all effects. How can then Nature be seen, for to knowledge a frame is necessary?’ The reply is, **The attainment**, &c. :

Adequate knowledge, that which is capable of destroying false knowledge. **By the rise** or origination of that, **virtue and the rest**, of conditions different from those which originate the body, accumulated and in the process of acquisition, [are reduced to] the condition of burnt seeds. As before demonstrated, [they are] by discriminative knowledge rendered inoperative, incapable of producing the due results in their proper state. Through the influence of **impulse**, the invisible force bringing body into being, the existent frame remains, as the revolution of the wheel ceases not through inertia even when the potter’s work has ended. What has been begun is destructible only by fruition.² Therefore it is said in the *Śruti*,³ “The delay is only so long as liberation is not attained, then we merge in the Supreme Spirit.” So by lord Vyāsa also in the *Vedānta*, “others reducing it by experience.” ‘On acquisition

¹ *Muṇḍaka Upanishad*, 2. 2. 8.

² That is, Destiny must work itself out.

³ Cf. *Chhândogya Upanishad*, 6. 14. 2.

of a knowledge of principles there is a destruction of effects:’ here on the removal of the prior privation of such knowledge the non-production of the results at first is alone meant, and not the destruction of the body also. This is the substance.

ANNOTATIONS.

How is it that liberation does not follow as soon as discriminative knowledge has been attained? We hear of liberation during life,¹ the Scriptures tell us about spiritual sages,² and we see preceptors instructing about truth that they must have learnt by discrimination.³ How comes it that they still retain their physical frames, that they have not yet been relieved of the bonds of flesh? It is owing to the force of previous impressions. The effects of the acts that they performed on anterior occasions have not yet been thoroughly exhausted, and so long as the least vestige of impression remains, the minutest relics of those impressions of objects which are the causes of having a body, the body cannot perish.⁴ Kapila makes his meaning clear by an illustration.⁵ He compares the accumulated force, yet unconsumed, of antecedent acts to the motal inertia which keeps a wheel revolving even after the force that set it in motion has been withdrawn. When the all-important knowledge has been gained, actions do not arise, and if any seem to be undertaken their results are prevented.

¹ Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, III. 78.

² *Ibid.*, I. 157.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 79.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III. 83.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III. 82.

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।

ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

68. When owing to gratification of ends,¹ [its] separation from the body takes place and Nature ceases to act, [Soul] obtains both absolute and final isolation.

[GAUḌAPĀDA.] What is liberation is next specified.

On the destruction of the effects of virtue and vice,² and Nature having ceased, **absolute**, certain, and **final**, unimpeded, **isolation**, emancipation through abstraction ;³ [that is], Soul obtains liberation, which is both absolute and final.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] 'But if [Soul] stays even after a knowledge of principles has arisen, when does it attain liberation?' It is replied, **When owing to gratification**, &c. :

When **separation from the body** or its destruction takes place through exhaustion of destiny,⁴ [and when] **because of fulfilment**, [that is], satisfaction

¹ Mr. Davies renders, "because her (Nature's) purpose has been accomplished." Colebrooke takes no notice of the word unless it be in the phrase "the informed soul."

² A comparison with Wilson's edition shows that the words प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् have here dropt out from Paṇḍit Bechanārāma's reprint.

³ कैवल्य, solitariness, a state of being alone and free, detached from the non-soul.

⁴ Or desert, the two being practically synonymous in Hindu Philosophy.

of the needs of experience and liberation by means of intellect and the rest, **Nature ceases to act**, with reference to Soul. With the death of the body¹ [Soul] attains **isolation** [or] freedom from pain marked by two qualities. The two are named : **final**, certain, **absolute**, characterised by an absence of the regeneration of the genus pain. The isolation is **two-fold**, because of these qualities. The substance of the whole is that a person who has envisaged the ego and whose infinite impurities have been consumed by experience through exhaustion of destiny, obtains true, certain and absolute freedom from pain.

ANNOTATIONS.

This verse takes us back to the first, and closes the investigation that was started by that. The enquiry proposed there was one into the means of absolute and final emancipation from pain. This, we have been shown, consists in a discriminative knowledge of the twenty-five categories. When the Soul has attained to that, Nature loses all the hold that it seemed to have got over it, and it becomes possible for the former to shuffle off the mortal coil completely and for ever. There is a period to mundane existence, and the Soul that knows itself as other than Nature does not come again, does not come again.²

¹ Lit., 'the mark of absence of union (between Soul and Nature).'

² Cf. *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*, VI. 17, with comments (Ballantyne, p. 429, Garbe, p. 275).

पुरुषार्थं ज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समा ख्यातम् ।

स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्तयन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥६८॥

69. This abstruse knowledge, which is for the benefit of Soul, and in which the origin, production and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great sage.

[GAUDAPÁDA.] **Soul's purpose** is liberation ; for that object this knowledge, **abstruse**, mysterious, has been thoroughly expounded by **the great sage**, the saintly Kapila. **Wherein**, in which knowledge, **the origin, production and dissolution**, [that is], existence, appearance and disappearance, **of beings**, of the modes [of Nature], are **considered** or discussed. From an investigation of which adequate knowledge, which consists in a cognition of the twenty-five principles, springs.

Upon the Sāṅkhya doctrines expounded by the sage Kapila for securing release from migration, and of which these are the seventy verses, this is the gloss composed by Gaudapáda.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] For the assurance of the wise it is said, **This abstruse knowledge**, &c. :

The knowledge which effects **Soul's benefit** or purpose, *viz.*, final beatitude, and [which is] **abstruse**, not intelligible to the many, has been expounded by the great sage Kapila.

Yatra (where) is a locative of purpose, the sense being, in order to acquire which knowledge.

ANNOTATIONS.

With this verse Gauḍapāda's commentary ends. It is, however, added that there are *seventy* verses in all in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. The ordinarily received editions all give 72. It is difficult to decide which, if any, of the remaining three verses are spurious. None of them is of much consequence. It is traced how the Sāṅkhya doctrine originated, and through whom it was transmitted to the author of these memorial verses. The number of these is fixed by tradition as seventy and even the present verse 72 states as much. That verse, at any rate, seems wholly superfluous. But there is not much profit in trying to guess (for we have got no data to go upon) which other distich should be eliminated.

एतत् पवित्रमग्रं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
 आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्मम् ॥७०॥

70. This, the first of purifying doctrines, the sage imparted to A'suri out of compassion ; and A'suri [taught it] to Panchas'ikha, by whom it was extensively made known.

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] It is next traced how the knowledge of principles expounded by the sage has descended, **This, the first, &c. :**

Pure, sacred ; **first**, chief of all holy [sciences]. **The sage**, Kapila, **gave** or imparted to Asuri out of

compassion. He again explained it to Panchaśikha, who made it known extensively by instruction to disciples. This is the sense.

ग्रिथ्यपरंपरयागतमोश्वरक्षणेन चैतदार्याभिः ।

संचित्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग् विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥७१॥

71. Received from a succession of disciples, it was compendiously composed in *A'rya'* metre by the pious-minded I's'vara-Krishna, who had adequately learnt the demonstrated truth.

[NÁRÁYAṆA.] Did I'svara Kṛishṇa receive it directly? It is replied, **Received from**, &c. :

Aryá is the name of a metre ; a poem composed in that is also called an *áryá*. In the said ÁRYÁ. How? After having learnt the demonstrated truth by adequate study and meditation.

सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।

आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताद्यापि ॥७२॥¹

72. The subjects dealt with in seventy stanzas comprise the whole [science] consist-

¹ After this verse follows an inscription which says, "Thus is completed the book *Sánkhya Káriká* [May] Prosperity [attend]!"

ing of sixty topics, excluding anecdotes as well as controversial matters.¹

[NĀRĀYAṆA.] It is next said that inasmuch as it indicates the meaning of the doctrine it is a scientific treatise, and not [merely] an introduction, The subjects, &c. :

Of the doctrine comprising sixty topics, [*viz.*,] Soul, Nature, &c., the whole meaning is expounded in the seventy *kārikās*. How? **Without the anecdotes**, exclusive of illustrative tales and the like. Also, **purged of controversy**, without reference to the six systems of philosophy. For instance, in the aphorisms of Kapila in six books, the fourth [contains] anecdotes [and] the fifth refutation of others' opinions; these are absent here, this is the Sense. In another work the sixty things are thus enumerated: "Soul, Nature, intellect, egoism, the three constitutive powers, the elemental rudiments, the sense-organs, and the gross elements, these are remem-

¹ The mention of the anecdotes and controversial matters here leads Prof. Wilson to think that "the *Kārikā* must consequently refer to the collection of Kapila's aphorisms, called *Sāṅkhya Pravachana*" (p. 192). It may be taken as settled now that *Sāṅkhya Pravachana* is not the original work of Kapila, and the probabilities are that its author borrowed from Iśvara Kṛishṇa rather than *vice versa*. But the question of the relation between the *Pravachana* and the *Kārikā* must be reserved for the present for consideration on some future occasion. The reference may here be to Panchasikha's work which is quoted from by Vyāsa in his *Pātanjala Bhāshya* (see I. 4 and II. 13), but which does not seem to be now extant.

bered as the ten radicals;¹ obstruction is five-fold, contemnt nine, disabilities of the instruments are believed to be twenty eight; these together with the eight perfections make up the sixty topics." Now, since here the sixty topics are discussed [and considered], this is not an introduction but a principal work; this has been demonstrated.

THE SÁÑKHYA-CHANDRIKÁ COMPOSED BY NÁRÁYAṆA
TÍRTHA, THE PUPIL OF ŚRÍ RÁMA GOVINDA
TÍRTHA, HAS REACHED COMPLETION.
MAY PROSPERITY ATTEND!

¹ The ten radicals are thus enumerated in the *Rāja-vārtika* :

प्रधानास्तत्त्वमेकत्वमथैवत्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थं च तथानैक्यं वियोगी योग एव च ॥

शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ॥

Addenda et Corrigenda.

Page XVIII	Line 32	insert	"interested action, for this led to" between "was" and "sin."
" XXVII	" 28	read	82 for 83.
" XXXII	" 24	add	"रजः, energy, is alone said to be active, but तमः is not without a negative sort of activity, it clogs and prevents change."
" XI.	headline	insert	"Notions" after "Fundamental."
" LI	Line 24	read	प्रकृत्यातु for प्रकृत्यातु
" 3 and			
all subse-			
quent odd	headline	"	Verse
pages		"	Sútra
" 5	Line 19	"	there
" "	" 30	"	विविदिषा
" 8	" 20	"	निवृत्ति
" 24	" 24	"	रूप
" 30	" 29	"	the
" 31	" 14	"	what was
" 33	" 23	"	intentio
" 37	" 30	"	form...is
" 58	" 31	add	"Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad, I. 4. 7."
" 73	" 18-25	omit	"The non-ego...knowledge."
" 107	9	read	पुरुषो for पुरुषो
" 110	" 25	"	therefore
" 125	" 14	"	conjunction
" 127	" 23	"	springs
" 129	" 12	"	parts
" 131	" 23	"	are
" "	" 29	"	अव्यक्तं

Page	Line	6	read	[and]	for	is
"	138	"	23	"	संकृप्	संकृप्
"	150	"	30	"	वाद्य	वाद्य
"	155	"	24	"	सङ्कल्पिते	सङ्कल्पिते
"	164	"	11	"	वाद्य	वाद्य
"	175	"	26	"	this.	his
"	184	"	27	"	Sāṅkhya	Sāṅkhya
"	210	"	29	"	of	o
"	213	"	23	"	subtle	subtles
"	"	"	24	"	enters	enter
"	220	"	10	"	perfection	perception
"	230	"	11	"	प्रकृत्यु	प्रकृत्यु
"	247	"	24	"	दैवं	दैवं
"	254	"	5	"	becomes	become
"	258	"	1	"	प्रवृत्ति	प्रवृत्ति
"	269	"	17	"	मुच्यते	मुच्यते
"	276	"	28	"	पुरुष	पुरुष
"	282	"	23	"	एवं	एवं
"	"	"	29	add	"We should probably translate, 'As generic differences [between Nature and Soul continue to] exist [even] after the cessation of the forms [of Nature with regard to a particular Soul]... there is conjunction.' The point that Gauḍapāda seeks to make seems to be that conjunction is owing to two reasons, <i>viz.</i> , (1) because of generic difference between Nature and Soul,—a destruction of any particular set of the modes of the former cannot abolish the fundamental distinction that subsists between the two primordial categories, and because	

there is this difference, because the two are not identical, संयोग is possible between them; (2) because Nature and Soul are pervasive entities, all connection between them, cannot be put an end to even when they have ceased to act, if we may say so, in union. Cause and effect being identical, Nature and her modes would but form one class."

Page 283	Line 25	read	वत्	for	वत्
" 285	" 17	insert	footnote upon "By the rise ... burnt seeds." "The idea is that the consequences of such merit and demerit as have already produced their effect by creating a particular body cannot be avoided. But the power of such merit and demerit as were acquired in previous lives but have not yet taken effect, and such as are being acquired in the present life may by virtue of तत्त्वज्ञान be arrested; thus sterilised they will not bear fruit, and therefore after the dissolution (in its due course) of the present body there will be no re-birth."		
" 287	" 1	read	विनिवृत्तौ	for	विनिवृत्तौ
" 292	" 16	"	enumerated		erumerated.

INDEX.

Acquiescence, 220, 223, 230, 232.

Activity, unselfish, 254, 264.

Adhyavāsāya, 33, 132.

Afflictions, five, 224, 227.

Agent, competency of, 53 ; limitations of, 97.

Airs, vital, 159.

Analogy, 35, 38.

Bed, composite, 108.

Bhūtādi, 142.

Body, 191, 283 ; subtle, 197, 202, 242, 251.

Categories, 11, 20, 25, 127.

Causation, xxxv, 53, 124 ; theories of, 60 *seq.*

Cause, prime, xxxi, 102, 104 ; and effect, 97.

Compound, for another, 107.

Constituents, xxxii, 75, 81, 85, 86, 102, 121, 153, 219, 249, *et passim*.

Counter-entity, 110.

Creation, xxvii, 126 ; intellectual, 219 ; elemental, 247, 249 ; sixteen-fold, 250.

Darkness, 81, 85 ; utter, 225.

Desert, 23, 256, 285.

Disability, 220, 223, 228.

Dispassion, 134, 137, 215.

Diversity, 102, 152.

Dualism, xxv ; Kapila's, xxviii.

Duties, 134.

'Dyes,' mental, 137.

Effect, and cause, 53, 97.

Egoism, 140, 142, 146, *et passim*.

Elements, 127, 142, 187 ; and rudiments, 129-130.

Energy, 97 ; conservation of, 65.

Entity, and non-entity, xlviii.

Epistemology, Kapila's, xxxviii ; Kant's, xli.

Ether, 21.

Evolution, xxxiii ; Sāṅkhya, 20, 127, 254.

Experience, xxvii, xxxvii, 261, 266, 281.

Experiencer, 107.

Factors, see *Constituents*.

Faculties, 162, 163.

Fate, 23, 256.

Force, 101.

Forces, three, xxxii, 81, 85.

Function, simultaneous and successive, 163.

Gloom, 225 ; extreme, 226.

God, xlvi, 101, 171, 256, 263, 266.

Goodness, 81, 85, *et passim*.

Homogeneity, 97.

Illusion, 225 ; extreme, 225.

Impulse, previous, 283.

Inference, 26, 33 ; Hindu theory of, 40.

Intellect, 132, 146, 182, 184, *et passim* ; injuries of, 228.

Isolation, 107, 113, 287 ; striving for, 107.

Kapila, 3, 289.

Karma, doctrine of, xvi, xliv, 245.

Knowledge, xix, xxiv, 134, 213, 274, 276, 281.

Liberation, xliii, 287, *et passim*.

Līṅgam 68, 123, 202, 206, 242.

Luck, 230.

Mahat, 139.

- Manifest, principles, 67, 75, *et passim*; and non-manifest, 73, 92.
 Means-contentment, 230.
 Mind, XXXIII, 150, *et passim*.
 Monism, XXV.
 Nature, XXX, 19, 91, 101, 102, 131, 266, *et passim*; and Soul, 124, 258, 260, 261, 263, 279, 281; bondage of, 269, 273; contentment, 230.
 Nerve-force, 163.
 Nihilism, 64.
 Non-entity, and entity, XLVIII.
 Non-existent, 53; non-existence, 28.
 Non-manifest, XXX.
 Object, XXIV.
 Objects, finite, 97; specific, 178.
 Obscurity, 225.
 Obstruction, 220, 223, 225.
 Organ, 173, 178, 181, 184; activity of, 168, 175.
 Pain, XXII, I *seq.* 251; remedies, 2 *seq.*
 Passion, 81, 85; 215.
 Perception, 26, 33, 163; failure of, 47.
 Perfection, 220, 223, 237.
 Philosophy, Hindu, XV *seq.*; problem of, XXVII.
 Power, eight-fold, 133, 137, 215; 58.
 Privation, 28, 110; prior, 7.
 Production, from energy, 58, 97; of existent, 53; no universal, 53.
 Proof, methods of, 26.
 Qualities, 87.
 Radicals, ten, 293.
 Reasoning, 27.
 Revelation, 17, 46.
 'Rudiment,' 202, 206.
 Rudiments, 127, 142, 187, *et passim*.
 Sacrifices, impure, 10 *seq.*
 Sāṅkhya, meaning of, I.; works, LII, 292.
 Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, analysed, LIII; history of, 291.
 Self-apperception, XL, 140, 142, *et passim*.
 Sense-organs, 148, 157, 159, 168, 178.
 Soul, activity of, 121, and Intellect, 185; immortality of, XV, 75; Kapila's conception of, XXIX, 19, 75, 118, 183, 251; liberation of, XX, 269, 281, 287; multitude of, XLV, 114; object of, 124, 255.
 Specific, and non-specific, 178, 187.
 Spontaneity, as First Cause, 152, 266.
 Subtle, body, 197, 202, 242, 251; principles, 127.
 Superintendence, 107.
 Syllogism, Hindu theory of, 42.
 Tanmātrā, 190.
 Tattvam, 128; *tattvavibhājakopādhi*, 22, 71.
 Testimony, 26, 33.
 Time, as First Cause, 267; contentment, 230.
 Topics, sixty, 292.
 Unmanifest, XXX, 68, 75, 92, 97, *et passim*.
 Universe, unity in, 97.
 Vice, 213.
 Virtue, 134, 213, 284, *et passim*.
 Winds, life, 159.
 Work, power of, XVI.
 World, of pain, XVIII. •

